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https://github.com/Sneed-Group/Poodletooth-iLand
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356 lines
12 KiB
Python
356 lines
12 KiB
Python
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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
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#
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# Signature/PKCS1_PSS.py : PKCS#1 PPS
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#
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# ===================================================================
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# The contents of this file are dedicated to the public domain. To
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# the extent that dedication to the public domain is not available,
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# everyone is granted a worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free,
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# non-exclusive license to exercise all rights associated with the
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# contents of this file for any purpose whatsoever.
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# No rights are reserved.
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#
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# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
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# EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
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# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
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# NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
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# BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
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# ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
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# CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
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# SOFTWARE.
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# ===================================================================
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"""RSA digital signature protocol with appendix according to PKCS#1 PSS.
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See RFC3447__ or the `original RSA Labs specification`__.
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This scheme is more properly called ``RSASSA-PSS``.
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For example, a sender may authenticate a message using SHA-1 and PSS like
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this:
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>>> from Crypto.Signature import PKCS1_PSS
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>>> from Crypto.Hash import SHA
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>>> from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA
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>>> from Crypto import Random
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>>>
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>>> message = 'To be signed'
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>>> key = RSA.importKey(open('privkey.der').read())
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>>> h = SHA.new()
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>>> h.update(message)
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>>> signer = PKCS1_PSS.new(key)
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>>> signature = PKCS1_PSS.sign(key)
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At the receiver side, verification can be done like using the public part of
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the RSA key:
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>>> key = RSA.importKey(open('pubkey.der').read())
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>>> h = SHA.new()
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>>> h.update(message)
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>>> verifier = PKCS1_PSS.new(key)
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>>> if verifier.verify(h, signature):
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>>> print "The signature is authentic."
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>>> else:
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>>> print "The signature is not authentic."
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:undocumented: __revision__, __package__
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.. __: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
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.. __: http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2125
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"""
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# Allow nested scopes in Python 2.1
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# See http://oreilly.com/pub/a/python/2001/04/19/pythonnews.html
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from __future__ import nested_scopes
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__revision__ = "$Id$"
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__all__ = [ 'new', 'PSS_SigScheme' ]
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from Crypto.Util.py3compat import *
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if sys.version_info[0] == 2 and sys.version_info[1] == 1:
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from Crypto.Util.py21compat import *
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import Crypto.Util.number
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from Crypto.Util.number import ceil_shift, ceil_div, long_to_bytes
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from Crypto.Util.strxor import strxor
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class PSS_SigScheme:
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"""This signature scheme can perform PKCS#1 PSS RSA signature or verification."""
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def __init__(self, key, mgfunc, saltLen):
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"""Initialize this PKCS#1 PSS signature scheme object.
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:Parameters:
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key : an RSA key object
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If a private half is given, both signature and verification are possible.
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If a public half is given, only verification is possible.
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mgfunc : callable
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A mask generation function that accepts two parameters: a string to
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use as seed, and the lenth of the mask to generate, in bytes.
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saltLen : int
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Length of the salt, in bytes.
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"""
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self._key = key
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self._saltLen = saltLen
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self._mgfunc = mgfunc
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def can_sign(self):
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"""Return True if this cipher object can be used for signing messages."""
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return self._key.has_private()
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def sign(self, mhash):
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"""Produce the PKCS#1 PSS signature of a message.
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This function is named ``RSASSA-PSS-SIGN``, and is specified in
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section 8.1.1 of RFC3447.
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:Parameters:
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mhash : hash object
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The hash that was carried out over the message. This is an object
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belonging to the `Crypto.Hash` module.
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:Return: The PSS signature encoded as a string.
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:Raise ValueError:
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If the RSA key length is not sufficiently long to deal with the given
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hash algorithm.
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:Raise TypeError:
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If the RSA key has no private half.
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:attention: Modify the salt length and the mask generation function only
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if you know what you are doing.
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The receiver must use the same parameters too.
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"""
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# TODO: Verify the key is RSA
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randfunc = self._key._randfunc
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# Set defaults for salt length and mask generation function
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if self._saltLen == None:
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sLen = mhash.digest_size
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else:
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sLen = self._saltLen
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if self._mgfunc:
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mgf = self._mgfunc
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else:
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mgf = lambda x,y: MGF1(x,y,mhash)
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modBits = Crypto.Util.number.size(self._key.n)
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# See 8.1.1 in RFC3447
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k = ceil_div(modBits,8) # Convert from bits to bytes
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# Step 1
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em = EMSA_PSS_ENCODE(mhash, modBits-1, randfunc, mgf, sLen)
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# Step 2a (OS2IP) and 2b (RSASP1)
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m = self._key.decrypt(em)
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# Step 2c (I2OSP)
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S = bchr(0x00)*(k-len(m)) + m
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return S
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def verify(self, mhash, S):
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"""Verify that a certain PKCS#1 PSS signature is authentic.
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This function checks if the party holding the private half of the given
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RSA key has really signed the message.
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This function is called ``RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY``, and is specified in section
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8.1.2 of RFC3447.
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:Parameters:
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mhash : hash object
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The hash that was carried out over the message. This is an object
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belonging to the `Crypto.Hash` module.
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S : string
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The signature that needs to be validated.
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:Return: True if verification is correct. False otherwise.
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"""
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# TODO: Verify the key is RSA
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# Set defaults for salt length and mask generation function
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if self._saltLen == None:
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sLen = mhash.digest_size
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else:
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sLen = self._saltLen
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if self._mgfunc:
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mgf = self._mgfunc
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else:
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mgf = lambda x,y: MGF1(x,y,mhash)
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modBits = Crypto.Util.number.size(self._key.n)
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# See 8.1.2 in RFC3447
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k = ceil_div(modBits,8) # Convert from bits to bytes
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# Step 1
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if len(S) != k:
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return False
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# Step 2a (O2SIP), 2b (RSAVP1), and partially 2c (I2OSP)
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# Note that signature must be smaller than the module
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# but RSA.py won't complain about it.
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# TODO: Fix RSA object; don't do it here.
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em = self._key.encrypt(S, 0)[0]
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# Step 2c
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emLen = ceil_div(modBits-1,8)
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em = bchr(0x00)*(emLen-len(em)) + em
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# Step 3
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try:
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result = EMSA_PSS_VERIFY(mhash, em, modBits-1, mgf, sLen)
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except ValueError:
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return False
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# Step 4
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return result
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def MGF1(mgfSeed, maskLen, hash):
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"""Mask Generation Function, described in B.2.1"""
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T = b("")
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for counter in xrange(ceil_div(maskLen, hash.digest_size)):
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c = long_to_bytes(counter, 4)
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T = T + hash.new(mgfSeed + c).digest()
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assert(len(T)>=maskLen)
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return T[:maskLen]
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def EMSA_PSS_ENCODE(mhash, emBits, randFunc, mgf, sLen):
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"""
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Implement the ``EMSA-PSS-ENCODE`` function, as defined
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in PKCS#1 v2.1 (RFC3447, 9.1.1).
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The original ``EMSA-PSS-ENCODE`` actually accepts the message ``M`` as input,
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and hash it internally. Here, we expect that the message has already
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been hashed instead.
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:Parameters:
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mhash : hash object
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The hash object that holds the digest of the message being signed.
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emBits : int
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Maximum length of the final encoding, in bits.
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randFunc : callable
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An RNG function that accepts as only parameter an int, and returns
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a string of random bytes, to be used as salt.
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mgf : callable
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A mask generation function that accepts two parameters: a string to
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use as seed, and the lenth of the mask to generate, in bytes.
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sLen : int
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Length of the salt, in bytes.
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:Return: An ``emLen`` byte long string that encodes the hash
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(with ``emLen = \ceil(emBits/8)``).
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:Raise ValueError:
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When digest or salt length are too big.
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"""
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emLen = ceil_div(emBits,8)
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# Bitmask of digits that fill up
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lmask = 0
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for i in xrange(8*emLen-emBits):
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lmask = lmask>>1 | 0x80
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# Step 1 and 2 have been already done
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# Step 3
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if emLen < mhash.digest_size+sLen+2:
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raise ValueError("Digest or salt length are too long for given key size.")
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# Step 4
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salt = b("")
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if randFunc and sLen>0:
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salt = randFunc(sLen)
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# Step 5 and 6
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h = mhash.new(bchr(0x00)*8 + mhash.digest() + salt)
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# Step 7 and 8
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db = bchr(0x00)*(emLen-sLen-mhash.digest_size-2) + bchr(0x01) + salt
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# Step 9
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dbMask = mgf(h.digest(), emLen-mhash.digest_size-1)
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# Step 10
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maskedDB = strxor(db,dbMask)
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# Step 11
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maskedDB = bchr(bord(maskedDB[0]) & ~lmask) + maskedDB[1:]
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# Step 12
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em = maskedDB + h.digest() + bchr(0xBC)
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return em
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def EMSA_PSS_VERIFY(mhash, em, emBits, mgf, sLen):
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"""
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Implement the ``EMSA-PSS-VERIFY`` function, as defined
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in PKCS#1 v2.1 (RFC3447, 9.1.2).
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``EMSA-PSS-VERIFY`` actually accepts the message ``M`` as input,
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and hash it internally. Here, we expect that the message has already
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been hashed instead.
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:Parameters:
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mhash : hash object
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The hash object that holds the digest of the message to be verified.
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em : string
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The signature to verify, therefore proving that the sender really signed
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the message that was received.
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emBits : int
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Length of the final encoding (em), in bits.
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mgf : callable
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A mask generation function that accepts two parameters: a string to
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use as seed, and the lenth of the mask to generate, in bytes.
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sLen : int
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Length of the salt, in bytes.
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:Return: 0 if the encoding is consistent, 1 if it is inconsistent.
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:Raise ValueError:
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When digest or salt length are too big.
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"""
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emLen = ceil_div(emBits,8)
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# Bitmask of digits that fill up
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lmask = 0
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for i in xrange(8*emLen-emBits):
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lmask = lmask>>1 | 0x80
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# Step 1 and 2 have been already done
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# Step 3
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if emLen < mhash.digest_size+sLen+2:
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return False
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# Step 4
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if ord(em[-1:])!=0xBC:
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return False
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# Step 5
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maskedDB = em[:emLen-mhash.digest_size-1]
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h = em[emLen-mhash.digest_size-1:-1]
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# Step 6
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if lmask & bord(em[0]):
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return False
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# Step 7
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dbMask = mgf(h, emLen-mhash.digest_size-1)
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# Step 8
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db = strxor(maskedDB, dbMask)
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# Step 9
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db = bchr(bord(db[0]) & ~lmask) + db[1:]
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# Step 10
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if not db.startswith(bchr(0x00)*(emLen-mhash.digest_size-sLen-2) + bchr(0x01)):
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return False
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# Step 11
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salt = b("")
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if sLen: salt = db[-sLen:]
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# Step 12 and 13
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hp = mhash.new(bchr(0x00)*8 + mhash.digest() + salt).digest()
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# Step 14
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if h!=hp:
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return False
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return True
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def new(key, mgfunc=None, saltLen=None):
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"""Return a signature scheme object `PSS_SigScheme` that
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can be used to perform PKCS#1 PSS signature or verification.
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:Parameters:
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key : RSA key object
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The key to use to sign or verify the message. This is a `Crypto.PublicKey.RSA` object.
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Signing is only possible if *key* is a private RSA key.
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mgfunc : callable
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A mask generation function that accepts two parameters: a string to
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use as seed, and the lenth of the mask to generate, in bytes.
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If not specified, the standard MGF1 is used.
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saltLen : int
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Length of the salt, in bytes. If not specified, it matches the output
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size of the hash function.
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"""
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return PSS_SigScheme(key, mgfunc, saltLen)
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