8058 lines
235 KiB
C
8058 lines
235 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (c) 2000-2020 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
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*
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* @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
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*
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* This file contains Original Code and/or Modifications of Original Code
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* as defined in and that are subject to the Apple Public Source License
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* Version 2.0 (the 'License'). You may not use this file except in
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* compliance with the License. The rights granted to you under the License
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* may not be used to create, or enable the creation or redistribution of,
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* unlawful or unlicensed copies of an Apple operating system, or to
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* circumvent, violate, or enable the circumvention or violation of, any
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* terms of an Apple operating system software license agreement.
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*
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* Please obtain a copy of the License at
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* http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl/ and read it before using this file.
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*
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* The Original Code and all software distributed under the License are
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* distributed on an 'AS IS' basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER
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* EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AND APPLE HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL SUCH WARRANTIES,
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* INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
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* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, QUIET ENJOYMENT OR NON-INFRINGEMENT.
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* Please see the License for the specific language governing rights and
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* limitations under the License.
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*
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* @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
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*/
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/* Copyright (c) 1995 NeXT Computer, Inc. All Rights Reserved */
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/*
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* Mach Operating System
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* Copyright (c) 1987 Carnegie-Mellon University
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* All rights reserved. The CMU software License Agreement specifies
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* the terms and conditions for use and redistribution.
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*/
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/*-
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* Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1991, 1993
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* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
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* (c) UNIX System Laboratories, Inc.
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* All or some portions of this file are derived from material licensed
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* to the University of California by American Telephone and Telegraph
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* Co. or Unix System Laboratories, Inc. and are reproduced herein with
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* the permission of UNIX System Laboratories, Inc.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* This product includes software developed by the University of
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* California, Berkeley and its contributors.
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* 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
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* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
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* without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* from: @(#)kern_exec.c 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/10/93
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*/
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/*
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* NOTICE: This file was modified by SPARTA, Inc. in 2005 to introduce
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* support for mandatory and extensible security protections. This notice
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* is included in support of clause 2.2 (b) of the Apple Public License,
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* Version 2.0.
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*/
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#include <machine/reg.h>
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#include <machine/cpu_capabilities.h>
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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#include <sys/filedesc.h>
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#include <sys/kernel.h>
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#include <sys/proc_internal.h>
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#include <sys/kauth.h>
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#include <sys/user.h>
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#include <sys/socketvar.h>
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#include <sys/malloc.h>
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#include <sys/namei.h>
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#include <sys/mount_internal.h>
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#include <sys/vnode_internal.h>
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#include <sys/file_internal.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <sys/uio_internal.h>
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#include <sys/acct.h>
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#include <sys/exec.h>
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#include <sys/kdebug.h>
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#include <sys/signal.h>
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#include <sys/aio_kern.h>
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#include <sys/sysproto.h>
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#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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#include <sys/persona.h>
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#include <sys/reason.h>
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#if SYSV_SHM
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#include <sys/shm_internal.h> /* shmexec() */
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#endif
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#include <sys/ubc_internal.h> /* ubc_map() */
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#include <sys/spawn.h>
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#include <sys/spawn_internal.h>
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#include <sys/process_policy.h>
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#include <sys/codesign.h>
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#include <sys/random.h>
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#include <crypto/sha1.h>
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#include <libkern/libkern.h>
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#include <libkern/crypto/sha2.h>
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#include <security/audit/audit.h>
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#include <ipc/ipc_types.h>
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#include <mach/mach_param.h>
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#include <mach/mach_types.h>
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#include <mach/port.h>
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#include <mach/task.h>
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#include <mach/task_access.h>
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#include <mach/thread_act.h>
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#include <mach/vm_map.h>
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#include <mach/mach_vm.h>
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#include <mach/vm_param.h>
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#include <mach_debug/mach_debug_types.h>
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#include <kern/sched_prim.h> /* thread_wakeup() */
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#include <kern/affinity.h>
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#include <kern/assert.h>
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#include <kern/task.h>
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#include <kern/thread.h>
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#include <kern/coalition.h>
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#include <kern/policy_internal.h>
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#include <kern/kalloc.h>
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#include <kern/zalloc.h> /* zone_userspace_reboot_checks() */
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#include <os/log.h>
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#if CONFIG_MACF
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#include <security/mac_framework.h>
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#include <security/mac_mach_internal.h>
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#endif
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#if CONFIG_AUDIT
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#include <bsm/audit_kevents.h>
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#endif
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#if CONFIG_ARCADE
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#include <kern/arcade.h>
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#endif
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#include <vm/vm_map.h>
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#include <vm/vm_kern.h>
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#include <vm/vm_protos.h>
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#include <vm/vm_kern.h>
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#include <vm/vm_fault.h>
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#include <vm/vm_pageout.h>
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#include <vm/pmap.h>
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#include <vm/vm_reclaim_internal.h>
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#include <kdp/kdp_dyld.h>
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#include <machine/machine_routines.h>
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#include <machine/pal_routines.h>
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#include <pexpert/pexpert.h>
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#if CONFIG_MEMORYSTATUS
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#include <sys/kern_memorystatus.h>
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#endif
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#include <IOKit/IOBSD.h>
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#include "kern_exec_internal.h"
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#include <CodeSignature/Entitlements.h>
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#include <mach/exclaves.h>
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extern boolean_t vm_darkwake_mode;
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/* enable crash reports on various exec failures */
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static TUNABLE(bool, bootarg_execfailurereports, "execfailurecrashes", false);
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#if XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX
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#if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls)
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static TUNABLE(bool, bootarg_arm64e_preview_abi, "-arm64e_preview_abi", false);
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#endif /* __has_feature(ptrauth_calls) */
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#if DEBUG || DEVELOPMENT
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static TUNABLE(bool, unentitled_ios_sim_launch, "unentitled_ios_sim_launch", false);
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#endif /* DEBUG || DEVELOPMENT */
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#endif /* XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX */
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#if CONFIG_DTRACE
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/* Do not include dtrace.h, it redefines kmem_[alloc/free] */
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extern void dtrace_proc_exec(proc_t);
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extern void (*dtrace_proc_waitfor_exec_ptr)(proc_t);
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/*
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* Since dtrace_proc_waitfor_exec_ptr can be added/removed in dtrace_subr.c,
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* we will store its value before actually calling it.
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*/
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static void (*dtrace_proc_waitfor_hook)(proc_t) = NULL;
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#include <sys/dtrace_ptss.h>
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#endif
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#if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls)
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static TUNABLE_DEV_WRITEABLE(int, vm_shared_region_per_team_id,
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"vm_shared_region_per_team_id", 1);
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static TUNABLE_DEV_WRITEABLE(int, vm_shared_region_by_entitlement,
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"vm_shared_region_by_entitlement", 1);
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/* Upon userland request, reslide the shared cache. */
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static TUNABLE_DEV_WRITEABLE(int, vm_shared_region_reslide_aslr,
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"vm_shared_region_reslide_aslr",
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#if CONFIG_RESLIDE_SHARED_CACHE
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1
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#else
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0
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#endif /* CONFIG_RESLIDE_SHARED_CACHE */
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);
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/*
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* Flag to control what processes should get shared cache randomize resliding
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* after a fault in the shared cache region:
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*
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* 0 - all processes get a new randomized slide
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* 1 - only platform processes get a new randomized slide
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*/
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TUNABLE_DEV_WRITEABLE(int, vm_shared_region_reslide_restrict,
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"vm_shared_region_reslide_restrict", 1);
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#if DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG
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SYSCTL_INT(_vm, OID_AUTO, vm_shared_region_per_team_id,
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CTLFLAG_RW, &vm_shared_region_per_team_id, 0, "");
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SYSCTL_INT(_vm, OID_AUTO, vm_shared_region_by_entitlement,
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CTLFLAG_RW, &vm_shared_region_by_entitlement, 0, "");
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SYSCTL_INT(_vm, OID_AUTO, vm_shared_region_reslide_restrict,
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CTLFLAG_RW, &vm_shared_region_reslide_restrict, 0, "");
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SYSCTL_INT(_vm, OID_AUTO, vm_shared_region_reslide_aslr,
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CTLFLAG_RW, &vm_shared_region_reslide_aslr, 0, "");
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#endif
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#endif /* __has_feature(ptrauth_calls) */
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#if DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG
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static TUNABLE(bool, enable_dext_coredumps_on_panic, "dext_panic_coredump", true);
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#else
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static TUNABLE(bool, enable_dext_coredumps_on_panic, "dext_panic_coredump", false);
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#endif
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extern kern_return_t kern_register_userspace_coredump(task_t task, const char * name);
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#define USERSPACE_COREDUMP_PANIC_ENTITLEMENT "com.apple.private.enable-coredump-on-panic"
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#define USERSPACE_COREDUMP_PANIC_SEED_ENTITLEMENT \
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"com.apple.private.enable-coredump-on-panic-seed-privacy-approved"
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extern void proc_apply_task_networkbg_internal(proc_t, thread_t);
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extern void task_set_did_exec_flag(task_t task);
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extern void task_clear_exec_copy_flag(task_t task);
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proc_t proc_exec_switch_task(proc_t old_proc, proc_t new_proc, task_t old_task,
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task_t new_task, thread_t new_thread, void **inherit);
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boolean_t task_is_active(task_t);
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boolean_t thread_is_active(thread_t thread);
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void thread_copy_resource_info(thread_t dst_thread, thread_t src_thread);
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void *ipc_importance_exec_switch_task(task_t old_task, task_t new_task);
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extern void ipc_importance_release(void *elem);
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extern boolean_t task_has_watchports(task_t task);
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extern void task_set_no_smt(task_t task);
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#if defined(HAS_APPLE_PAC)
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char *task_get_vm_shared_region_id_and_jop_pid(task_t task, uint64_t *jop_pid);
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#endif
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task_t convert_port_to_task(ipc_port_t port);
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#if CONFIG_EXCLAVES
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int task_add_conclave(task_t task, const char *task_conclave_id);
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kern_return_t task_inherit_conclave(task_t old_task, task_t new_task);
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#endif /* CONFIG_EXCLAVES */
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/*
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* Mach things for which prototypes are unavailable from Mach headers
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*/
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#define IPC_OBJECT_COPYIN_FLAGS_ALLOW_IMMOVABLE_SEND 0x1
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void ipc_task_enable(
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task_t task);
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void ipc_task_reset(
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task_t task);
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void ipc_thread_reset(
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thread_t thread);
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kern_return_t ipc_object_copyin(
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ipc_space_t space,
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mach_port_name_t name,
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mach_msg_type_name_t msgt_name,
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ipc_object_t *objectp,
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mach_port_context_t context,
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mach_msg_guard_flags_t *guard_flags,
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uint32_t kmsg_flags);
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void ipc_port_release_send(ipc_port_t);
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#if DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG
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void task_importance_update_owner_info(task_t);
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#endif
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extern struct savearea *get_user_regs(thread_t);
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__attribute__((noinline)) int __EXEC_WAITING_ON_TASKGATED_CODE_SIGNATURE_UPCALL__(mach_port_t task_access_port, int32_t new_pid);
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#include <kern/thread.h>
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#include <kern/task.h>
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#include <kern/ast.h>
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#include <kern/mach_loader.h>
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#include <kern/mach_fat.h>
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#include <mach-o/fat.h>
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#include <mach-o/loader.h>
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#include <machine/vmparam.h>
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#include <sys/imgact.h>
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#include <sys/sdt.h>
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/*
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* EAI_ITERLIMIT The maximum number of times to iterate an image
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* activator in exec_activate_image() before treating
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* it as malformed/corrupt.
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*/
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#define EAI_ITERLIMIT 3
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/*
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* For #! interpreter parsing
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*/
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#define IS_WHITESPACE(ch) ((ch == ' ') || (ch == '\t'))
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#define IS_EOL(ch) ((ch == '#') || (ch == '\n'))
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extern vm_map_t bsd_pageable_map;
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extern const struct fileops vnops;
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extern int nextpidversion;
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#define USER_ADDR_ALIGN(addr, val) \
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( ( (user_addr_t)(addr) + (val) - 1) \
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& ~((val) - 1) )
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/*
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* For subsystem root support
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*/
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#define SPAWN_SUBSYSTEM_ROOT_ENTITLEMENT "com.apple.private.spawn-subsystem-root"
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/*
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* Allow setting p_crash_behavior to trigger panic on crash
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*/
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#define SPAWN_SET_PANIC_CRASH_BEHAVIOR "com.apple.private.spawn-panic-crash-behavior"
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/* Platform Code Exec Logging */
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static int platform_exec_logging = 0;
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SYSCTL_DECL(_security_mac);
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SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, platform_exec_logging, CTLFLAG_RW, &platform_exec_logging, 0,
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"log cdhashes for all platform binary executions");
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static os_log_t peLog = OS_LOG_DEFAULT;
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struct exception_port_action_t {
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ipc_port_t port;
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_ps_port_action_t *port_action;
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};
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struct exec_port_actions {
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uint32_t exception_port_count;
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uint32_t portwatch_count;
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uint32_t registered_count;
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struct exception_port_action_t *excport_array;
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ipc_port_t *portwatch_array;
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ipc_port_t *registered_array;
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};
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struct image_params; /* Forward */
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static int exec_activate_image(struct image_params *imgp);
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static int exec_copyout_strings(struct image_params *imgp, user_addr_t *stackp);
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static int load_return_to_errno(load_return_t lrtn);
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static int execargs_alloc(struct image_params *imgp);
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static int execargs_free(struct image_params *imgp);
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static int exec_check_permissions(struct image_params *imgp);
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static int exec_extract_strings(struct image_params *imgp);
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static int exec_add_apple_strings(struct image_params *imgp, const load_result_t *load_result);
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static int exec_handle_sugid(struct image_params *imgp);
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static int sugid_scripts = 0;
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SYSCTL_INT(_kern, OID_AUTO, sugid_scripts, CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_LOCKED, &sugid_scripts, 0, "");
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static kern_return_t create_unix_stack(vm_map_t map, load_result_t* load_result, proc_t p);
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static int copyoutptr(user_addr_t ua, user_addr_t ptr, int ptr_size);
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static void exec_resettextvp(proc_t, struct image_params *);
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static int process_signature(proc_t, struct image_params *);
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static void exec_prefault_data(proc_t, struct image_params *, load_result_t *);
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static errno_t exec_handle_port_actions(struct image_params *imgp,
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struct exec_port_actions *port_actions);
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static errno_t exec_handle_exception_port_actions(const struct image_params *imgp,
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const struct exec_port_actions *port_actions);
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static errno_t exec_handle_spawnattr_policy(proc_t p, thread_t thread, int psa_apptype, uint64_t psa_qos_clamp,
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task_role_t psa_darwin_role, struct exec_port_actions *port_actions);
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static void exec_port_actions_destroy(struct exec_port_actions *port_actions);
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/*
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* exec_add_user_string
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*
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* Add the requested string to the string space area.
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*
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* Parameters; struct image_params * image parameter block
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* user_addr_t string to add to strings area
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* int segment from which string comes
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* boolean_t TRUE if string contributes to NCARGS
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*
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* Returns: 0 Success
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* !0 Failure errno from copyinstr()
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*
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* Implicit returns:
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* (imgp->ip_strendp) updated location of next add, if any
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* (imgp->ip_strspace) updated byte count of space remaining
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* (imgp->ip_argspace) updated byte count of space in NCARGS
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*/
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__attribute__((noinline))
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static int
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exec_add_user_string(struct image_params *imgp, user_addr_t str, int seg, boolean_t is_ncargs)
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{
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int error = 0;
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do {
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size_t len = 0;
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int space;
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if (is_ncargs) {
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space = imgp->ip_argspace; /* by definition smaller than ip_strspace */
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} else {
|
|
space = imgp->ip_strspace;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (space <= 0) {
|
|
error = E2BIG;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!UIO_SEG_IS_USER_SPACE(seg)) {
|
|
char *kstr = CAST_DOWN(char *, str); /* SAFE */
|
|
error = copystr(kstr, imgp->ip_strendp, space, &len);
|
|
} else {
|
|
error = copyinstr(str, imgp->ip_strendp, space, &len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
imgp->ip_strendp += len;
|
|
imgp->ip_strspace -= len;
|
|
if (is_ncargs) {
|
|
imgp->ip_argspace -= len;
|
|
}
|
|
} while (error == ENAMETOOLONG);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* dyld is now passed the executable path as a getenv-like variable
|
|
* in the same fashion as the stack_guard and malloc_entropy keys.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define EXECUTABLE_KEY "executable_path="
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* exec_save_path
|
|
*
|
|
* To support new app package launching for Mac OS X, the dyld needs the
|
|
* first argument to execve() stored on the user stack.
|
|
*
|
|
* Save the executable path name at the bottom of the strings area and set
|
|
* the argument vector pointer to the location following that to indicate
|
|
* the start of the argument and environment tuples, setting the remaining
|
|
* string space count to the size of the string area minus the path length.
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters; struct image_params * image parameter block
|
|
* char * path used to invoke program
|
|
* int segment from which path comes
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: int 0 Success
|
|
* EFAULT Bad address
|
|
* copy[in]str:EFAULT Bad address
|
|
* copy[in]str:ENAMETOOLONG Filename too long
|
|
*
|
|
* Implicit returns:
|
|
* (imgp->ip_strings) saved path
|
|
* (imgp->ip_strspace) space remaining in ip_strings
|
|
* (imgp->ip_strendp) start of remaining copy area
|
|
* (imgp->ip_argspace) space remaining of NCARGS
|
|
* (imgp->ip_applec) Initial applev[0]
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: We have to do this before the initial namei() since in the
|
|
* path contains symbolic links, namei() will overwrite the
|
|
* original path buffer contents. If the last symbolic link
|
|
* resolved was a relative pathname, we would lose the original
|
|
* "path", which could be an absolute pathname. This might be
|
|
* unacceptable for dyld.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
exec_save_path(struct image_params *imgp, user_addr_t path, int seg, const char **excpath)
|
|
{
|
|
int error;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
char *kpath;
|
|
|
|
// imgp->ip_strings can come out of a cache, so we need to obliterate the
|
|
// old path.
|
|
memset(imgp->ip_strings, '\0', strlen(EXECUTABLE_KEY) + MAXPATHLEN);
|
|
|
|
len = MIN(MAXPATHLEN, imgp->ip_strspace);
|
|
|
|
switch (seg) {
|
|
case UIO_USERSPACE32:
|
|
case UIO_USERSPACE64: /* Same for copyin()... */
|
|
error = copyinstr(path, imgp->ip_strings + strlen(EXECUTABLE_KEY), len, &len);
|
|
break;
|
|
case UIO_SYSSPACE:
|
|
kpath = CAST_DOWN(char *, path); /* SAFE */
|
|
error = copystr(kpath, imgp->ip_strings + strlen(EXECUTABLE_KEY), len, &len);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
error = EFAULT;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!error) {
|
|
bcopy(EXECUTABLE_KEY, imgp->ip_strings, strlen(EXECUTABLE_KEY));
|
|
len += strlen(EXECUTABLE_KEY);
|
|
|
|
imgp->ip_strendp += len;
|
|
imgp->ip_strspace -= len;
|
|
|
|
if (excpath) {
|
|
*excpath = imgp->ip_strings + strlen(EXECUTABLE_KEY);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* exec_reset_save_path
|
|
*
|
|
* If we detect a shell script, we need to reset the string area
|
|
* state so that the interpreter can be saved onto the stack.
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters; struct image_params * image parameter block
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: int 0 Success
|
|
*
|
|
* Implicit returns:
|
|
* (imgp->ip_strings) saved path
|
|
* (imgp->ip_strspace) space remaining in ip_strings
|
|
* (imgp->ip_strendp) start of remaining copy area
|
|
* (imgp->ip_argspace) space remaining of NCARGS
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
exec_reset_save_path(struct image_params *imgp)
|
|
{
|
|
imgp->ip_strendp = imgp->ip_strings;
|
|
imgp->ip_argspace = NCARGS;
|
|
imgp->ip_strspace = (NCARGS + PAGE_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* exec_shell_imgact
|
|
*
|
|
* Image activator for interpreter scripts. If the image begins with
|
|
* the characters "#!", then it is an interpreter script. Verify the
|
|
* length of the script line indicating the interpreter is not in
|
|
* excess of the maximum allowed size. If this is the case, then
|
|
* break out the arguments, if any, which are separated by white
|
|
* space, and copy them into the argument save area as if they were
|
|
* provided on the command line before all other arguments. The line
|
|
* ends when we encounter a comment character ('#') or newline.
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters; struct image_params * image parameter block
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: -1 not an interpreter (keep looking)
|
|
* -3 Success: interpreter: relookup
|
|
* >0 Failure: interpreter: error number
|
|
*
|
|
* A return value other than -1 indicates subsequent image activators should
|
|
* not be given the opportunity to attempt to activate the image.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
exec_shell_imgact(struct image_params *imgp)
|
|
{
|
|
char *vdata = imgp->ip_vdata;
|
|
char *ihp;
|
|
char *line_startp, *line_endp;
|
|
char *interp;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Make sure it's a shell script. If we've already redirected
|
|
* from an interpreted file once, don't do it again.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (vdata[0] != '#' ||
|
|
vdata[1] != '!' ||
|
|
(imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_INTERPRET) != 0) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (imgp->ip_origcputype != 0) {
|
|
/* Fat header previously matched, don't allow shell script inside */
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_INTERPRET;
|
|
imgp->ip_interp_sugid_fd = -1;
|
|
imgp->ip_interp_buffer[0] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
/* Check to see if SUGID scripts are permitted. If they aren't then
|
|
* clear the SUGID bits.
|
|
* imgp->ip_vattr is known to be valid.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sugid_scripts == 0) {
|
|
imgp->ip_origvattr->va_mode &= ~(VSUID | VSGID);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Try to find the first non-whitespace character */
|
|
for (ihp = &vdata[2]; ihp < &vdata[IMG_SHSIZE]; ihp++) {
|
|
if (IS_EOL(*ihp)) {
|
|
/* Did not find interpreter, "#!\n" */
|
|
return ENOEXEC;
|
|
} else if (IS_WHITESPACE(*ihp)) {
|
|
/* Whitespace, like "#! /bin/sh\n", keep going. */
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Found start of interpreter */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ihp == &vdata[IMG_SHSIZE]) {
|
|
/* All whitespace, like "#! " */
|
|
return ENOEXEC;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
line_startp = ihp;
|
|
|
|
/* Try to find the end of the interpreter+args string */
|
|
for (; ihp < &vdata[IMG_SHSIZE]; ihp++) {
|
|
if (IS_EOL(*ihp)) {
|
|
/* Got it */
|
|
break;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Still part of interpreter or args */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ihp == &vdata[IMG_SHSIZE]) {
|
|
/* A long line, like "#! blah blah blah" without end */
|
|
return ENOEXEC;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Backtrack until we find the last non-whitespace */
|
|
while (IS_EOL(*ihp) || IS_WHITESPACE(*ihp)) {
|
|
ihp--;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The character after the last non-whitespace is our logical end of line */
|
|
line_endp = ihp + 1;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now we have pointers to the usable part of:
|
|
*
|
|
* "#! /usr/bin/int first second third \n"
|
|
* ^ line_startp ^ line_endp
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* copy the interpreter name */
|
|
interp = imgp->ip_interp_buffer;
|
|
for (ihp = line_startp; (ihp < line_endp) && !IS_WHITESPACE(*ihp); ihp++) {
|
|
*interp++ = *ihp;
|
|
}
|
|
*interp = '\0';
|
|
|
|
exec_reset_save_path(imgp);
|
|
exec_save_path(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(imgp->ip_interp_buffer),
|
|
UIO_SYSSPACE, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* Copy the entire interpreter + args for later processing into argv[] */
|
|
interp = imgp->ip_interp_buffer;
|
|
for (ihp = line_startp; (ihp < line_endp); ihp++) {
|
|
*interp++ = *ihp;
|
|
}
|
|
*interp = '\0';
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_SETUID
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we have an SUID or SGID script, create a file descriptor
|
|
* from the vnode and pass /dev/fd/%d instead of the actual
|
|
* path name so that the script does not get opened twice
|
|
*/
|
|
if (imgp->ip_origvattr->va_mode & (VSUID | VSGID)) {
|
|
proc_t p;
|
|
struct fileproc *fp;
|
|
int fd;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
p = vfs_context_proc(imgp->ip_vfs_context);
|
|
error = falloc_exec(p, imgp->ip_vfs_context, &fp, &fd);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fp->fp_glob->fg_flag = FREAD;
|
|
fp->fp_glob->fg_ops = &vnops;
|
|
fp_set_data(fp, imgp->ip_vp);
|
|
|
|
proc_fdlock(p);
|
|
procfdtbl_releasefd(p, fd, NULL);
|
|
fp_drop(p, fd, fp, 1);
|
|
proc_fdunlock(p);
|
|
vnode_ref(imgp->ip_vp);
|
|
|
|
imgp->ip_interp_sugid_fd = fd;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SETUID */
|
|
|
|
return -3;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* exec_fat_imgact
|
|
*
|
|
* Image activator for fat 1.0 binaries. If the binary is fat, then we
|
|
* need to select an image from it internally, and make that the image
|
|
* we are going to attempt to execute. At present, this consists of
|
|
* reloading the first page for the image with a first page from the
|
|
* offset location indicated by the fat header.
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters; struct image_params * image parameter block
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: -1 not a fat binary (keep looking)
|
|
* -2 Success: encapsulated binary: reread
|
|
* >0 Failure: error number
|
|
*
|
|
* Important: This image activator is byte order neutral.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: A return value other than -1 indicates subsequent image
|
|
* activators should not be given the opportunity to attempt
|
|
* to activate the image.
|
|
*
|
|
* If we find an encapsulated binary, we make no assertions
|
|
* about its validity; instead, we leave that up to a rescan
|
|
* for an activator to claim it, and, if it is claimed by one,
|
|
* that activator is responsible for determining validity.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
exec_fat_imgact(struct image_params *imgp)
|
|
{
|
|
proc_t p = vfs_context_proc(imgp->ip_vfs_context);
|
|
kauth_cred_t cred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
|
|
struct fat_header *fat_header = (struct fat_header *)imgp->ip_vdata;
|
|
struct _posix_spawnattr *psa = NULL;
|
|
struct fat_arch fat_arch;
|
|
int resid, error;
|
|
load_return_t lret;
|
|
|
|
if (imgp->ip_origcputype != 0) {
|
|
/* Fat header previously matched, don't allow another fat file inside */
|
|
error = -1; /* not claimed */
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure it's a fat binary */
|
|
if (OSSwapBigToHostInt32(fat_header->magic) != FAT_MAGIC) {
|
|
error = -1; /* not claimed */
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* imgp->ip_vdata has PAGE_SIZE, zerofilled if the file is smaller */
|
|
lret = fatfile_validate_fatarches((vm_offset_t)fat_header, PAGE_SIZE,
|
|
(off_t)imgp->ip_vattr->va_data_size);
|
|
if (lret != LOAD_SUCCESS) {
|
|
error = load_return_to_errno(lret);
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If posix_spawn binprefs exist, respect those prefs. */
|
|
psa = (struct _posix_spawnattr *) imgp->ip_px_sa;
|
|
if (psa != NULL && psa->psa_binprefs[0] != 0) {
|
|
uint32_t pr = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Check each preference listed against all arches in header */
|
|
for (pr = 0; pr < NBINPREFS; pr++) {
|
|
cpu_type_t pref = psa->psa_binprefs[pr];
|
|
cpu_type_t subpref = psa->psa_subcpuprefs[pr];
|
|
|
|
if (pref == 0) {
|
|
/* No suitable arch in the pref list */
|
|
error = EBADARCH;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pref == CPU_TYPE_ANY) {
|
|
/* Fall through to regular grading */
|
|
goto regular_grading;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
lret = fatfile_getbestarch_for_cputype(pref,
|
|
subpref,
|
|
(vm_offset_t)fat_header,
|
|
PAGE_SIZE,
|
|
imgp,
|
|
&fat_arch);
|
|
if (lret == LOAD_SUCCESS) {
|
|
goto use_arch;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Requested binary preference was not honored */
|
|
error = EBADEXEC;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
regular_grading:
|
|
/* Look up our preferred architecture in the fat file. */
|
|
lret = fatfile_getbestarch((vm_offset_t)fat_header,
|
|
PAGE_SIZE,
|
|
imgp,
|
|
&fat_arch,
|
|
(p->p_flag & P_AFFINITY) != 0);
|
|
if (lret != LOAD_SUCCESS) {
|
|
error = load_return_to_errno(lret);
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
use_arch:
|
|
/* Read the Mach-O header out of fat_arch */
|
|
error = vn_rdwr(UIO_READ, imgp->ip_vp, imgp->ip_vdata,
|
|
PAGE_SIZE, fat_arch.offset,
|
|
UIO_SYSSPACE, (IO_UNIT | IO_NODELOCKED),
|
|
cred, &resid, p);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (resid) {
|
|
memset(imgp->ip_vdata + (PAGE_SIZE - resid), 0x0, resid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Success. Indicate we have identified an encapsulated binary */
|
|
error = -2;
|
|
imgp->ip_arch_offset = (user_size_t)fat_arch.offset;
|
|
imgp->ip_arch_size = (user_size_t)fat_arch.size;
|
|
imgp->ip_origcputype = fat_arch.cputype;
|
|
imgp->ip_origcpusubtype = fat_arch.cpusubtype;
|
|
|
|
bad:
|
|
kauth_cred_unref(&cred);
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
activate_exec_state(task_t task, proc_t p, thread_t thread, load_result_t *result)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
(void)task_set_dyld_info(task, MACH_VM_MIN_ADDRESS, 0);
|
|
task_set_64bit(task, result->is_64bit_addr, result->is_64bit_data);
|
|
if (result->is_64bit_addr) {
|
|
OSBitOrAtomic(P_LP64, &p->p_flag);
|
|
get_bsdthread_info(thread)->uu_flag |= UT_LP64;
|
|
} else {
|
|
OSBitAndAtomic(~((uint32_t)P_LP64), &p->p_flag);
|
|
get_bsdthread_info(thread)->uu_flag &= ~UT_LP64;
|
|
}
|
|
task_set_mach_header_address(task, result->mach_header);
|
|
|
|
ret = thread_state_initialize(thread);
|
|
if (ret != KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (result->threadstate) {
|
|
uint32_t *ts = result->threadstate;
|
|
uint32_t total_size = (uint32_t)result->threadstate_sz;
|
|
|
|
while (total_size > 0) {
|
|
uint32_t flavor = *ts++;
|
|
uint32_t size = *ts++;
|
|
|
|
ret = thread_setstatus(thread, flavor, (thread_state_t)ts, size);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
ts += size;
|
|
total_size -= (size + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
thread_setentrypoint(thread, result->entry_point);
|
|
|
|
return KERN_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if (DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG)
|
|
extern char panic_on_proc_crash[];
|
|
extern int use_panic_on_proc_crash;
|
|
|
|
extern char panic_on_proc_exit[];
|
|
extern int use_panic_on_proc_exit;
|
|
|
|
extern char panic_on_proc_spawn_fail[];
|
|
extern int use_panic_on_proc_spawn_fail;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
set_proc_name(struct image_params *imgp, proc_t p)
|
|
{
|
|
int p_name_len = sizeof(p->p_name) - 1;
|
|
|
|
if (imgp->ip_ndp->ni_cnd.cn_namelen > p_name_len) {
|
|
imgp->ip_ndp->ni_cnd.cn_namelen = p_name_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bcopy((caddr_t)imgp->ip_ndp->ni_cnd.cn_nameptr, (caddr_t)p->p_name,
|
|
(unsigned)imgp->ip_ndp->ni_cnd.cn_namelen);
|
|
p->p_name[imgp->ip_ndp->ni_cnd.cn_namelen] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
if (imgp->ip_ndp->ni_cnd.cn_namelen > MAXCOMLEN) {
|
|
imgp->ip_ndp->ni_cnd.cn_namelen = MAXCOMLEN;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bcopy((caddr_t)imgp->ip_ndp->ni_cnd.cn_nameptr, (caddr_t)p->p_comm,
|
|
(unsigned)imgp->ip_ndp->ni_cnd.cn_namelen);
|
|
p->p_comm[imgp->ip_ndp->ni_cnd.cn_namelen] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
#if DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG
|
|
/*
|
|
* This happens during image activation, so the crash behavior flags from
|
|
* posix_spawn will have already been set. So we don't have to worry about
|
|
* this being overridden.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (use_panic_on_proc_crash && strcmp(p->p_comm, panic_on_proc_crash) == 0) {
|
|
printf("will panic on proc crash: %s\n", p->p_comm);
|
|
p->p_crash_behavior |= POSIX_SPAWN_PANIC_ON_CRASH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (use_panic_on_proc_exit && strcmp(p->p_comm, panic_on_proc_exit) == 0) {
|
|
printf("will panic on proc exit: %s\n", p->p_comm);
|
|
p->p_crash_behavior |= POSIX_SPAWN_PANIC_ON_EXIT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (use_panic_on_proc_spawn_fail && strcmp(p->p_comm, panic_on_proc_spawn_fail) == 0) {
|
|
printf("will panic on proc spawn fail: %s\n", p->p_comm);
|
|
p->p_crash_behavior |= POSIX_SPAWN_PANIC_ON_SPAWN_FAIL;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls)
|
|
/**
|
|
* Returns a team ID string that may be used to assign a shared region.
|
|
*
|
|
* Platform binaries do not have team IDs and will return NULL. Non-platform
|
|
* binaries without a team ID will be assigned an artificial team ID of ""
|
|
* (empty string) so that they will not be assigned to the default shared
|
|
* region.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param imgp image parameter block
|
|
* @return NULL if this is a platform binary, or an appropriate team ID string
|
|
* otherwise
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline const char *
|
|
get_teamid_for_shared_region(struct image_params *imgp)
|
|
{
|
|
assert(imgp->ip_vp != NULL);
|
|
|
|
const char *ret = csvnode_get_teamid(imgp->ip_vp, imgp->ip_arch_offset);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct cs_blob *blob = csvnode_get_blob(imgp->ip_vp, imgp->ip_arch_offset);
|
|
if (csblob_get_platform_binary(blob)) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
static const char *NO_TEAM_ID = "";
|
|
return NO_TEAM_ID;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Determines whether ptrauth should be enabled for the provided arm64 CPU subtype.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param cpusubtype Mach-O style CPU subtype
|
|
* @return whether the CPU subtype matches arm64e with the current ptrauth ABI
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline bool
|
|
arm64_cpusubtype_uses_ptrauth(cpu_subtype_t cpusubtype)
|
|
{
|
|
return (cpusubtype & ~CPU_SUBTYPE_MASK) == CPU_SUBTYPE_ARM64E &&
|
|
CPU_SUBTYPE_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_VERSION(cpusubtype) == CPU_SUBTYPE_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_CURRENT_VERSION;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* __has_feature(ptrauth_calls) */
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Returns whether a type/subtype slice matches the requested
|
|
* type/subtype.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param mask Bits to mask from the requested/tested cpu type
|
|
* @param req_cpu Requested cpu type
|
|
* @param req_subcpu Requested cpu subtype
|
|
* @param test_cpu Tested slice cpu type
|
|
* @param test_subcpu Tested slice cpu subtype
|
|
*/
|
|
boolean_t
|
|
binary_match(cpu_type_t mask, cpu_type_t req_cpu,
|
|
cpu_subtype_t req_subcpu, cpu_type_t test_cpu,
|
|
cpu_subtype_t test_subcpu)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((test_cpu & ~mask) != (req_cpu & ~mask)) {
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
test_subcpu &= ~CPU_SUBTYPE_MASK;
|
|
req_subcpu &= ~CPU_SUBTYPE_MASK;
|
|
|
|
if (test_subcpu != req_subcpu && req_subcpu != (CPU_SUBTYPE_ANY & ~CPU_SUBTYPE_MASK)) {
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define MIN_IOS_TPRO_SDK_VERSION 0x00100000
|
|
#define MIN_OSX_TPRO_SDK_VERSION 0x000D0000
|
|
#define MIN_TVOS_TPRO_SDK_VERSION 0x000D0000
|
|
#define MIN_WATCHOS_TPRO_SDK_VERSION 0x00090000
|
|
#define MIN_DRIVERKIT_TPRO_SDK_VERSION 0x00600000
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
exec_setup_tpro(struct image_params *imgp, load_result_t *load_result)
|
|
{
|
|
extern boolean_t xprr_tpro_enabled;
|
|
extern boolean_t enable_user_modifiable_perms;
|
|
uint32_t min_sdk_version = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* x86-64 translated code cannot take advantage of TPRO */
|
|
if (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_ROSETTA) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Do not enable on 32-bit VA targets */
|
|
if (!(imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_IS_64BIT_ADDR)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (load_result->ip_platform) {
|
|
case PLATFORM_IOS:
|
|
case PLATFORM_IOSSIMULATOR:
|
|
case PLATFORM_MACCATALYST:
|
|
min_sdk_version = MIN_IOS_TPRO_SDK_VERSION;
|
|
break;
|
|
case PLATFORM_MACOS:
|
|
min_sdk_version = MIN_OSX_TPRO_SDK_VERSION;
|
|
break;
|
|
case PLATFORM_TVOS:
|
|
case PLATFORM_TVOSSIMULATOR:
|
|
min_sdk_version = MIN_TVOS_TPRO_SDK_VERSION;
|
|
break;
|
|
case PLATFORM_WATCHOS:
|
|
case PLATFORM_WATCHOSSIMULATOR:
|
|
min_sdk_version = MIN_WATCHOS_TPRO_SDK_VERSION;
|
|
break;
|
|
case PLATFORM_DRIVERKIT:
|
|
min_sdk_version = MIN_DRIVERKIT_TPRO_SDK_VERSION;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
/* TPRO is on by default for newer platforms */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the passed in executable's vnode should use the RSR
|
|
* shared region, then this should return TRUE, otherwise, return FALSE.
|
|
*/
|
|
static uint32_t rsr_current_version = 0;
|
|
boolean_t (*rsr_check_vnode)(void *vnode) = NULL;
|
|
|
|
boolean_t
|
|
vnode_is_rsr(vnode_t vp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!(vnode_isreg(vp) && vnode_tag(vp) == VT_APFS)) {
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rsr_check_vnode != NULL && rsr_check_vnode((void *)vp)) {
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void
|
|
encode_HR_entitlement(const char *entitlement, HR_flags_t mask,
|
|
const struct image_params *imgp, load_result_t *load_result)
|
|
{
|
|
if (IOVnodeHasEntitlement(imgp->ip_vp, (int64_t)imgp->ip_arch_offset, entitlement)) {
|
|
load_result->hardened_runtime_binary |= mask;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint32_t
|
|
rsr_get_version(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return os_atomic_load(&rsr_current_version, relaxed);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
rsr_bump_version(void)
|
|
{
|
|
os_atomic_inc(&rsr_current_version, relaxed);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX
|
|
static int
|
|
rsr_version_sysctl SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS
|
|
{
|
|
#pragma unused(arg1, arg2, oidp)
|
|
int value = rsr_get_version();
|
|
int error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &value, sizeof(int));
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!req->newptr) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = SYSCTL_IN(req, &value, sizeof(int));
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
if (value != 0) {
|
|
rsr_bump_version();
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_PROC(_vm, OID_AUTO, shared_region_control,
|
|
CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_LOCKED | CTLFLAG_MASKED,
|
|
0, 0, rsr_version_sysctl, "I", "");
|
|
#endif /* XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* exec_mach_imgact
|
|
*
|
|
* Image activator for mach-o 1.0 binaries.
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters; struct image_params * image parameter block
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: -1 not a fat binary (keep looking)
|
|
* -2 Success: encapsulated binary: reread
|
|
* >0 Failure: error number
|
|
* EBADARCH Mach-o binary, but with an unrecognized
|
|
* architecture
|
|
* ENOMEM No memory for child process after -
|
|
* can only happen after vfork()
|
|
*
|
|
* Important: This image activator is NOT byte order neutral.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: A return value other than -1 indicates subsequent image
|
|
* activators should not be given the opportunity to attempt
|
|
* to activate the image.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
exec_mach_imgact(struct image_params *imgp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct mach_header *mach_header = (struct mach_header *)imgp->ip_vdata;
|
|
proc_t p = vfs_context_proc(imgp->ip_vfs_context);
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
task_t task;
|
|
task_t new_task = NULL; /* protected by vfexec */
|
|
thread_t thread;
|
|
struct uthread *uthread;
|
|
vm_map_t old_map = VM_MAP_NULL;
|
|
vm_map_t map = VM_MAP_NULL;
|
|
load_return_t lret;
|
|
load_result_t load_result = {};
|
|
struct _posix_spawnattr *psa = NULL;
|
|
int spawn = (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_SPAWN);
|
|
const int vfexec = 0;
|
|
int exec = (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_EXEC);
|
|
os_reason_t exec_failure_reason = OS_REASON_NULL;
|
|
boolean_t reslide = FALSE;
|
|
char * userspace_coredump_name = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* make sure it's a Mach-O 1.0 or Mach-O 2.0 binary; the difference
|
|
* is a reserved field on the end, so for the most part, we can
|
|
* treat them as if they were identical. Reverse-endian Mach-O
|
|
* binaries are recognized but not compatible.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((mach_header->magic == MH_CIGAM) ||
|
|
(mach_header->magic == MH_CIGAM_64)) {
|
|
error = EBADARCH;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((mach_header->magic != MH_MAGIC) &&
|
|
(mach_header->magic != MH_MAGIC_64)) {
|
|
error = -1;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mach_header->filetype != MH_EXECUTE) {
|
|
error = -1;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (imgp->ip_origcputype != 0) {
|
|
/* Fat header previously had an idea about this thin file */
|
|
if (imgp->ip_origcputype != mach_header->cputype ||
|
|
imgp->ip_origcpusubtype != mach_header->cpusubtype) {
|
|
error = EBADARCH;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
imgp->ip_origcputype = mach_header->cputype;
|
|
imgp->ip_origcpusubtype = mach_header->cpusubtype;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
task = current_task();
|
|
thread = current_thread();
|
|
uthread = get_bsdthread_info(thread);
|
|
|
|
if ((mach_header->cputype & CPU_ARCH_ABI64) == CPU_ARCH_ABI64) {
|
|
imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_IS_64BIT_ADDR | IMGPF_IS_64BIT_DATA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If posix_spawn binprefs exist, respect those prefs. */
|
|
psa = (struct _posix_spawnattr *) imgp->ip_px_sa;
|
|
if (psa != NULL && psa->psa_binprefs[0] != 0) {
|
|
int pr = 0;
|
|
for (pr = 0; pr < NBINPREFS; pr++) {
|
|
cpu_type_t pref = psa->psa_binprefs[pr];
|
|
cpu_subtype_t subpref = psa->psa_subcpuprefs[pr];
|
|
|
|
if (pref == 0) {
|
|
/* No suitable arch in the pref list */
|
|
error = EBADARCH;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pref == CPU_TYPE_ANY) {
|
|
/* Jump to regular grading */
|
|
goto grade;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (binary_match(CPU_ARCH_MASK, pref, subpref,
|
|
imgp->ip_origcputype, imgp->ip_origcpusubtype)) {
|
|
goto grade;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
error = EBADARCH;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
grade:
|
|
if (!grade_binary(imgp->ip_origcputype, imgp->ip_origcpusubtype & ~CPU_SUBTYPE_MASK,
|
|
imgp->ip_origcpusubtype & CPU_SUBTYPE_MASK, TRUE)) {
|
|
error = EBADARCH;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (validate_potential_simulator_binary(imgp->ip_origcputype, imgp,
|
|
imgp->ip_arch_offset, imgp->ip_arch_size) != LOAD_SUCCESS) {
|
|
#if __x86_64__
|
|
const char *excpath;
|
|
error = exec_save_path(imgp, imgp->ip_user_fname, imgp->ip_seg, &excpath);
|
|
os_log_error(OS_LOG_DEFAULT, "Unsupported 32-bit executable: \"%s\"", (error) ? imgp->ip_vp->v_name : excpath);
|
|
#endif
|
|
error = EBADARCH;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(HAS_APPLE_PAC)
|
|
assert(mach_header->cputype == CPU_TYPE_ARM64
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
if ((mach_header->cputype == CPU_TYPE_ARM64 &&
|
|
arm64_cpusubtype_uses_ptrauth(mach_header->cpusubtype))
|
|
) {
|
|
imgp->ip_flags &= ~IMGPF_NOJOP;
|
|
} else {
|
|
imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_NOJOP;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Copy in arguments/environment from the old process */
|
|
error = exec_extract_strings(imgp);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARG(argv, imgp->ip_startargv, imgp->ip_argc,
|
|
imgp->ip_endargv - imgp->ip_startargv);
|
|
AUDIT_ARG(envv, imgp->ip_endargv, imgp->ip_envc,
|
|
imgp->ip_endenvv - imgp->ip_endargv);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* reset local idea of thread, uthread, task */
|
|
thread = imgp->ip_new_thread;
|
|
uthread = get_bsdthread_info(thread);
|
|
task = new_task = get_threadtask(thread);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Load the Mach-O file.
|
|
*
|
|
* NOTE: An error after this point indicates we have potentially
|
|
* destroyed or overwritten some process state while attempting an
|
|
* execve() following a vfork(), which is an unrecoverable condition.
|
|
* We send the new process an immediate SIGKILL to avoid it executing
|
|
* any instructions in the mutated address space. For true spawns,
|
|
* this is not the case, and "too late" is still not too late to
|
|
* return an error code to the parent process.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Actually load the image file we previously decided to load.
|
|
*/
|
|
lret = load_machfile(imgp, mach_header, thread, &map, &load_result);
|
|
if (lret != LOAD_SUCCESS) {
|
|
error = load_return_to_errno(lret);
|
|
|
|
KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT(BSDDBG_CODE(DBG_BSD_PROC, BSD_PROC_EXITREASON_CREATE) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
|
|
proc_getpid(p), OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_BAD_MACHO, 0, 0);
|
|
if (lret == LOAD_BADMACHO_UPX) {
|
|
set_proc_name(imgp, p);
|
|
exec_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_UPX);
|
|
exec_failure_reason->osr_flags |= OS_REASON_FLAG_GENERATE_CRASH_REPORT;
|
|
} else {
|
|
exec_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_BAD_MACHO);
|
|
|
|
if (bootarg_execfailurereports) {
|
|
set_proc_name(imgp, p);
|
|
exec_failure_reason->osr_flags |= OS_REASON_FLAG_GENERATE_CRASH_REPORT;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
exec_failure_reason->osr_flags |= OS_REASON_FLAG_CONSISTENT_FAILURE;
|
|
|
|
goto badtoolate;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* ERROR RECOVERY
|
|
*
|
|
* load_machfile() returned the new VM map ("map") but we haven't
|
|
* committed to it yet.
|
|
* Any error path between here and the point where we commit to using
|
|
* the new "map" (with swap_task_map()) should deallocate "map".
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifndef KASAN
|
|
/*
|
|
* Security: zone sanity checks on fresh boot or initproc re-exec.
|
|
* launchd by design does not tear down its own service port on USR (rdar://72797967),
|
|
* which means here is the earliest point we can assert on empty service port label zone,
|
|
* after load_machfile() above terminates old launchd's IPC space.
|
|
*
|
|
* Disable on KASAN builds since zone_size_allocated() accounts for elements
|
|
* under quarantine.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (task_pid(task) == 1) {
|
|
zone_userspace_reboot_checks();
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
proc_lock(p);
|
|
p->p_cputype = imgp->ip_origcputype;
|
|
p->p_cpusubtype = imgp->ip_origcpusubtype;
|
|
proc_setplatformdata(p, load_result.ip_platform, load_result.lr_min_sdk, load_result.lr_sdk);
|
|
exec_setup_tpro(imgp, &load_result);
|
|
|
|
vm_map_set_size_limit(map, proc_limitgetcur(p, RLIMIT_AS));
|
|
vm_map_set_data_limit(map, proc_limitgetcur(p, RLIMIT_DATA));
|
|
vm_map_set_user_wire_limit(map, (vm_size_t)proc_limitgetcur(p, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK));
|
|
#if XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX
|
|
if (proc_platform(p) == PLATFORM_IOS) {
|
|
assert(vm_map_is_alien(map));
|
|
} else {
|
|
assert(!vm_map_is_alien(map));
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX */
|
|
proc_unlock(p);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set TPRO flags if enabled
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set code-signing flags if this binary is signed, or if parent has
|
|
* requested them on exec.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (load_result.csflags & CS_VALID) {
|
|
imgp->ip_csflags |= load_result.csflags &
|
|
(CS_VALID | CS_SIGNED | CS_DEV_CODE | CS_LINKER_SIGNED |
|
|
CS_HARD | CS_KILL | CS_RESTRICT | CS_ENFORCEMENT | CS_REQUIRE_LV |
|
|
CS_FORCED_LV | CS_ENTITLEMENTS_VALIDATED | CS_NO_UNTRUSTED_HELPERS | CS_RUNTIME |
|
|
CS_ENTITLEMENT_FLAGS |
|
|
CS_EXEC_SET_HARD | CS_EXEC_SET_KILL | CS_EXEC_SET_ENFORCEMENT);
|
|
} else {
|
|
imgp->ip_csflags &= ~CS_VALID;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (proc_getcsflags(p) & CS_EXEC_SET_HARD) {
|
|
imgp->ip_csflags |= CS_HARD;
|
|
}
|
|
if (proc_getcsflags(p) & CS_EXEC_SET_KILL) {
|
|
imgp->ip_csflags |= CS_KILL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (proc_getcsflags(p) & CS_EXEC_SET_ENFORCEMENT) {
|
|
imgp->ip_csflags |= CS_ENFORCEMENT;
|
|
}
|
|
if (proc_getcsflags(p) & CS_EXEC_INHERIT_SIP) {
|
|
if (proc_getcsflags(p) & CS_INSTALLER) {
|
|
imgp->ip_csflags |= CS_INSTALLER;
|
|
}
|
|
if (proc_getcsflags(p) & CS_DATAVAULT_CONTROLLER) {
|
|
imgp->ip_csflags |= CS_DATAVAULT_CONTROLLER;
|
|
}
|
|
if (proc_getcsflags(p) & CS_NVRAM_UNRESTRICTED) {
|
|
imgp->ip_csflags |= CS_NVRAM_UNRESTRICTED;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls) && defined(XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX)
|
|
/*
|
|
* ptrauth version 0 is a preview ABI. Developers can opt into running
|
|
* their own arm64e binaries for local testing, with the understanding
|
|
* that future OSes may break ABI.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((imgp->ip_origcpusubtype & ~CPU_SUBTYPE_MASK) == CPU_SUBTYPE_ARM64E &&
|
|
CPU_SUBTYPE_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_VERSION(imgp->ip_origcpusubtype) == 0 &&
|
|
!load_result.platform_binary &&
|
|
!bootarg_arm64e_preview_abi) {
|
|
static bool logged_once = false;
|
|
set_proc_name(imgp, p);
|
|
|
|
printf("%s: not running binary \"%s\" built against preview arm64e ABI\n", __func__, p->p_name);
|
|
if (!os_atomic_xchg(&logged_once, true, relaxed)) {
|
|
printf("%s: (to allow this, add \"-arm64e_preview_abi\" to boot-args)\n", __func__);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
exec_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_BAD_MACHO);
|
|
if (bootarg_execfailurereports) {
|
|
exec_failure_reason->osr_flags |= OS_REASON_FLAG_GENERATE_CRASH_REPORT;
|
|
exec_failure_reason->osr_flags |= OS_REASON_FLAG_CONSISTENT_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* release new address space since we won't use it */
|
|
imgp->ip_free_map = map;
|
|
map = VM_MAP_NULL;
|
|
goto badtoolate;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((imgp->ip_origcpusubtype & ~CPU_SUBTYPE_MASK) != CPU_SUBTYPE_ARM64E &&
|
|
imgp->ip_origcputype == CPU_TYPE_ARM64 &&
|
|
load_result.platform_binary &&
|
|
(imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_DRIVER) != 0) {
|
|
set_proc_name(imgp, p);
|
|
printf("%s: disallowing arm64 platform driverkit binary \"%s\", should be arm64e\n", __func__, p->p_name);
|
|
exec_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_BAD_MACHO);
|
|
if (bootarg_execfailurereports) {
|
|
exec_failure_reason->osr_flags |= OS_REASON_FLAG_GENERATE_CRASH_REPORT;
|
|
exec_failure_reason->osr_flags |= OS_REASON_FLAG_CONSISTENT_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* release new address space since we won't use it */
|
|
imgp->ip_free_map = map;
|
|
map = VM_MAP_NULL;
|
|
goto badtoolate;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* __has_feature(ptrauth_calls) && defined(XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX) */
|
|
|
|
|
|
load_result.hardened_runtime_binary = 0;
|
|
// Propogate which hardened runtime entitlements are active to the apple array
|
|
encode_HR_entitlement(kCSWebBrowserHostEntitlement, BrowserHostEntitlementMask, imgp, &load_result);
|
|
encode_HR_entitlement(kCSWebBrowserGPUEntitlement, BrowserGPUEntitlementMask, imgp, &load_result);
|
|
encode_HR_entitlement(kCSWebBrowserNetworkEntitlement, BrowserNetworkEntitlementMask, imgp, &load_result);
|
|
encode_HR_entitlement(kCSWebBrowserWebContentEntitlement, BrowserWebContentEntitlementMask, imgp, &load_result);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set up the shared cache region in the new process.
|
|
*
|
|
* Normally there is a single shared region per architecture.
|
|
* However on systems with Pointer Authentication, we can create
|
|
* multiple shared caches with the amount of sharing determined
|
|
* by team-id or entitlement. Inherited shared region IDs are used
|
|
* for system processes that need to match and be able to inspect
|
|
* a pre-existing task.
|
|
*/
|
|
int cpu_subtype = 0; /* all cpu_subtypes use the same shared region */
|
|
#if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls)
|
|
char *shared_region_id = NULL;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
char *base;
|
|
const char *cbase;
|
|
#define HARDENED_RUNTIME_CONTENT_ID "C-"
|
|
#define TEAM_ID_PREFIX "T-"
|
|
#define ENTITLE_PREFIX "E-"
|
|
#define SR_PREFIX_LEN 2
|
|
#define SR_ENTITLEMENT "com.apple.pac.shared_region_id"
|
|
|
|
if (cpu_type() == CPU_TYPE_ARM64 &&
|
|
arm64_cpusubtype_uses_ptrauth(p->p_cpusubtype) &&
|
|
(imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_NOJOP) == 0) {
|
|
assertf(p->p_cputype == CPU_TYPE_ARM64,
|
|
"p %p cpu_type() 0x%x p->p_cputype 0x%x p->p_cpusubtype 0x%x",
|
|
p, cpu_type(), p->p_cputype, p->p_cpusubtype);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* arm64e uses pointer authentication, so request a separate
|
|
* shared region for this CPU subtype.
|
|
*/
|
|
cpu_subtype = p->p_cpusubtype & ~CPU_SUBTYPE_MASK;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Determine which shared cache to select based on being told,
|
|
* matching a team-id or matching an entitlement.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (load_result.hardened_runtime_binary & BrowserWebContentEntitlementMask) {
|
|
len = sizeof(HARDENED_RUNTIME_CONTENT_ID);
|
|
shared_region_id = kalloc_data(len, Z_WAITOK | Z_NOFAIL);
|
|
strlcpy(shared_region_id, HARDENED_RUNTIME_CONTENT_ID, len);
|
|
} else if (imgp->ip_inherited_shared_region_id) {
|
|
len = strlen(imgp->ip_inherited_shared_region_id);
|
|
shared_region_id = kalloc_data(len + 1, Z_WAITOK | Z_NOFAIL);
|
|
memcpy(shared_region_id, imgp->ip_inherited_shared_region_id, len + 1);
|
|
} else if ((cbase = get_teamid_for_shared_region(imgp)) != NULL) {
|
|
len = strlen(cbase);
|
|
if (vm_shared_region_per_team_id) {
|
|
shared_region_id = kalloc_data(len + SR_PREFIX_LEN + 1,
|
|
Z_WAITOK | Z_NOFAIL);
|
|
memcpy(shared_region_id, TEAM_ID_PREFIX, SR_PREFIX_LEN);
|
|
memcpy(shared_region_id + SR_PREFIX_LEN, cbase, len + 1);
|
|
}
|
|
} else if ((base = IOVnodeGetEntitlement(imgp->ip_vp,
|
|
(int64_t)imgp->ip_arch_offset, SR_ENTITLEMENT)) != NULL) {
|
|
len = strlen(base);
|
|
if (vm_shared_region_by_entitlement) {
|
|
shared_region_id = kalloc_data(len + SR_PREFIX_LEN + 1,
|
|
Z_WAITOK | Z_NOFAIL);
|
|
memcpy(shared_region_id, ENTITLE_PREFIX, SR_PREFIX_LEN);
|
|
memcpy(shared_region_id + SR_PREFIX_LEN, base, len + 1);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Discard the copy of the entitlement */
|
|
kfree_data(base, len + 1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_RESLIDE) {
|
|
reslide = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* use "" as the default shared_region_id */
|
|
if (shared_region_id == NULL) {
|
|
shared_region_id = kalloc_data(1, Z_WAITOK | Z_ZERO | Z_NOFAIL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ensure there's a unique pointer signing key for this shared_region_id */
|
|
shared_region_key_alloc(shared_region_id,
|
|
imgp->ip_inherited_shared_region_id != NULL, imgp->ip_inherited_jop_pid);
|
|
task_set_shared_region_id(task, shared_region_id);
|
|
shared_region_id = NULL;
|
|
#endif /* __has_feature(ptrauth_calls) */
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_ROSETTA
|
|
if (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_ROSETTA) {
|
|
OSBitOrAtomic(P_TRANSLATED, &p->p_flag);
|
|
} else if (p->p_flag & P_TRANSLATED) {
|
|
OSBitAndAtomic(~P_TRANSLATED, &p->p_flag);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int cputype = cpu_type();
|
|
|
|
uint32_t rsr_version = 0;
|
|
#if XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX
|
|
if (vnode_is_rsr(imgp->ip_vp)) {
|
|
rsr_version = rsr_get_version();
|
|
os_atomic_or(&p->p_ladvflag, P_RSR, relaxed);
|
|
os_atomic_or(&p->p_vfs_iopolicy, P_VFS_IOPOLICY_ALTLINK, relaxed);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX */
|
|
|
|
vm_map_exec(map, task, load_result.is_64bit_addr,
|
|
(void *)p->p_fd.fd_rdir, cputype, cpu_subtype, reslide,
|
|
(imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_DRIVER) != 0,
|
|
rsr_version);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Close file descriptors which specify close-on-exec.
|
|
*/
|
|
fdt_exec(p, vfs_context_ucred(imgp->ip_vfs_context),
|
|
psa != NULL ? psa->psa_flags : 0, imgp->ip_new_thread, exec);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* deal with set[ug]id.
|
|
*/
|
|
error = exec_handle_sugid(imgp);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT(BSDDBG_CODE(DBG_BSD_PROC, BSD_PROC_EXITREASON_CREATE) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
|
|
proc_getpid(p), OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_SUGID_FAILURE, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
exec_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_SUGID_FAILURE);
|
|
if (bootarg_execfailurereports) {
|
|
set_proc_name(imgp, p);
|
|
exec_failure_reason->osr_flags |= OS_REASON_FLAG_GENERATE_CRASH_REPORT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* release new address space since we won't use it */
|
|
imgp->ip_free_map = map;
|
|
map = VM_MAP_NULL;
|
|
goto badtoolate;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Commit to new map.
|
|
*
|
|
* Swap the new map for the old for target task, which consumes
|
|
* our new map reference but each leaves us responsible for the
|
|
* old_map reference. That lets us get off the pmap associated
|
|
* with it, and then we can release it.
|
|
*
|
|
* The map needs to be set on the target task which is different
|
|
* than current task, thus swap_task_map is used instead of
|
|
* vm_map_switch.
|
|
*/
|
|
old_map = swap_task_map(task, thread, map);
|
|
#if MACH_ASSERT
|
|
/*
|
|
* Reset the pmap's process info to prevent ledger checks
|
|
* which might fail due to the ledgers being shared between
|
|
* the old and new pmaps.
|
|
*/
|
|
vm_map_pmap_set_process(old_map, -1, "<old_map>");
|
|
#endif /* MACH_ASSERT */
|
|
imgp->ip_free_map = old_map;
|
|
old_map = NULL;
|
|
|
|
lret = activate_exec_state(task, p, thread, &load_result);
|
|
if (lret != KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT(BSDDBG_CODE(DBG_BSD_PROC, BSD_PROC_EXITREASON_CREATE) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
|
|
proc_getpid(p), OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_ACTV_THREADSTATE, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
exec_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_ACTV_THREADSTATE);
|
|
if (bootarg_execfailurereports) {
|
|
set_proc_name(imgp, p);
|
|
exec_failure_reason->osr_flags |= OS_REASON_FLAG_GENERATE_CRASH_REPORT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto badtoolate;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* deal with voucher on exec-calling thread.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (imgp->ip_new_thread == NULL) {
|
|
thread_set_mach_voucher(current_thread(), IPC_VOUCHER_NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure we won't interrupt ourself signalling a partial process */
|
|
if (!vfexec && !spawn && (p->p_lflag & P_LTRACED)) {
|
|
psignal(p, SIGTRAP);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (load_result.unixproc &&
|
|
create_unix_stack(get_task_map(task),
|
|
&load_result,
|
|
p) != KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
error = load_return_to_errno(LOAD_NOSPACE);
|
|
|
|
KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT(BSDDBG_CODE(DBG_BSD_PROC, BSD_PROC_EXITREASON_CREATE) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
|
|
proc_getpid(p), OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_STACK_ALLOC, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
exec_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_STACK_ALLOC);
|
|
if (bootarg_execfailurereports) {
|
|
set_proc_name(imgp, p);
|
|
exec_failure_reason->osr_flags |= OS_REASON_FLAG_GENERATE_CRASH_REPORT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto badtoolate;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (load_result.hardened_runtime_binary) {
|
|
if (cs_debug) {
|
|
printf("setting hardened runtime with entitlement mask= "
|
|
"0x%x on task: pid = %d\n",
|
|
load_result.hardened_runtime_binary,
|
|
proc_getpid(p));
|
|
}
|
|
task_set_hardened_runtime(task, true);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The load result will have already been munged by AMFI to include the
|
|
* platform binary flag if boot-args dictated it (AMFI will mark anything
|
|
* that doesn't go through the upcall path as a platform binary if its
|
|
* enforcement is disabled).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (load_result.platform_binary) {
|
|
if (cs_debug) {
|
|
printf("setting platform binary on task: pid = %d\n", proc_getpid(p));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We must use 'task' here because the proc's task has not yet been
|
|
* switched to the new one.
|
|
*/
|
|
task_set_platform_binary(task, TRUE);
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (cs_debug) {
|
|
printf("clearing platform binary on task: pid = %d\n", proc_getpid(p));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
task_set_platform_binary(task, FALSE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX
|
|
/* Disable mach hardening for all 1P tasks which load 3P plugins */
|
|
if (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_3P_PLUGINS) {
|
|
if (cs_debug) {
|
|
printf("Disabling some mach hardening on task due to 3P plugins: pid = %d\n", proc_getpid(p));
|
|
}
|
|
task_disable_mach_hardening(task);
|
|
}
|
|
#if DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG
|
|
/* Disable mach hardening for all tasks if amfi_get_out_of_my_way is set.
|
|
* Customers will have to turn SIP off to use this boot-arg, and so this is
|
|
* only needed internally since we disable this feature when SIP is off. */
|
|
if (AMFI_bootarg_disable_mach_hardening) {
|
|
if (cs_debug) {
|
|
printf("Disabling some mach hardening on task due to AMFI boot-args: pid = %d\n", proc_getpid(p));
|
|
}
|
|
task_disable_mach_hardening(task);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG */
|
|
#endif /* XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set starting EXC_GUARD and control port behavior for task now that
|
|
* platform and hardened runtime is set. Use the name directly from imgp since we haven't
|
|
* set_proc_name() yet. Also make control port for the task and main thread
|
|
* immovable/pinned based on task's option.
|
|
*
|
|
* Must happen before main thread port copyout in exc_add_apple_strings.
|
|
*/
|
|
task_set_exc_guard_ctrl_port_default(task, thread,
|
|
imgp->ip_ndp->ni_cnd.cn_nameptr,
|
|
(unsigned)imgp->ip_ndp->ni_cnd.cn_namelen,
|
|
proc_is_simulated(p),
|
|
load_result.ip_platform,
|
|
load_result.lr_sdk);
|
|
|
|
error = exec_add_apple_strings(imgp, &load_result); /* copies out main thread port */
|
|
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT(BSDDBG_CODE(DBG_BSD_PROC, BSD_PROC_EXITREASON_CREATE) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
|
|
proc_getpid(p), OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_APPLE_STRING_INIT, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
exec_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_APPLE_STRING_INIT);
|
|
if (bootarg_execfailurereports) {
|
|
set_proc_name(imgp, p);
|
|
exec_failure_reason->osr_flags |= OS_REASON_FLAG_GENERATE_CRASH_REPORT;
|
|
}
|
|
goto badtoolate;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Switch to target task's map to copy out strings */
|
|
old_map = vm_map_switch(get_task_map(task));
|
|
|
|
if (load_result.unixproc) {
|
|
user_addr_t ap;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Copy the strings area out into the new process address
|
|
* space.
|
|
*/
|
|
ap = p->user_stack;
|
|
error = exec_copyout_strings(imgp, &ap);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
vm_map_switch(old_map);
|
|
|
|
KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT(BSDDBG_CODE(DBG_BSD_PROC, BSD_PROC_EXITREASON_CREATE) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
|
|
proc_getpid(p), OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_COPYOUT_STRINGS, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
exec_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_COPYOUT_STRINGS);
|
|
if (bootarg_execfailurereports) {
|
|
set_proc_name(imgp, p);
|
|
exec_failure_reason->osr_flags |= OS_REASON_FLAG_GENERATE_CRASH_REPORT;
|
|
}
|
|
goto badtoolate;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Set the stack */
|
|
thread_setuserstack(thread, ap);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (load_result.dynlinker || load_result.is_rosetta) {
|
|
user_addr_t ap;
|
|
int new_ptr_size = (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_IS_64BIT_ADDR) ? 8 : 4;
|
|
|
|
/* Adjust the stack */
|
|
ap = thread_adjuserstack(thread, -new_ptr_size);
|
|
error = copyoutptr(load_result.mach_header, ap, new_ptr_size);
|
|
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
vm_map_switch(old_map);
|
|
|
|
KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT(BSDDBG_CODE(DBG_BSD_PROC, BSD_PROC_EXITREASON_CREATE) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
|
|
proc_getpid(p), OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_COPYOUT_DYNLINKER, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
exec_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_COPYOUT_DYNLINKER);
|
|
if (bootarg_execfailurereports) {
|
|
set_proc_name(imgp, p);
|
|
exec_failure_reason->osr_flags |= OS_REASON_FLAG_GENERATE_CRASH_REPORT;
|
|
}
|
|
goto badtoolate;
|
|
}
|
|
error = task_set_dyld_info(task, load_result.all_image_info_addr,
|
|
load_result.all_image_info_size);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
vm_map_switch(old_map);
|
|
|
|
KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT(BSDDBG_CODE(DBG_BSD_PROC, BSD_PROC_EXITREASON_CREATE) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
|
|
proc_getpid(p), OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_SET_DYLD_INFO, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
exec_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_SET_DYLD_INFO);
|
|
if (bootarg_execfailurereports) {
|
|
set_proc_name(imgp, p);
|
|
exec_failure_reason->osr_flags |= OS_REASON_FLAG_GENERATE_CRASH_REPORT;
|
|
}
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto badtoolate;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_ROSETTA
|
|
if (load_result.is_rosetta) {
|
|
// Add an fd for the executable file for Rosetta's use
|
|
int main_binary_fd;
|
|
struct fileproc *fp;
|
|
|
|
error = falloc_exec(p, imgp->ip_vfs_context, &fp, &main_binary_fd);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
vm_map_switch(old_map);
|
|
|
|
KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT(BSDDBG_CODE(DBG_BSD_PROC, BSD_PROC_EXITREASON_CREATE) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
|
|
proc_getpid(p), OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_MAIN_FD_ALLOC, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
exec_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_MAIN_FD_ALLOC);
|
|
if (bootarg_execfailurereports) {
|
|
set_proc_name(imgp, p);
|
|
exec_failure_reason->osr_flags |= OS_REASON_FLAG_GENERATE_CRASH_REPORT;
|
|
}
|
|
goto badtoolate;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = VNOP_OPEN(imgp->ip_vp, FREAD, imgp->ip_vfs_context);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
vm_map_switch(old_map);
|
|
|
|
KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT(BSDDBG_CODE(DBG_BSD_PROC, BSD_PROC_EXITREASON_CREATE) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
|
|
proc_getpid(p), OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_MAIN_FD_ALLOC, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
exec_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_MAIN_FD_ALLOC);
|
|
if (bootarg_execfailurereports) {
|
|
set_proc_name(imgp, p);
|
|
exec_failure_reason->osr_flags |= OS_REASON_FLAG_GENERATE_CRASH_REPORT;
|
|
}
|
|
goto cleanup_rosetta_fp;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fp->fp_glob->fg_flag = FREAD;
|
|
fp->fp_glob->fg_ops = &vnops;
|
|
fp_set_data(fp, imgp->ip_vp);
|
|
|
|
proc_fdlock(p);
|
|
procfdtbl_releasefd(p, main_binary_fd, NULL);
|
|
fp_drop(p, main_binary_fd, fp, 1);
|
|
proc_fdunlock(p);
|
|
|
|
vnode_ref(imgp->ip_vp);
|
|
|
|
// Pass the dyld load address, main binary fd, and dyld fd on the stack
|
|
uint64_t ap = thread_adjuserstack(thread, -24);
|
|
|
|
error = copyoutptr((user_addr_t)load_result.dynlinker_fd, ap, 8);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
vm_map_switch(old_map);
|
|
|
|
KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT(BSDDBG_CODE(DBG_BSD_PROC, BSD_PROC_EXITREASON_CREATE) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
|
|
proc_getpid(p), OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_COPYOUT_ROSETTA, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
exec_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_COPYOUT_ROSETTA);
|
|
if (bootarg_execfailurereports) {
|
|
set_proc_name(imgp, p);
|
|
exec_failure_reason->osr_flags |= OS_REASON_FLAG_GENERATE_CRASH_REPORT;
|
|
}
|
|
goto cleanup_rosetta_fp;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = copyoutptr(load_result.dynlinker_mach_header, ap + 8, 8);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
vm_map_switch(old_map);
|
|
|
|
KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT(BSDDBG_CODE(DBG_BSD_PROC, BSD_PROC_EXITREASON_CREATE) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
|
|
proc_getpid(p), OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_COPYOUT_ROSETTA, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
exec_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_COPYOUT_ROSETTA);
|
|
if (bootarg_execfailurereports) {
|
|
set_proc_name(imgp, p);
|
|
exec_failure_reason->osr_flags |= OS_REASON_FLAG_GENERATE_CRASH_REPORT;
|
|
}
|
|
goto cleanup_rosetta_fp;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = copyoutptr((user_addr_t)main_binary_fd, ap + 16, 8);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
vm_map_switch(old_map);
|
|
|
|
KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT(BSDDBG_CODE(DBG_BSD_PROC, BSD_PROC_EXITREASON_CREATE) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
|
|
proc_getpid(p), OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_COPYOUT_ROSETTA, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
exec_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_COPYOUT_ROSETTA);
|
|
if (bootarg_execfailurereports) {
|
|
set_proc_name(imgp, p);
|
|
exec_failure_reason->osr_flags |= OS_REASON_FLAG_GENERATE_CRASH_REPORT;
|
|
}
|
|
goto cleanup_rosetta_fp;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cleanup_rosetta_fp:
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
fp_free(p, load_result.dynlinker_fd, load_result.dynlinker_fp);
|
|
fp_free(p, main_binary_fd, fp);
|
|
goto badtoolate;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Avoid immediate VM faults back into kernel */
|
|
exec_prefault_data(p, imgp, &load_result);
|
|
|
|
vm_map_switch(old_map);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Reset signal state.
|
|
*/
|
|
execsigs(p, thread);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* need to cancel async IO requests that can be cancelled and wait for those
|
|
* already active. MAY BLOCK!
|
|
*/
|
|
_aio_exec( p );
|
|
|
|
#if SYSV_SHM
|
|
/* FIXME: Till vmspace inherit is fixed: */
|
|
if (!vfexec && p->vm_shm) {
|
|
shmexec(p);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if SYSV_SEM
|
|
/* Clean up the semaphores */
|
|
semexit(p);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Remember file name for accounting.
|
|
*/
|
|
p->p_acflag &= ~AFORK;
|
|
|
|
set_proc_name(imgp, p);
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_SECLUDED_MEMORY
|
|
if (secluded_for_apps &&
|
|
load_result.platform_binary) {
|
|
if (strncmp(p->p_name,
|
|
"Camera",
|
|
sizeof(p->p_name)) == 0) {
|
|
task_set_could_use_secluded_mem(task, TRUE);
|
|
} else {
|
|
task_set_could_use_secluded_mem(task, FALSE);
|
|
}
|
|
if (strncmp(p->p_name,
|
|
"mediaserverd",
|
|
sizeof(p->p_name)) == 0) {
|
|
task_set_could_also_use_secluded_mem(task, TRUE);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SECLUDED_MEMORY */
|
|
|
|
#if __arm64__
|
|
if (load_result.legacy_footprint) {
|
|
task_set_legacy_footprint(task);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* __arm64__ */
|
|
|
|
pal_dbg_set_task_name(task);
|
|
|
|
#if DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG
|
|
/*
|
|
* Update the pid an proc name for importance base if any
|
|
*/
|
|
task_importance_update_owner_info(task);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
proc_setexecutableuuid(p, &load_result.uuid[0]);
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_DTRACE
|
|
dtrace_proc_exec(p);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (kdebug_enable) {
|
|
long args[4] = {};
|
|
|
|
uintptr_t fsid = 0, fileid = 0;
|
|
if (imgp->ip_vattr) {
|
|
uint64_t fsid64 = vnode_get_va_fsid(imgp->ip_vattr);
|
|
fsid = (uintptr_t)fsid64;
|
|
fileid = (uintptr_t)imgp->ip_vattr->va_fileid;
|
|
// check for (unexpected) overflow and trace zero in that case
|
|
if (fsid != fsid64 || fileid != imgp->ip_vattr->va_fileid) {
|
|
fsid = fileid = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT_IST1(TRACE_DATA_EXEC, proc_getpid(p), fsid, fileid, 0,
|
|
(uintptr_t)thread_tid(thread));
|
|
|
|
extern void kdebug_proc_name_args(struct proc *proc, long args[static 4]);
|
|
kdebug_proc_name_args(p, args);
|
|
KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT_IST1(TRACE_STRING_EXEC, args[0], args[1],
|
|
args[2], args[3], (uintptr_t)thread_tid(thread));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If posix_spawned with the START_SUSPENDED flag, stop the
|
|
* process before it runs.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL) {
|
|
psa = (struct _posix_spawnattr *) imgp->ip_px_sa;
|
|
if (psa->psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_START_SUSPENDED) {
|
|
proc_lock(p);
|
|
p->p_stat = SSTOP;
|
|
proc_unlock(p);
|
|
(void) task_suspend_internal(task);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* mark as execed
|
|
*/
|
|
OSBitOrAtomic(P_EXEC, &p->p_flag);
|
|
proc_resetregister(p);
|
|
if (p->p_pptr && (p->p_lflag & P_LPPWAIT)) {
|
|
proc_lock(p);
|
|
p->p_lflag &= ~P_LPPWAIT;
|
|
proc_unlock(p);
|
|
wakeup((caddr_t)p->p_pptr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set up dext coredumps on kernel panic.
|
|
* This requires the following:
|
|
* - dext_panic_coredump=1 boot-arg (enabled by default on DEVELOPMENT, DEBUG and certain Seed builds)
|
|
* - process must be a driver
|
|
* - process must have the com.apple.private.enable-coredump-on-panic entitlement, and the
|
|
* entitlement has a string value.
|
|
* - process must have the com.apple.private.enable-coredump-on-panic-seed-privacy-approved
|
|
* entitlement (Seed builds only).
|
|
*
|
|
* The core dump file name is formatted with the entitlement string value, followed by a hyphen
|
|
* and the process PID.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (enable_dext_coredumps_on_panic &&
|
|
(imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_DRIVER) != 0 &&
|
|
(userspace_coredump_name = IOVnodeGetEntitlement(imgp->ip_vp,
|
|
(int64_t)imgp->ip_arch_offset, USERSPACE_COREDUMP_PANIC_ENTITLEMENT)) != NULL) {
|
|
size_t userspace_coredump_name_len = strlen(userspace_coredump_name);
|
|
|
|
char core_name[MACH_CORE_FILEHEADER_NAMELEN];
|
|
/* 16 - NULL char - strlen("-") - maximum of 5 digits for pid */
|
|
snprintf(core_name, MACH_CORE_FILEHEADER_NAMELEN, "%.9s-%d", userspace_coredump_name, proc_getpid(p));
|
|
|
|
kern_register_userspace_coredump(task, core_name);
|
|
|
|
/* Discard the copy of the entitlement */
|
|
kfree_data(userspace_coredump_name, userspace_coredump_name_len + 1);
|
|
userspace_coredump_name = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
badtoolate:
|
|
/* Don't allow child process to execute any instructions */
|
|
if (!spawn) {
|
|
{
|
|
assert(exec_failure_reason != OS_REASON_NULL);
|
|
if (bootarg_execfailurereports) {
|
|
set_proc_name(imgp, current_proc());
|
|
}
|
|
psignal_with_reason(current_proc(), SIGKILL, exec_failure_reason);
|
|
exec_failure_reason = OS_REASON_NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (exec) {
|
|
/* Terminate the exec copy task */
|
|
task_terminate_internal(task);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We can't stop this system call at this point, so just pretend we succeeded */
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
os_reason_free(exec_failure_reason);
|
|
exec_failure_reason = OS_REASON_NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
if (load_result.threadstate) {
|
|
kfree_data(load_result.threadstate, load_result.threadstate_sz);
|
|
load_result.threadstate = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bad:
|
|
/* If we hit this, we likely would have leaked an exit reason */
|
|
assert(exec_failure_reason == OS_REASON_NULL);
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Our image activator table; this is the table of the image types we are
|
|
* capable of loading. We list them in order of preference to ensure the
|
|
* fastest image load speed.
|
|
*
|
|
* XXX hardcoded, for now; should use linker sets
|
|
*/
|
|
struct execsw {
|
|
int(*const ex_imgact)(struct image_params *);
|
|
const char *ex_name;
|
|
}const execsw[] = {
|
|
{ exec_mach_imgact, "Mach-o Binary" },
|
|
{ exec_fat_imgact, "Fat Binary" },
|
|
{ exec_shell_imgact, "Interpreter Script" },
|
|
{ NULL, NULL}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* exec_activate_image
|
|
*
|
|
* Description: Iterate through the available image activators, and activate
|
|
* the image associated with the imgp structure. We start with
|
|
* the activator for Mach-o binaries followed by that for Fat binaries
|
|
* for Interpreter scripts.
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters: struct image_params * Image parameter block
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: 0 Success
|
|
* ENOEXEC No activator for image.
|
|
* EBADEXEC The executable is corrupt/unknown
|
|
* execargs_alloc:EINVAL Invalid argument
|
|
* execargs_alloc:EACCES Permission denied
|
|
* execargs_alloc:EINTR Interrupted function
|
|
* execargs_alloc:ENOMEM Not enough space
|
|
* exec_save_path:EFAULT Bad address
|
|
* exec_save_path:ENAMETOOLONG Filename too long
|
|
* exec_check_permissions:EACCES Permission denied
|
|
* exec_check_permissions:ENOEXEC Executable file format error
|
|
* exec_check_permissions:ETXTBSY Text file busy [misuse of error code]
|
|
* exec_check_permissions:???
|
|
* namei:???
|
|
* vn_rdwr:??? [anything vn_rdwr can return]
|
|
* <ex_imgact>:??? [anything an imgact can return]
|
|
* EDEADLK Process is being terminated
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
exec_activate_image(struct image_params *imgp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct nameidata *ndp = NULL;
|
|
const char *excpath;
|
|
int error;
|
|
int resid;
|
|
int once = 1; /* save SGUID-ness for interpreted files */
|
|
int i;
|
|
int itercount = 0;
|
|
proc_t p = vfs_context_proc(imgp->ip_vfs_context);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* For exec, the translock needs to be taken on old proc and not
|
|
* on new shadow proc.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_EXEC) {
|
|
p = current_proc();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = execargs_alloc(imgp);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad_notrans;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = exec_save_path(imgp, imgp->ip_user_fname, imgp->ip_seg, &excpath);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad_notrans;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Use excpath, which contains the copyin-ed exec path */
|
|
DTRACE_PROC1(exec, uintptr_t, excpath);
|
|
|
|
ndp = kalloc_type(struct nameidata, Z_WAITOK | Z_ZERO | Z_NOFAIL);
|
|
|
|
NDINIT(ndp, LOOKUP, OP_LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | AUDITVNPATH1,
|
|
UIO_SYSSPACE, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(excpath), imgp->ip_vfs_context);
|
|
|
|
again:
|
|
error = namei(ndp);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
if (error == ERESTART) {
|
|
error = EINTR;
|
|
}
|
|
goto bad_notrans;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_ndp = ndp; /* successful namei(); call nameidone() later */
|
|
imgp->ip_vp = ndp->ni_vp; /* if set, need to vnode_put() at some point */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Before we start the transition from binary A to binary B, make
|
|
* sure another thread hasn't started exiting the process. We grab
|
|
* the proc lock to check p_lflag initially, and the transition
|
|
* mechanism ensures that the value doesn't change after we release
|
|
* the lock.
|
|
*/
|
|
proc_lock(p);
|
|
if (p->p_lflag & P_LEXIT) {
|
|
error = EDEADLK;
|
|
proc_unlock(p);
|
|
goto bad_notrans;
|
|
}
|
|
error = proc_transstart(p, 1, 0);
|
|
proc_unlock(p);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad_notrans;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = exec_check_permissions(imgp);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Copy; avoid invocation of an interpreter overwriting the original */
|
|
if (once) {
|
|
once = 0;
|
|
*imgp->ip_origvattr = *imgp->ip_vattr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = vn_rdwr(UIO_READ, imgp->ip_vp, imgp->ip_vdata, PAGE_SIZE, 0,
|
|
UIO_SYSSPACE, IO_NODELOCKED,
|
|
vfs_context_ucred(imgp->ip_vfs_context),
|
|
&resid, vfs_context_proc(imgp->ip_vfs_context));
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (resid) {
|
|
memset(imgp->ip_vdata + (PAGE_SIZE - resid), 0x0, resid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
encapsulated_binary:
|
|
/* Limit the number of iterations we will attempt on each binary */
|
|
if (++itercount > EAI_ITERLIMIT) {
|
|
error = EBADEXEC;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
error = -1;
|
|
for (i = 0; error == -1 && execsw[i].ex_imgact != NULL; i++) {
|
|
error = (*execsw[i].ex_imgact)(imgp);
|
|
|
|
switch (error) {
|
|
/* case -1: not claimed: continue */
|
|
case -2: /* Encapsulated binary, imgp->ip_XXX set for next iteration */
|
|
goto encapsulated_binary;
|
|
|
|
case -3: /* Interpreter */
|
|
#if CONFIG_MACF
|
|
/*
|
|
* Copy the script label for later use. Note that
|
|
* the label can be different when the script is
|
|
* actually read by the interpreter.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (imgp->ip_scriptlabelp) {
|
|
mac_vnode_label_free(imgp->ip_scriptlabelp);
|
|
imgp->ip_scriptlabelp = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_scriptlabelp = mac_vnode_label_alloc(NULL);
|
|
if (imgp->ip_scriptlabelp == NULL) {
|
|
error = ENOMEM;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
mac_vnode_label_copy(mac_vnode_label(imgp->ip_vp),
|
|
imgp->ip_scriptlabelp);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Take a ref of the script vnode for later use.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (imgp->ip_scriptvp) {
|
|
vnode_put(imgp->ip_scriptvp);
|
|
imgp->ip_scriptvp = NULLVP;
|
|
}
|
|
if (vnode_getwithref(imgp->ip_vp) == 0) {
|
|
imgp->ip_scriptvp = imgp->ip_vp;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
nameidone(ndp);
|
|
|
|
vnode_put(imgp->ip_vp);
|
|
imgp->ip_vp = NULL; /* already put */
|
|
imgp->ip_ndp = NULL; /* already nameidone */
|
|
|
|
/* Use excpath, which exec_shell_imgact reset to the interpreter */
|
|
NDINIT(ndp, LOOKUP, OP_LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF,
|
|
UIO_SYSSPACE, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(excpath), imgp->ip_vfs_context);
|
|
|
|
proc_transend(p, 0);
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (error == -1) {
|
|
error = ENOEXEC;
|
|
} else if (error == 0) {
|
|
if (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_INTERPRET && ndp->ni_vp) {
|
|
AUDIT_ARG(vnpath, ndp->ni_vp, ARG_VNODE2);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Call out to allow 3rd party notification of exec.
|
|
* Ignore result of kauth_authorize_fileop call.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (kauth_authorize_fileop_has_listeners()) {
|
|
kauth_authorize_fileop(vfs_context_ucred(imgp->ip_vfs_context),
|
|
KAUTH_FILEOP_EXEC,
|
|
(uintptr_t)ndp->ni_vp, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
bad:
|
|
proc_transend(p, 0);
|
|
|
|
bad_notrans:
|
|
if (imgp->ip_strings) {
|
|
execargs_free(imgp);
|
|
}
|
|
if (imgp->ip_ndp) {
|
|
nameidone(imgp->ip_ndp);
|
|
}
|
|
kfree_type(struct nameidata, ndp);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* exec_validate_spawnattr_policy
|
|
*
|
|
* Description: Validates the entitlements required to set the apptype.
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters: int psa_apptype posix spawn attribute apptype
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: 0 Success
|
|
* EPERM Failure
|
|
*/
|
|
static errno_t
|
|
exec_validate_spawnattr_policy(int psa_apptype)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((psa_apptype & POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_MASK) != 0) {
|
|
int proctype = psa_apptype & POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_MASK;
|
|
if (proctype == POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_DRIVER) {
|
|
if (!IOCurrentTaskHasEntitlement(POSIX_SPAWN_ENTITLEMENT_DRIVER)) {
|
|
return EPERM;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* exec_handle_spawnattr_policy
|
|
*
|
|
* Description: Decode and apply the posix_spawn apptype, qos clamp, and watchport ports to the task.
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters: proc_t p process to apply attributes to
|
|
* int psa_apptype posix spawn attribute apptype
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: 0 Success
|
|
*/
|
|
static errno_t
|
|
exec_handle_spawnattr_policy(proc_t p, thread_t thread, int psa_apptype, uint64_t psa_qos_clamp,
|
|
task_role_t psa_darwin_role, struct exec_port_actions *port_actions)
|
|
{
|
|
int apptype = TASK_APPTYPE_NONE;
|
|
int qos_clamp = THREAD_QOS_UNSPECIFIED;
|
|
task_role_t role = TASK_UNSPECIFIED;
|
|
|
|
if ((psa_apptype & POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_MASK) != 0) {
|
|
int proctype = psa_apptype & POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_MASK;
|
|
|
|
switch (proctype) {
|
|
case POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_DAEMON_INTERACTIVE:
|
|
apptype = TASK_APPTYPE_DAEMON_INTERACTIVE;
|
|
break;
|
|
case POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_DAEMON_STANDARD:
|
|
apptype = TASK_APPTYPE_DAEMON_STANDARD;
|
|
break;
|
|
case POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_DAEMON_ADAPTIVE:
|
|
apptype = TASK_APPTYPE_DAEMON_ADAPTIVE;
|
|
break;
|
|
case POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_DAEMON_BACKGROUND:
|
|
apptype = TASK_APPTYPE_DAEMON_BACKGROUND;
|
|
break;
|
|
case POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_APP_DEFAULT:
|
|
apptype = TASK_APPTYPE_APP_DEFAULT;
|
|
break;
|
|
case POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_DRIVER:
|
|
apptype = TASK_APPTYPE_DRIVER;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
apptype = TASK_APPTYPE_NONE;
|
|
/* TODO: Should an invalid value here fail the spawn? */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (psa_qos_clamp != POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_CLAMP_NONE) {
|
|
switch (psa_qos_clamp) {
|
|
case POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_CLAMP_UTILITY:
|
|
qos_clamp = THREAD_QOS_UTILITY;
|
|
break;
|
|
case POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_CLAMP_BACKGROUND:
|
|
qos_clamp = THREAD_QOS_BACKGROUND;
|
|
break;
|
|
case POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_CLAMP_MAINTENANCE:
|
|
qos_clamp = THREAD_QOS_MAINTENANCE;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
qos_clamp = THREAD_QOS_UNSPECIFIED;
|
|
/* TODO: Should an invalid value here fail the spawn? */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (psa_darwin_role != PRIO_DARWIN_ROLE_DEFAULT) {
|
|
proc_darwin_role_to_task_role(psa_darwin_role, &role);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (apptype != TASK_APPTYPE_NONE ||
|
|
qos_clamp != THREAD_QOS_UNSPECIFIED ||
|
|
role != TASK_UNSPECIFIED ||
|
|
port_actions->portwatch_count) {
|
|
proc_set_task_spawnpolicy(proc_task(p), thread, apptype, qos_clamp, role,
|
|
port_actions->portwatch_array, port_actions->portwatch_count);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (port_actions->registered_count) {
|
|
if (mach_ports_register(proc_task(p), port_actions->registered_array,
|
|
port_actions->registered_count)) {
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
/* mach_ports_register() consumed the array */
|
|
port_actions->registered_array = NULL;
|
|
port_actions->registered_count = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
exec_port_actions_destroy(struct exec_port_actions *port_actions)
|
|
{
|
|
if (port_actions->excport_array) {
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < port_actions->exception_port_count; i++) {
|
|
ipc_port_t port = NULL;
|
|
if ((port = port_actions->excport_array[i].port) != NULL) {
|
|
ipc_port_release_send(port);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
kfree_type(struct exception_port_action_t, port_actions->exception_port_count,
|
|
port_actions->excport_array);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (port_actions->portwatch_array) {
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < port_actions->portwatch_count; i++) {
|
|
ipc_port_t port = NULL;
|
|
if ((port = port_actions->portwatch_array[i]) != NULL) {
|
|
ipc_port_release_send(port);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
kfree_type(ipc_port_t, port_actions->portwatch_count,
|
|
port_actions->portwatch_array);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (port_actions->registered_array) {
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < port_actions->registered_count; i++) {
|
|
ipc_port_t port = NULL;
|
|
if ((port = port_actions->registered_array[i]) != NULL) {
|
|
ipc_port_release_send(port);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
kfree_type(ipc_port_t, port_actions->registered_count,
|
|
port_actions->registered_array);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* exec_handle_port_actions
|
|
*
|
|
* Description: Go through the _posix_port_actions_t contents,
|
|
* calling task_set_special_port, task_set_exception_ports
|
|
* and/or audit_session_spawnjoin for the current task.
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters: struct image_params * Image parameter block
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: 0 Success
|
|
* EINVAL Failure
|
|
* ENOTSUP Illegal posix_spawn attr flag was set
|
|
*/
|
|
static errno_t
|
|
exec_handle_port_actions(struct image_params *imgp,
|
|
struct exec_port_actions *actions)
|
|
{
|
|
_posix_spawn_port_actions_t pacts = imgp->ip_px_spa;
|
|
#if CONFIG_AUDIT
|
|
proc_t p = vfs_context_proc(imgp->ip_vfs_context);
|
|
#endif
|
|
_ps_port_action_t *act = NULL;
|
|
task_t task = get_threadtask(imgp->ip_new_thread);
|
|
ipc_port_t port = NULL;
|
|
errno_t ret = 0;
|
|
int i = 0, portwatch_i = 0, registered_i = 0, excport_i = 0;
|
|
kern_return_t kr;
|
|
boolean_t task_has_watchport_boost = task_has_watchports(current_task());
|
|
boolean_t in_exec = (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_EXEC);
|
|
int ptrauth_task_port_count = 0;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < pacts->pspa_count; i++) {
|
|
act = &pacts->pspa_actions[i];
|
|
|
|
switch (act->port_type) {
|
|
case PSPA_SPECIAL:
|
|
#if CONFIG_AUDIT
|
|
case PSPA_AU_SESSION:
|
|
#endif
|
|
break;
|
|
case PSPA_EXCEPTION:
|
|
if (++actions->exception_port_count > TASK_MAX_EXCEPTION_PORT_COUNT) {
|
|
ret = EINVAL;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case PSPA_IMP_WATCHPORTS:
|
|
if (++actions->portwatch_count > TASK_MAX_WATCHPORT_COUNT) {
|
|
ret = EINVAL;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case PSPA_REGISTERED_PORTS:
|
|
if (++actions->registered_count > TASK_PORT_REGISTER_MAX) {
|
|
ret = EINVAL;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case PSPA_PTRAUTH_TASK_PORT:
|
|
if (++ptrauth_task_port_count > 1) {
|
|
ret = EINVAL;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
ret = EINVAL;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (actions->exception_port_count) {
|
|
actions->excport_array = kalloc_type(struct exception_port_action_t,
|
|
actions->exception_port_count, Z_WAITOK | Z_ZERO);
|
|
|
|
if (actions->excport_array == NULL) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (actions->portwatch_count) {
|
|
if (in_exec && task_has_watchport_boost) {
|
|
ret = EINVAL;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
actions->portwatch_array = kalloc_type(ipc_port_t,
|
|
actions->portwatch_count, Z_WAITOK | Z_ZERO);
|
|
if (actions->portwatch_array == NULL) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (actions->registered_count) {
|
|
actions->registered_array = kalloc_type(ipc_port_t,
|
|
actions->registered_count, Z_WAITOK | Z_ZERO);
|
|
if (actions->registered_array == NULL) {
|
|
ret = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < pacts->pspa_count; i++) {
|
|
act = &pacts->pspa_actions[i];
|
|
|
|
if (MACH_PORT_VALID(act->new_port)) {
|
|
kr = ipc_object_copyin(get_task_ipcspace(current_task()),
|
|
act->new_port, MACH_MSG_TYPE_COPY_SEND,
|
|
(ipc_object_t *) &port, 0, NULL, IPC_OBJECT_COPYIN_FLAGS_ALLOW_IMMOVABLE_SEND);
|
|
|
|
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
ret = EINVAL;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* it's NULL or DEAD */
|
|
port = CAST_MACH_NAME_TO_PORT(act->new_port);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (act->port_type) {
|
|
case PSPA_SPECIAL:
|
|
kr = task_set_special_port(task, act->which, port);
|
|
|
|
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
ret = EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_AUDIT
|
|
case PSPA_AU_SESSION:
|
|
ret = audit_session_spawnjoin(p, port);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
/* audit_session_spawnjoin() has already dropped the reference in case of error. */
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
case PSPA_EXCEPTION:
|
|
assert(excport_i < actions->exception_port_count);
|
|
/* hold on to this till end of spawn */
|
|
actions->excport_array[excport_i].port_action = act;
|
|
actions->excport_array[excport_i].port = port;
|
|
excport_i++;
|
|
break;
|
|
case PSPA_IMP_WATCHPORTS:
|
|
assert(portwatch_i < actions->portwatch_count);
|
|
/* hold on to this till end of spawn */
|
|
actions->portwatch_array[portwatch_i++] = port;
|
|
break;
|
|
case PSPA_REGISTERED_PORTS:
|
|
assert(registered_i < actions->registered_count);
|
|
/* hold on to this till end of spawn */
|
|
actions->registered_array[registered_i++] = port;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PSPA_PTRAUTH_TASK_PORT:
|
|
#if (DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG)
|
|
#if defined(HAS_APPLE_PAC)
|
|
{
|
|
task_t ptr_auth_task = convert_port_to_task(port);
|
|
|
|
if (ptr_auth_task == TASK_NULL) {
|
|
ret = EINVAL;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
imgp->ip_inherited_shared_region_id =
|
|
task_get_vm_shared_region_id_and_jop_pid(ptr_auth_task,
|
|
&imgp->ip_inherited_jop_pid);
|
|
|
|
/* Deallocate task ref returned by convert_port_to_task */
|
|
task_deallocate(ptr_auth_task);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* HAS_APPLE_PAC */
|
|
#endif /* (DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG) */
|
|
|
|
/* consume the port right in case of success */
|
|
ipc_port_release_send(port);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
ret = EINVAL;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
/* action failed, so release port resources */
|
|
ipc_port_release_send(port);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
if (0 != ret) {
|
|
DTRACE_PROC1(spawn__port__failure, mach_port_name_t, act->new_port);
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* exec_handle_exception_port_actions
|
|
*
|
|
* Description: Go through the saved exception ports in exec_port_actions,
|
|
* calling task_set_exception_ports for the current Task.
|
|
* This must happen after image activation, and after exec_resettextvp()
|
|
* because task_set_exception_ports checks the `TF_PLATFORM` bit and entitlements.
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters: struct image_params * Image parameter block
|
|
* struct exec_port_actions * Saved Port Actions
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: 0 Success
|
|
* EINVAL task_set_exception_ports failed
|
|
*/
|
|
static errno_t
|
|
exec_handle_exception_port_actions(const struct image_params *imgp,
|
|
const struct exec_port_actions *actions)
|
|
{
|
|
task_t task = get_threadtask(imgp->ip_new_thread);
|
|
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < actions->exception_port_count; i++) {
|
|
ipc_port_t port = actions->excport_array[i].port;
|
|
_ps_port_action_t *act = actions->excport_array[i].port_action;
|
|
assert(act != NULL);
|
|
kern_return_t kr = task_set_exception_ports(task, act->mask, port,
|
|
act->behavior, act->flavor);
|
|
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
DTRACE_PROC1(spawn__exception__port__failure, mach_port_name_t, act->new_port);
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
actions->excport_array[i].port = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* exec_handle_file_actions
|
|
*
|
|
* Description: Go through the _posix_file_actions_t contents applying the
|
|
* open, close, and dup2 operations to the open file table for
|
|
* the current process.
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters: struct image_params * Image parameter block
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: 0 Success
|
|
* ???
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: Actions are applied in the order specified, with the credential
|
|
* of the parent process. This is done to permit the parent
|
|
* process to utilize POSIX_SPAWN_RESETIDS to drop privilege in
|
|
* the child following operations the child may in fact not be
|
|
* normally permitted to perform.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
exec_handle_file_actions(struct image_params *imgp, short psa_flags)
|
|
{
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
int action;
|
|
proc_t p = vfs_context_proc(imgp->ip_vfs_context);
|
|
kauth_cred_t p_cred = vfs_context_ucred(imgp->ip_vfs_context);
|
|
_posix_spawn_file_actions_t px_sfap = imgp->ip_px_sfa;
|
|
int ival[2]; /* dummy retval for system calls) */
|
|
#if CONFIG_AUDIT
|
|
struct uthread *uthread = current_uthread();
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
for (action = 0; action < px_sfap->psfa_act_count; action++) {
|
|
_psfa_action_t *psfa = &px_sfap->psfa_act_acts[action];
|
|
|
|
switch (psfa->psfaa_type) {
|
|
case PSFA_OPEN: {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Open is different, in that it requires the use of
|
|
* a path argument, which is normally copied in from
|
|
* user space; because of this, we have to support an
|
|
* open from kernel space that passes an address space
|
|
* context of UIO_SYSSPACE, and casts the address
|
|
* argument to a user_addr_t.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct vnode_attr *vap;
|
|
struct nameidata *ndp;
|
|
int mode = psfa->psfaa_openargs.psfao_mode;
|
|
int origfd;
|
|
struct {
|
|
struct vnode_attr va;
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
|
} *__open_data;
|
|
|
|
__open_data = kalloc_type(typeof(*__open_data), Z_WAITOK | Z_ZERO);
|
|
if (__open_data == NULL) {
|
|
error = ENOMEM;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vap = &__open_data->va;
|
|
ndp = &__open_data->nd;
|
|
|
|
VATTR_INIT(vap);
|
|
/* Mask off all but regular access permissions */
|
|
mode = ((mode & ~p->p_fd.fd_cmask) & ALLPERMS) & ~S_ISTXT;
|
|
VATTR_SET(vap, va_mode, mode & ACCESSPERMS);
|
|
|
|
AUDIT_SUBCALL_ENTER(OPEN, p, uthread);
|
|
|
|
NDINIT(ndp, LOOKUP, OP_OPEN, FOLLOW | AUDITVNPATH1, UIO_SYSSPACE,
|
|
CAST_USER_ADDR_T(psfa->psfaa_openargs.psfao_path),
|
|
imgp->ip_vfs_context);
|
|
|
|
error = open1(imgp->ip_vfs_context, ndp,
|
|
psfa->psfaa_openargs.psfao_oflag,
|
|
vap, NULL, NULL, &origfd, AUTH_OPEN_NOAUTHFD);
|
|
|
|
kfree_type(typeof(*__open_data), __open_data);
|
|
|
|
AUDIT_SUBCALL_EXIT(uthread, error);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If there's an error, or we get the right fd by
|
|
* accident, then drop out here. This is easier than
|
|
* reworking all the open code to preallocate fd
|
|
* slots, and internally taking one as an argument.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (error || origfd == psfa->psfaa_filedes) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we didn't fall out from an error, we ended up
|
|
* with the wrong fd; so now we've got to try to dup2
|
|
* it to the right one.
|
|
*/
|
|
AUDIT_SUBCALL_ENTER(DUP2, p, uthread);
|
|
error = dup2(p, p_cred, origfd, psfa->psfaa_filedes, ival);
|
|
AUDIT_SUBCALL_EXIT(uthread, error);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Finally, close the original fd.
|
|
*/
|
|
AUDIT_SUBCALL_ENTER(CLOSE, p, uthread);
|
|
error = close_nocancel(p, p_cred, origfd);
|
|
AUDIT_SUBCALL_EXIT(uthread, error);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PSFA_DUP2: {
|
|
AUDIT_SUBCALL_ENTER(DUP2, p, uthread);
|
|
error = dup2(p, p_cred, psfa->psfaa_filedes,
|
|
psfa->psfaa_dup2args.psfad_newfiledes, ival);
|
|
AUDIT_SUBCALL_EXIT(uthread, error);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PSFA_FILEPORT_DUP2: {
|
|
ipc_port_t port;
|
|
kern_return_t kr;
|
|
int origfd;
|
|
|
|
if (!MACH_PORT_VALID(psfa->psfaa_fileport)) {
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kr = ipc_object_copyin(get_task_ipcspace(current_task()),
|
|
psfa->psfaa_fileport, MACH_MSG_TYPE_COPY_SEND,
|
|
(ipc_object_t *) &port, 0, NULL, IPC_OBJECT_COPYIN_FLAGS_ALLOW_IMMOVABLE_SEND);
|
|
|
|
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = fileport_makefd(p, port, 0, &origfd);
|
|
|
|
if (IPC_PORT_NULL != port) {
|
|
ipc_port_release_send(port);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (error || origfd == psfa->psfaa_dup2args.psfad_newfiledes) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
AUDIT_SUBCALL_ENTER(DUP2, p, uthread);
|
|
error = dup2(p, p_cred, origfd,
|
|
psfa->psfaa_dup2args.psfad_newfiledes, ival);
|
|
AUDIT_SUBCALL_EXIT(uthread, error);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
AUDIT_SUBCALL_ENTER(CLOSE, p, uthread);
|
|
error = close_nocancel(p, p_cred, origfd);
|
|
AUDIT_SUBCALL_EXIT(uthread, error);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PSFA_CLOSE: {
|
|
AUDIT_SUBCALL_ENTER(CLOSE, p, uthread);
|
|
error = close_nocancel(p, p_cred, psfa->psfaa_filedes);
|
|
AUDIT_SUBCALL_EXIT(uthread, error);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PSFA_INHERIT: {
|
|
struct fileproc *fp;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check to see if the descriptor exists, and
|
|
* ensure it's -not- marked as close-on-exec.
|
|
*
|
|
* Attempting to "inherit" a guarded fd will
|
|
* result in a error.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
proc_fdlock(p);
|
|
if ((fp = fp_get_noref_locked(p, psfa->psfaa_filedes)) == NULL) {
|
|
error = EBADF;
|
|
} else if (fp->fp_guard_attrs) {
|
|
error = fp_guard_exception(p, psfa->psfaa_filedes,
|
|
fp, kGUARD_EXC_NOCLOEXEC);
|
|
} else {
|
|
fp->fp_flags &= ~FP_CLOEXEC;
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
proc_fdunlock(p);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PSFA_CHDIR: {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Chdir is different, in that it requires the use of
|
|
* a path argument, which is normally copied in from
|
|
* user space; because of this, we have to support a
|
|
* chdir from kernel space that passes an address space
|
|
* context of UIO_SYSSPACE, and casts the address
|
|
* argument to a user_addr_t.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct nameidata *nd;
|
|
nd = kalloc_type(struct nameidata,
|
|
Z_WAITOK | Z_ZERO | Z_NOFAIL);
|
|
|
|
AUDIT_SUBCALL_ENTER(CHDIR, p, uthread);
|
|
NDINIT(nd, LOOKUP, OP_CHDIR, FOLLOW | AUDITVNPATH1, UIO_SYSSPACE,
|
|
CAST_USER_ADDR_T(psfa->psfaa_chdirargs.psfac_path),
|
|
imgp->ip_vfs_context);
|
|
|
|
error = chdir_internal(p, imgp->ip_vfs_context, nd, 0);
|
|
kfree_type(struct nameidata, nd);
|
|
AUDIT_SUBCALL_EXIT(uthread, error);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PSFA_FCHDIR: {
|
|
AUDIT_SUBCALL_ENTER(FCHDIR, p, uthread);
|
|
error = fchdir(p, imgp->ip_vfs_context,
|
|
psfa->psfaa_filedes, false);
|
|
AUDIT_SUBCALL_EXIT(uthread, error);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* All file actions failures are considered fatal, per POSIX */
|
|
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
if (PSFA_OPEN == psfa->psfaa_type) {
|
|
DTRACE_PROC1(spawn__open__failure, uintptr_t,
|
|
psfa->psfaa_openargs.psfao_path);
|
|
} else {
|
|
DTRACE_PROC1(spawn__fd__failure, int, psfa->psfaa_filedes);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0 || (psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_CLOEXEC_DEFAULT) == 0) {
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If POSIX_SPAWN_CLOEXEC_DEFAULT is set, behave (during
|
|
* this spawn only) as if "close on exec" is the default
|
|
* disposition of all pre-existing file descriptors. In this case,
|
|
* the list of file descriptors mentioned in the file actions
|
|
* are the only ones that can be inherited, so mark them now.
|
|
*
|
|
* The actual closing part comes later, in fdt_exec().
|
|
*/
|
|
proc_fdlock(p);
|
|
for (action = 0; action < px_sfap->psfa_act_count; action++) {
|
|
_psfa_action_t *psfa = &px_sfap->psfa_act_acts[action];
|
|
int fd = psfa->psfaa_filedes;
|
|
|
|
switch (psfa->psfaa_type) {
|
|
case PSFA_DUP2:
|
|
case PSFA_FILEPORT_DUP2:
|
|
fd = psfa->psfaa_dup2args.psfad_newfiledes;
|
|
OS_FALLTHROUGH;
|
|
case PSFA_OPEN:
|
|
case PSFA_INHERIT:
|
|
*fdflags(p, fd) |= UF_INHERIT;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PSFA_CLOSE:
|
|
case PSFA_CHDIR:
|
|
case PSFA_FCHDIR:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Although PSFA_FCHDIR does have a file descriptor, it is not
|
|
* *creating* one, thus we do not automatically mark it for
|
|
* inheritance under POSIX_SPAWN_CLOEXEC_DEFAULT. A client that
|
|
* wishes it to be inherited should use the PSFA_INHERIT action
|
|
* explicitly.
|
|
*/
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
proc_fdunlock(p);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_MACF
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check that the extension's data is within the bounds of the
|
|
* allocation storing all extensions' data
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline errno_t
|
|
exec_spawnattr_validate_policyext_data(const struct ip_px_smpx_s *px_s,
|
|
const _ps_mac_policy_extension_t *ext)
|
|
{
|
|
uint64_t dataend;
|
|
|
|
if (__improbable(os_add_overflow(ext->dataoff, ext->datalen, &dataend))) {
|
|
return EOVERFLOW;
|
|
}
|
|
if (__improbable(dataend > px_s->datalen)) {
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* exec_spawnattr_getmacpolicyinfo
|
|
*/
|
|
void *
|
|
exec_spawnattr_getmacpolicyinfo(const void *macextensions, const char *policyname, size_t *lenp)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct ip_px_smpx_s *px_s = macextensions;
|
|
const struct _posix_spawn_mac_policy_extensions *psmx = NULL;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (px_s == NULL) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
psmx = px_s->array;
|
|
if (psmx == NULL) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < psmx->psmx_count; i++) {
|
|
const _ps_mac_policy_extension_t *extension = &psmx->psmx_extensions[i];
|
|
if (strncmp(extension->policyname, policyname, sizeof(extension->policyname)) == 0) {
|
|
if (__improbable(exec_spawnattr_validate_policyext_data(px_s, extension))) {
|
|
panic("invalid mac policy extension data");
|
|
}
|
|
if (lenp != NULL) {
|
|
*lenp = (size_t)extension->datalen;
|
|
}
|
|
return (void *)((uintptr_t)px_s->data + extension->dataoff);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (lenp != NULL) {
|
|
*lenp = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
spawn_copyin_macpolicyinfo(const struct user__posix_spawn_args_desc *px_args,
|
|
struct ip_px_smpx_s *pxsp)
|
|
{
|
|
_posix_spawn_mac_policy_extensions_t psmx = NULL;
|
|
uint8_t *data = NULL;
|
|
uint64_t datalen = 0;
|
|
uint64_t dataoff = 0;
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
bzero(pxsp, sizeof(*pxsp));
|
|
|
|
if (px_args->mac_extensions_size < PS_MAC_EXTENSIONS_SIZE(1) ||
|
|
px_args->mac_extensions_size > PAGE_SIZE) {
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
psmx = kalloc_data(px_args->mac_extensions_size, Z_WAITOK);
|
|
if (psmx == NULL) {
|
|
error = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = copyin(px_args->mac_extensions, psmx, px_args->mac_extensions_size);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t extsize = PS_MAC_EXTENSIONS_SIZE(psmx->psmx_count);
|
|
if (extsize == 0 || extsize > px_args->mac_extensions_size) {
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < psmx->psmx_count; i++) {
|
|
_ps_mac_policy_extension_t *extension = &psmx->psmx_extensions[i];
|
|
if (extension->datalen == 0 || extension->datalen > PAGE_SIZE) {
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
if (__improbable(os_add_overflow(datalen, extension->datalen, &datalen))) {
|
|
error = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data = kalloc_data((vm_size_t)datalen, Z_WAITOK);
|
|
if (data == NULL) {
|
|
error = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < psmx->psmx_count; i++) {
|
|
_ps_mac_policy_extension_t *extension = &psmx->psmx_extensions[i];
|
|
|
|
#if !__LP64__
|
|
if (extension->data > UINT32_MAX) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
error = copyin((user_addr_t)extension->data, &data[dataoff], (size_t)extension->datalen);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
error = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
extension->dataoff = dataoff;
|
|
dataoff += extension->datalen;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pxsp->array = psmx;
|
|
pxsp->data = data;
|
|
pxsp->datalen = datalen;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
bad:
|
|
kfree_data(psmx, px_args->mac_extensions_size);
|
|
kfree_data(data, (vm_size_t)datalen);
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_MACF */
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_COALITIONS
|
|
static inline void
|
|
spawn_coalitions_release_all(coalition_t coal[COALITION_NUM_TYPES])
|
|
{
|
|
for (int c = 0; c < COALITION_NUM_TYPES; c++) {
|
|
if (coal[c]) {
|
|
coalition_remove_active(coal[c]);
|
|
coalition_release(coal[c]);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_PERSONAS
|
|
static int
|
|
spawn_validate_persona(struct _posix_spawn_persona_info *px_persona)
|
|
{
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
struct persona *persona = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!IOCurrentTaskHasEntitlement( PERSONA_MGMT_ENTITLEMENT)) {
|
|
return EPERM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (px_persona->pspi_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_PERSONA_GROUPS) {
|
|
if (px_persona->pspi_ngroups > NGROUPS_MAX) {
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
persona = persona_lookup(px_persona->pspi_id);
|
|
if (!persona) {
|
|
error = ESRCH;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
if (persona) {
|
|
persona_put(persona);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool
|
|
kauth_cred_model_setpersona(
|
|
kauth_cred_t model,
|
|
struct _posix_spawn_persona_info *px_persona)
|
|
{
|
|
bool updated = false;
|
|
|
|
if (px_persona->pspi_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_PERSONA_UID) {
|
|
updated |= kauth_cred_model_setresuid(model,
|
|
px_persona->pspi_uid,
|
|
px_persona->pspi_uid,
|
|
px_persona->pspi_uid,
|
|
KAUTH_UID_NONE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (px_persona->pspi_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_PERSONA_GID) {
|
|
updated |= kauth_cred_model_setresgid(model,
|
|
px_persona->pspi_gid,
|
|
px_persona->pspi_gid,
|
|
px_persona->pspi_gid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (px_persona->pspi_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_PERSONA_GROUPS) {
|
|
updated |= kauth_cred_model_setgroups(model,
|
|
px_persona->pspi_groups,
|
|
px_persona->pspi_ngroups,
|
|
px_persona->pspi_gmuid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return updated;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
spawn_persona_adopt(proc_t p, struct _posix_spawn_persona_info *px_persona)
|
|
{
|
|
struct persona *persona = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* we want to spawn into the given persona, but we want to override
|
|
* the kauth with a different UID/GID combo
|
|
*/
|
|
persona = persona_lookup(px_persona->pspi_id);
|
|
if (!persona) {
|
|
return ESRCH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return persona_proc_adopt(p, persona,
|
|
^bool (kauth_cred_t parent __unused, kauth_cred_t model) {
|
|
return kauth_cred_model_setpersona(model, px_persona);
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if __arm64__
|
|
#if DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG
|
|
TUNABLE(int, legacy_footprint_entitlement_mode, "legacy_footprint_entitlement_mode",
|
|
LEGACY_FOOTPRINT_ENTITLEMENT_IGNORE);
|
|
|
|
__startup_func
|
|
static void
|
|
legacy_footprint_entitlement_mode_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* legacy_footprint_entitlement_mode specifies the behavior we want associated
|
|
* with the entitlement. The supported modes are:
|
|
*
|
|
* LEGACY_FOOTPRINT_ENTITLEMENT_IGNORE:
|
|
* Indicates that we want every process to have the memory accounting
|
|
* that is available in iOS 12.0 and beyond.
|
|
*
|
|
* LEGACY_FOOTPRINT_ENTITLEMENT_IOS11_ACCT:
|
|
* Indicates that for every process that has the 'legacy footprint entitlement',
|
|
* we want to give it the old iOS 11.0 accounting behavior which accounted some
|
|
* of the process's memory to the kernel.
|
|
*
|
|
* LEGACY_FOOTPRINT_ENTITLEMENT_LIMIT_INCREASE:
|
|
* Indicates that for every process that has the 'legacy footprint entitlement',
|
|
* we want it to have a higher memory limit which will help them acclimate to the
|
|
* iOS 12.0 (& beyond) accounting behavior that does the right accounting.
|
|
* The bonus added to the system-wide task limit to calculate this higher memory limit
|
|
* is available in legacy_footprint_bonus_mb.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (legacy_footprint_entitlement_mode < LEGACY_FOOTPRINT_ENTITLEMENT_IGNORE ||
|
|
legacy_footprint_entitlement_mode > LEGACY_FOOTPRINT_ENTITLEMENT_LIMIT_INCREASE) {
|
|
legacy_footprint_entitlement_mode = LEGACY_FOOTPRINT_ENTITLEMENT_LIMIT_INCREASE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
STARTUP(TUNABLES, STARTUP_RANK_MIDDLE, legacy_footprint_entitlement_mode_init);
|
|
#else
|
|
const int legacy_footprint_entitlement_mode = LEGACY_FOOTPRINT_ENTITLEMENT_IGNORE;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static inline void
|
|
proc_legacy_footprint_entitled(proc_t p, task_t task)
|
|
{
|
|
#pragma unused(p)
|
|
boolean_t legacy_footprint_entitled;
|
|
|
|
switch (legacy_footprint_entitlement_mode) {
|
|
case LEGACY_FOOTPRINT_ENTITLEMENT_IGNORE:
|
|
/* the entitlement is ignored */
|
|
break;
|
|
case LEGACY_FOOTPRINT_ENTITLEMENT_IOS11_ACCT:
|
|
/* the entitlement grants iOS11 legacy accounting */
|
|
legacy_footprint_entitled = memorystatus_task_has_legacy_footprint_entitlement(proc_task(p));
|
|
if (legacy_footprint_entitled) {
|
|
task_set_legacy_footprint(task);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case LEGACY_FOOTPRINT_ENTITLEMENT_LIMIT_INCREASE:
|
|
/* the entitlement grants a footprint limit increase */
|
|
legacy_footprint_entitled = memorystatus_task_has_legacy_footprint_entitlement(proc_task(p));
|
|
if (legacy_footprint_entitled) {
|
|
task_set_extra_footprint_limit(task);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline void
|
|
proc_ios13extended_footprint_entitled(proc_t p, task_t task)
|
|
{
|
|
#pragma unused(p)
|
|
boolean_t ios13extended_footprint_entitled;
|
|
|
|
/* the entitlement grants a footprint limit increase */
|
|
ios13extended_footprint_entitled = memorystatus_task_has_ios13extended_footprint_limit(proc_task(p));
|
|
if (ios13extended_footprint_entitled) {
|
|
task_set_ios13extended_footprint_limit(task);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline void
|
|
proc_increased_memory_limit_entitled(proc_t p, task_t task)
|
|
{
|
|
bool entitled = memorystatus_task_has_increased_memory_limit_entitlement(task);
|
|
|
|
if (entitled) {
|
|
memorystatus_act_on_entitled_task_limit(p);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check for any of the various entitlements that permit a higher
|
|
* task footprint limit or alternate accounting and apply them.
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline void
|
|
proc_footprint_entitlement_hacks(proc_t p, task_t task)
|
|
{
|
|
proc_legacy_footprint_entitled(p, task);
|
|
proc_ios13extended_footprint_entitled(p, task);
|
|
proc_increased_memory_limit_entitled(p, task);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* __arm64__ */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Processes with certain entitlements are granted a jumbo-size VM map.
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline void
|
|
proc_apply_jit_and_vm_policies(struct image_params *imgp, proc_t p, task_t task)
|
|
{
|
|
#if CONFIG_MACF
|
|
bool jit_entitled = false;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_MACF */
|
|
bool needs_jumbo_va = false;
|
|
struct _posix_spawnattr *psa = imgp->ip_px_sa;
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_MACF
|
|
jit_entitled = (mac_proc_check_map_anon(p, proc_ucred_unsafe(p),
|
|
0, 0, 0, MAP_JIT, NULL) == 0);
|
|
needs_jumbo_va = jit_entitled || IOTaskHasEntitlement(task,
|
|
"com.apple.developer.kernel.extended-virtual-addressing") ||
|
|
memorystatus_task_has_increased_memory_limit_entitlement(task);
|
|
#else
|
|
#pragma unused(p)
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_MACF */
|
|
|
|
if (needs_jumbo_va) {
|
|
vm_map_set_jumbo(get_task_map(task));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (psa && psa->psa_max_addr) {
|
|
vm_map_set_max_addr(get_task_map(task), psa->psa_max_addr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_MAP_RANGES
|
|
if (task_is_hardened_binary(task) && !proc_is_simulated(p)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* This must be done last as it needs to observe
|
|
* any kind of VA space growth that was requested.
|
|
* This is used by the secure allocator, so
|
|
* must be applied to all hardened binaries
|
|
*/
|
|
vm_map_range_configure(get_task_map(task));
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_MAP_RANGES */
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_MACF
|
|
if (jit_entitled) {
|
|
vm_map_set_jit_entitled(get_task_map(task));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_MACF */
|
|
|
|
#if XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX
|
|
/* TPRO cannot be enforced on binaries that load 3P plugins on macos - rdar://107420220 */
|
|
const bool task_loads_3P_plugins = imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_3P_PLUGINS;
|
|
#endif /* XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX */
|
|
|
|
if (task_is_hardened_binary(task)
|
|
#if XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX
|
|
&& !task_loads_3P_plugins
|
|
#endif /* XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX */
|
|
) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Pre-emptively disable TPRO remapping for
|
|
* hardened binaries (which do not load 3P plugins)
|
|
*/
|
|
vm_map_set_tpro_enforcement(get_task_map(task));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
spawn_posix_cred_adopt(proc_t p,
|
|
struct _posix_spawn_posix_cred_info *px_pcred_info)
|
|
{
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (px_pcred_info->pspci_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_POSIX_CRED_GID) {
|
|
struct setgid_args args = {
|
|
.gid = px_pcred_info->pspci_gid,
|
|
};
|
|
error = setgid(p, &args, NULL);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (px_pcred_info->pspci_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_POSIX_CRED_GROUPS) {
|
|
error = setgroups_internal(p,
|
|
px_pcred_info->pspci_ngroups,
|
|
px_pcred_info->pspci_groups,
|
|
px_pcred_info->pspci_gmuid);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (px_pcred_info->pspci_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_POSIX_CRED_UID) {
|
|
struct setuid_args args = {
|
|
.uid = px_pcred_info->pspci_uid,
|
|
};
|
|
error = setuid(p, &args, NULL);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* posix_spawn
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters: uap->pid Pointer to pid return area
|
|
* uap->fname File name to exec
|
|
* uap->argp Argument list
|
|
* uap->envp Environment list
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: 0 Success
|
|
* EINVAL Invalid argument
|
|
* ENOTSUP Not supported
|
|
* ENOEXEC Executable file format error
|
|
* exec_activate_image:EINVAL Invalid argument
|
|
* exec_activate_image:EACCES Permission denied
|
|
* exec_activate_image:EINTR Interrupted function
|
|
* exec_activate_image:ENOMEM Not enough space
|
|
* exec_activate_image:EFAULT Bad address
|
|
* exec_activate_image:ENAMETOOLONG Filename too long
|
|
* exec_activate_image:ENOEXEC Executable file format error
|
|
* exec_activate_image:ETXTBSY Text file busy [misuse of error code]
|
|
* exec_activate_image:EAUTH Image decryption failed
|
|
* exec_activate_image:EBADEXEC The executable is corrupt/unknown
|
|
* exec_activate_image:???
|
|
* mac_execve_enter:???
|
|
*
|
|
* TODO: Expect to need __mac_posix_spawn() at some point...
|
|
* Handle posix_spawnattr_t
|
|
* Handle posix_spawn_file_actions_t
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
posix_spawn(proc_t ap, struct posix_spawn_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
|
|
{
|
|
proc_t p = ap;
|
|
user_addr_t pid = uap->pid;
|
|
int ival[2]; /* dummy retval for setpgid() */
|
|
char *subsystem_root_path = NULL;
|
|
struct image_params *imgp = NULL;
|
|
struct vnode_attr *vap = NULL;
|
|
struct vnode_attr *origvap = NULL;
|
|
struct uthread *uthread = 0; /* compiler complains if not set to 0*/
|
|
int error, sig;
|
|
int is_64 = IS_64BIT_PROCESS(p);
|
|
struct vfs_context context;
|
|
struct user__posix_spawn_args_desc px_args = {};
|
|
struct _posix_spawnattr px_sa = {};
|
|
_posix_spawn_file_actions_t px_sfap = NULL;
|
|
_posix_spawn_port_actions_t px_spap = NULL;
|
|
struct __kern_sigaction vec;
|
|
boolean_t spawn_no_exec = FALSE;
|
|
boolean_t proc_transit_set = TRUE;
|
|
boolean_t proc_signal_set = TRUE;
|
|
boolean_t exec_done = FALSE;
|
|
os_reason_t exec_failure_reason = NULL;
|
|
|
|
struct exec_port_actions port_actions = { };
|
|
vm_size_t px_sa_offset = offsetof(struct _posix_spawnattr, psa_ports);
|
|
task_t old_task = current_task();
|
|
task_t new_task = NULL;
|
|
boolean_t should_release_proc_ref = FALSE;
|
|
void *inherit = NULL;
|
|
uint8_t crash_behavior = 0;
|
|
uint64_t crash_behavior_deadline = 0;
|
|
#if CONFIG_EXCLAVES
|
|
char *task_conclave_id = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if CONFIG_PERSONAS
|
|
struct _posix_spawn_persona_info *px_persona = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
struct _posix_spawn_posix_cred_info *px_pcred_info = NULL;
|
|
struct {
|
|
struct image_params imgp;
|
|
struct vnode_attr va;
|
|
struct vnode_attr origva;
|
|
} *__spawn_data;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allocate a big chunk for locals instead of using stack since these
|
|
* structures are pretty big.
|
|
*/
|
|
__spawn_data = kalloc_type(typeof(*__spawn_data), Z_WAITOK | Z_ZERO);
|
|
if (__spawn_data == NULL) {
|
|
error = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp = &__spawn_data->imgp;
|
|
vap = &__spawn_data->va;
|
|
origvap = &__spawn_data->origva;
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize the common data in the image_params structure */
|
|
imgp->ip_user_fname = uap->path;
|
|
imgp->ip_user_argv = uap->argv;
|
|
imgp->ip_user_envv = uap->envp;
|
|
imgp->ip_vattr = vap;
|
|
imgp->ip_origvattr = origvap;
|
|
imgp->ip_vfs_context = &context;
|
|
imgp->ip_flags = (is_64 ? IMGPF_WAS_64BIT_ADDR : IMGPF_NONE);
|
|
imgp->ip_seg = (is_64 ? UIO_USERSPACE64 : UIO_USERSPACE32);
|
|
imgp->ip_mac_return = 0;
|
|
imgp->ip_px_persona = NULL;
|
|
imgp->ip_px_pcred_info = NULL;
|
|
imgp->ip_cs_error = OS_REASON_NULL;
|
|
imgp->ip_simulator_binary = IMGPF_SB_DEFAULT;
|
|
imgp->ip_subsystem_root_path = NULL;
|
|
imgp->ip_inherited_shared_region_id = NULL;
|
|
imgp->ip_inherited_jop_pid = 0;
|
|
uthread_set_exec_data(current_uthread(), imgp);
|
|
|
|
if (uap->adesc != USER_ADDR_NULL) {
|
|
if (is_64) {
|
|
error = copyin(uap->adesc, &px_args, sizeof(px_args));
|
|
} else {
|
|
struct user32__posix_spawn_args_desc px_args32;
|
|
|
|
error = copyin(uap->adesc, &px_args32, sizeof(px_args32));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Convert arguments descriptor from external 32 bit
|
|
* representation to internal 64 bit representation
|
|
*/
|
|
px_args.attr_size = px_args32.attr_size;
|
|
px_args.attrp = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(px_args32.attrp);
|
|
px_args.file_actions_size = px_args32.file_actions_size;
|
|
px_args.file_actions = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(px_args32.file_actions);
|
|
px_args.port_actions_size = px_args32.port_actions_size;
|
|
px_args.port_actions = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(px_args32.port_actions);
|
|
px_args.mac_extensions_size = px_args32.mac_extensions_size;
|
|
px_args.mac_extensions = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(px_args32.mac_extensions);
|
|
px_args.coal_info_size = px_args32.coal_info_size;
|
|
px_args.coal_info = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(px_args32.coal_info);
|
|
px_args.persona_info_size = px_args32.persona_info_size;
|
|
px_args.persona_info = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(px_args32.persona_info);
|
|
px_args.posix_cred_info_size = px_args32.posix_cred_info_size;
|
|
px_args.posix_cred_info = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(px_args32.posix_cred_info);
|
|
px_args.subsystem_root_path_size = px_args32.subsystem_root_path_size;
|
|
px_args.subsystem_root_path = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(px_args32.subsystem_root_path);
|
|
px_args.conclave_id_size = px_args32.conclave_id_size;
|
|
px_args.conclave_id = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(px_args32.conclave_id);
|
|
}
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (px_args.attr_size != 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We are not copying the port_actions pointer,
|
|
* because we already have it from px_args.
|
|
* This is a bit fragile: <rdar://problem/16427422>
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((error = copyin(px_args.attrp, &px_sa, px_sa_offset)) != 0) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
imgp->ip_px_sa = &px_sa;
|
|
}
|
|
if (px_args.file_actions_size != 0) {
|
|
/* Limit file_actions to allowed number of open files */
|
|
size_t maxfa_size = PSF_ACTIONS_SIZE(proc_limitgetcur_nofile(p));
|
|
|
|
if (px_args.file_actions_size < PSF_ACTIONS_SIZE(1) ||
|
|
maxfa_size == 0 || px_args.file_actions_size > maxfa_size) {
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
px_sfap = kalloc_data(px_args.file_actions_size, Z_WAITOK);
|
|
if (px_sfap == NULL) {
|
|
error = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_px_sfa = px_sfap;
|
|
|
|
if ((error = copyin(px_args.file_actions, px_sfap,
|
|
px_args.file_actions_size)) != 0) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Verify that the action count matches the struct size */
|
|
size_t psfsize = PSF_ACTIONS_SIZE(px_sfap->psfa_act_count);
|
|
if (psfsize == 0 || psfsize != px_args.file_actions_size) {
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (px_args.port_actions_size != 0) {
|
|
/* Limit port_actions to one page of data */
|
|
if (px_args.port_actions_size < PS_PORT_ACTIONS_SIZE(1) ||
|
|
px_args.port_actions_size > PAGE_SIZE) {
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
px_spap = kalloc_data(px_args.port_actions_size, Z_WAITOK);
|
|
if (px_spap == NULL) {
|
|
error = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_px_spa = px_spap;
|
|
|
|
if ((error = copyin(px_args.port_actions, px_spap,
|
|
px_args.port_actions_size)) != 0) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Verify that the action count matches the struct size */
|
|
size_t pasize = PS_PORT_ACTIONS_SIZE(px_spap->pspa_count);
|
|
if (pasize == 0 || pasize != px_args.port_actions_size) {
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#if CONFIG_PERSONAS
|
|
/* copy in the persona info */
|
|
if (px_args.persona_info_size != 0 && px_args.persona_info != 0) {
|
|
/* for now, we need the exact same struct in user space */
|
|
if (px_args.persona_info_size != sizeof(*px_persona)) {
|
|
error = ERANGE;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
px_persona = kalloc_data(px_args.persona_info_size, Z_WAITOK);
|
|
if (px_persona == NULL) {
|
|
error = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_px_persona = px_persona;
|
|
|
|
if ((error = copyin(px_args.persona_info, px_persona,
|
|
px_args.persona_info_size)) != 0) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((error = spawn_validate_persona(px_persona)) != 0) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* copy in the posix cred info */
|
|
if (px_args.posix_cred_info_size != 0 && px_args.posix_cred_info != 0) {
|
|
/* for now, we need the exact same struct in user space */
|
|
if (px_args.posix_cred_info_size != sizeof(*px_pcred_info)) {
|
|
error = ERANGE;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!kauth_cred_issuser(kauth_cred_get())) {
|
|
error = EPERM;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
px_pcred_info = kalloc_data(px_args.posix_cred_info_size, Z_WAITOK);
|
|
if (px_pcred_info == NULL) {
|
|
error = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_px_pcred_info = px_pcred_info;
|
|
|
|
if ((error = copyin(px_args.posix_cred_info, px_pcred_info,
|
|
px_args.posix_cred_info_size)) != 0) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (px_pcred_info->pspci_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_POSIX_CRED_GROUPS) {
|
|
if (px_pcred_info->pspci_ngroups > NGROUPS_MAX) {
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#if CONFIG_MACF
|
|
if (px_args.mac_extensions_size != 0) {
|
|
if ((error = spawn_copyin_macpolicyinfo(&px_args, (struct ip_px_smpx_s *)&imgp->ip_px_smpx)) != 0) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_MACF */
|
|
if ((px_args.subsystem_root_path_size > 0) && (px_args.subsystem_root_path_size <= MAXPATHLEN)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If a valid-looking subsystem root has been
|
|
* specified...
|
|
*/
|
|
if (IOTaskHasEntitlement(old_task, SPAWN_SUBSYSTEM_ROOT_ENTITLEMENT)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* ...AND the parent has the entitlement, copy
|
|
* the subsystem root path in.
|
|
*/
|
|
subsystem_root_path = zalloc_flags(ZV_NAMEI,
|
|
Z_WAITOK | Z_ZERO | Z_NOFAIL);
|
|
|
|
if ((error = copyin(px_args.subsystem_root_path, subsystem_root_path, px_args.subsystem_root_path_size))) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Paranoia */
|
|
subsystem_root_path[px_args.subsystem_root_path_size - 1] = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#if CONFIG_EXCLAVES
|
|
if ((px_args.conclave_id_size > 0) && (px_args.conclave_id_size <= MAXCONCLAVENAME) &&
|
|
(exclaves_get_status() == EXCLAVES_STATUS_AVAILABLE)) {
|
|
if (px_args.conclave_id) {
|
|
if (imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL && (px_sa.psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_SETEXEC)) {
|
|
/* Conclave id could be set only for true spawn */
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
task_conclave_id = kalloc_data(MAXCONCLAVENAME,
|
|
Z_WAITOK | Z_ZERO | Z_NOFAIL);
|
|
if ((error = copyin(px_args.conclave_id, task_conclave_id, MAXCONCLAVENAME))) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
task_conclave_id[MAXCONCLAVENAME - 1] = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (IOTaskHasEntitlement(old_task, SPAWN_SET_PANIC_CRASH_BEHAVIOR)) {
|
|
/* Truncate to uint8_t since we only support 2 flags for now */
|
|
crash_behavior = (uint8_t)px_sa.psa_crash_behavior;
|
|
crash_behavior_deadline = px_sa.psa_crash_behavior_deadline;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* set uthread to parent */
|
|
uthread = current_uthread();
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* <rdar://6640530>; this does not result in a behaviour change
|
|
* relative to Leopard, so there should not be any existing code
|
|
* which depends on it.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL) {
|
|
struct _posix_spawnattr *psa = (struct _posix_spawnattr *) imgp->ip_px_sa;
|
|
if ((psa->psa_options & PSA_OPTION_PLUGIN_HOST_DISABLE_A_KEYS) == PSA_OPTION_PLUGIN_HOST_DISABLE_A_KEYS) {
|
|
imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_PLUGIN_HOST_DISABLE_A_KEYS;
|
|
}
|
|
#if (DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG)
|
|
if ((psa->psa_options & PSA_OPTION_ALT_ROSETTA) == PSA_OPTION_ALT_ROSETTA) {
|
|
imgp->ip_flags |= (IMGPF_ROSETTA | IMGPF_ALT_ROSETTA);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if ((error = exec_validate_spawnattr_policy(psa->psa_apptype)) != 0) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we don't have the extension flag that turns "posix_spawn()"
|
|
* into "execve() with options", then we will be creating a new
|
|
* process which does not inherit memory from the parent process,
|
|
* which is one of the most expensive things about using fork()
|
|
* and execve().
|
|
*/
|
|
if (imgp->ip_px_sa == NULL || !(px_sa.psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_SETEXEC)) {
|
|
/* Set the new task's coalition, if it is requested. */
|
|
coalition_t coal[COALITION_NUM_TYPES] = { COALITION_NULL };
|
|
#if CONFIG_COALITIONS
|
|
int i, ncoals;
|
|
kern_return_t kr = KERN_SUCCESS;
|
|
struct _posix_spawn_coalition_info coal_info;
|
|
int coal_role[COALITION_NUM_TYPES];
|
|
|
|
if (imgp->ip_px_sa == NULL || !px_args.coal_info) {
|
|
goto do_fork1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(&coal_info, 0, sizeof(coal_info));
|
|
|
|
if (px_args.coal_info_size > sizeof(coal_info)) {
|
|
px_args.coal_info_size = sizeof(coal_info);
|
|
}
|
|
error = copyin(px_args.coal_info,
|
|
&coal_info, px_args.coal_info_size);
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ncoals = 0;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < COALITION_NUM_TYPES; i++) {
|
|
uint64_t cid = coal_info.psci_info[i].psci_id;
|
|
if (cid != 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* don't allow tasks which are not in a
|
|
* privileged coalition to spawn processes
|
|
* into coalitions other than their own
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!task_is_in_privileged_coalition(proc_task(p), i) &&
|
|
!IOTaskHasEntitlement(proc_task(p), COALITION_SPAWN_ENTITLEMENT)) {
|
|
coal_dbg("ERROR: %d not in privilegd "
|
|
"coalition of type %d",
|
|
proc_getpid(p), i);
|
|
spawn_coalitions_release_all(coal);
|
|
error = EPERM;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
coal_dbg("searching for coalition id:%llu", cid);
|
|
/*
|
|
* take a reference and activation on the
|
|
* coalition to guard against free-while-spawn
|
|
* races
|
|
*/
|
|
coal[i] = coalition_find_and_activate_by_id(cid);
|
|
if (coal[i] == COALITION_NULL) {
|
|
coal_dbg("could not find coalition id:%llu "
|
|
"(perhaps it has been terminated or reaped)", cid);
|
|
/*
|
|
* release any other coalition's we
|
|
* may have a reference to
|
|
*/
|
|
spawn_coalitions_release_all(coal);
|
|
error = ESRCH;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
if (coalition_type(coal[i]) != i) {
|
|
coal_dbg("coalition with id:%lld is not of type:%d"
|
|
" (it's type:%d)", cid, i, coalition_type(coal[i]));
|
|
spawn_coalitions_release_all(coal);
|
|
error = ESRCH;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
coal_role[i] = coal_info.psci_info[i].psci_role;
|
|
ncoals++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (ncoals < COALITION_NUM_TYPES) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the user is attempting to spawn into a subset of
|
|
* the known coalition types, then make sure they have
|
|
* _at_least_ specified a resource coalition. If not,
|
|
* the following fork1() call will implicitly force an
|
|
* inheritance from 'p' and won't actually spawn the
|
|
* new task into the coalitions the user specified.
|
|
* (also the call to coalitions_set_roles will panic)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (coal[COALITION_TYPE_RESOURCE] == COALITION_NULL) {
|
|
spawn_coalitions_release_all(coal);
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
do_fork1:
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_COALITIONS */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* note that this will implicitly inherit the
|
|
* caller's persona (if it exists)
|
|
*/
|
|
error = fork1(p, &imgp->ip_new_thread, PROC_CREATE_SPAWN, coal);
|
|
/* returns a thread and task reference */
|
|
|
|
if (error == 0) {
|
|
new_task = get_threadtask(imgp->ip_new_thread);
|
|
}
|
|
#if CONFIG_COALITIONS
|
|
/* set the roles of this task within each given coalition */
|
|
if (error == 0) {
|
|
kr = coalitions_set_roles(coal, new_task, coal_role);
|
|
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (kdebug_debugid_enabled(MACHDBG_CODE(DBG_MACH_COALITION,
|
|
MACH_COALITION_ADOPT))) {
|
|
for (i = 0; i < COALITION_NUM_TYPES; i++) {
|
|
if (coal[i] != COALITION_NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* On 32-bit targets, uniqueid
|
|
* will get truncated to 32 bits
|
|
*/
|
|
KDBG_RELEASE(MACHDBG_CODE(
|
|
DBG_MACH_COALITION,
|
|
MACH_COALITION_ADOPT),
|
|
coalition_id(coal[i]),
|
|
get_task_uniqueid(new_task));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* drop our references and activations - fork1() now holds them */
|
|
spawn_coalitions_release_all(coal);
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_COALITIONS */
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_SPAWN; /* spawn w/o exec */
|
|
spawn_no_exec = TRUE; /* used in later tests */
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Adjust the user proc count */
|
|
(void)chgproccnt(kauth_getruid(), 1);
|
|
/*
|
|
* For execve case, create a new proc, task and thread
|
|
* but don't make the proc visible to userland. After
|
|
* image activation, the new proc would take place of
|
|
* the old proc in pid hash and other lists that make
|
|
* the proc visible to the system.
|
|
*/
|
|
imgp->ip_new_thread = cloneproc(old_task, NULL, p, CLONEPROC_EXEC);
|
|
|
|
/* task and thread ref returned by cloneproc */
|
|
if (imgp->ip_new_thread == NULL) {
|
|
(void)chgproccnt(kauth_getruid(), -1);
|
|
error = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
new_task = get_threadtask(imgp->ip_new_thread);
|
|
imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_EXEC;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = (proc_t)get_bsdthreadtask_info(imgp->ip_new_thread);
|
|
|
|
if (spawn_no_exec) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We had to wait until this point before firing the
|
|
* proc:::create probe, otherwise p would not point to the
|
|
* child process.
|
|
*/
|
|
DTRACE_PROC1(create, proc_t, p);
|
|
}
|
|
assert(p != NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (subsystem_root_path) {
|
|
/* If a subsystem root was specified, swap it in */
|
|
char * old_subsystem_root_path = p->p_subsystem_root_path;
|
|
p->p_subsystem_root_path = subsystem_root_path;
|
|
subsystem_root_path = old_subsystem_root_path;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p->p_crash_behavior = crash_behavior;
|
|
p->p_crash_behavior_deadline = crash_behavior_deadline;
|
|
|
|
p->p_crash_count = px_sa.psa_crash_count;
|
|
p->p_throttle_timeout = px_sa.psa_throttle_timeout;
|
|
|
|
/* We'll need the subsystem root for setting up Apple strings */
|
|
imgp->ip_subsystem_root_path = p->p_subsystem_root_path;
|
|
|
|
context.vc_thread = imgp->ip_new_thread;
|
|
context.vc_ucred = proc_ucred_unsafe(p); /* in init */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Post fdt_fork(), pre exec_handle_sugid() - this is where we want
|
|
* to handle the file_actions.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Has spawn file actions? */
|
|
if (imgp->ip_px_sfa != NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* The POSIX_SPAWN_CLOEXEC_DEFAULT flag
|
|
* is handled in exec_handle_file_actions().
|
|
*/
|
|
#if CONFIG_AUDIT
|
|
/*
|
|
* The file actions auditing can overwrite the upath of
|
|
* AUE_POSIX_SPAWN audit record. Save the audit record.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct kaudit_record *save_uu_ar = uthread->uu_ar;
|
|
uthread->uu_ar = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
error = exec_handle_file_actions(imgp,
|
|
imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL ? px_sa.psa_flags : 0);
|
|
#if CONFIG_AUDIT
|
|
/* Restore the AUE_POSIX_SPAWN audit record. */
|
|
uthread->uu_ar = save_uu_ar;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Has spawn port actions? */
|
|
if (imgp->ip_px_spa != NULL) {
|
|
#if CONFIG_AUDIT
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do the same for the port actions as we did for the file
|
|
* actions. Save the AUE_POSIX_SPAWN audit record.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct kaudit_record *save_uu_ar = uthread->uu_ar;
|
|
uthread->uu_ar = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
error = exec_handle_port_actions(imgp, &port_actions);
|
|
#if CONFIG_AUDIT
|
|
/* Restore the AUE_POSIX_SPAWN audit record. */
|
|
uthread->uu_ar = save_uu_ar;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Has spawn attr? */
|
|
if (imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Reset UID/GID to parent's RUID/RGID; This works only
|
|
* because the operation occurs before the call
|
|
* to exec_handle_sugid() by the image activator called
|
|
* from exec_activate_image().
|
|
*
|
|
* POSIX requires that any setuid/setgid bits on the process
|
|
* image will take precedence over the spawn attributes
|
|
* (re)setting them.
|
|
*
|
|
* Modifications to p_ucred must be guarded using the
|
|
* proc's ucred lock. This prevents others from accessing
|
|
* a garbage credential.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (px_sa.psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_RESETIDS) {
|
|
kauth_cred_proc_update(p, PROC_SETTOKEN_NONE,
|
|
^bool (kauth_cred_t parent __unused, kauth_cred_t model){
|
|
return kauth_cred_model_setuidgid(model,
|
|
kauth_cred_getruid(parent),
|
|
kauth_cred_getrgid(parent));
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (imgp->ip_px_pcred_info) {
|
|
if (!spawn_no_exec) {
|
|
error = ENOTSUP;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = spawn_posix_cred_adopt(p, imgp->ip_px_pcred_info);
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_PERSONAS
|
|
if (imgp->ip_px_persona != NULL) {
|
|
if (!spawn_no_exec) {
|
|
error = ENOTSUP;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we were asked to spawn a process into a new persona,
|
|
* do the credential switch now (which may override the UID/GID
|
|
* inherit done just above). It's important to do this switch
|
|
* before image activation both for reasons stated above, and
|
|
* to ensure that the new persona has access to the image/file
|
|
* being executed.
|
|
*/
|
|
error = spawn_persona_adopt(p, imgp->ip_px_persona);
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_PERSONAS */
|
|
#if !SECURE_KERNEL
|
|
/*
|
|
* Disable ASLR for the spawned process.
|
|
*
|
|
* But only do so if we are not embedded + RELEASE.
|
|
* While embedded allows for a boot-arg (-disable_aslr)
|
|
* to deal with this (which itself is only honored on
|
|
* DEVELOPMENT or DEBUG builds of xnu), it is often
|
|
* useful or necessary to disable ASLR on a per-process
|
|
* basis for unit testing and debugging.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (px_sa.psa_flags & _POSIX_SPAWN_DISABLE_ASLR) {
|
|
OSBitOrAtomic(P_DISABLE_ASLR, &p->p_flag);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* !SECURE_KERNEL */
|
|
|
|
/* Randomize high bits of ASLR slide */
|
|
if (px_sa.psa_flags & _POSIX_SPAWN_HIGH_BITS_ASLR) {
|
|
imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_HIGH_BITS_ASLR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if !SECURE_KERNEL
|
|
/*
|
|
* Forcibly disallow execution from data pages for the spawned process
|
|
* even if it would otherwise be permitted by the architecture default.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (px_sa.psa_flags & _POSIX_SPAWN_ALLOW_DATA_EXEC) {
|
|
imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_ALLOW_DATA_EXEC;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* !SECURE_KERNEL */
|
|
|
|
#if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls)
|
|
if (vm_shared_region_reslide_aslr && is_64 && (px_sa.psa_flags & _POSIX_SPAWN_RESLIDE)) {
|
|
imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_RESLIDE;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* __has_feature(ptrauth_calls) */
|
|
|
|
if ((px_sa.psa_apptype & POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_MASK) ==
|
|
POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_DRIVER) {
|
|
imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_DRIVER;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Disable ASLR during image activation. This occurs either if the
|
|
* _POSIX_SPAWN_DISABLE_ASLR attribute was found above or if
|
|
* P_DISABLE_ASLR was inherited from the parent process.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (p->p_flag & P_DISABLE_ASLR) {
|
|
imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_DISABLE_ASLR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Clear transition flag so we won't hang if exec_activate_image() causes
|
|
* an automount (and launchd does a proc sysctl to service it).
|
|
*
|
|
* <rdar://problem/6848672>, <rdar://problem/5959568>.
|
|
*/
|
|
proc_transend(p, 0);
|
|
proc_transit_set = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!spawn_no_exec) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Clear the signal lock in case of exec, since
|
|
* image activation uses psignal on child process.
|
|
*/
|
|
proc_signalend(p, 0);
|
|
proc_signal_set = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if MAC_SPAWN /* XXX */
|
|
if (uap->mac_p != USER_ADDR_NULL) {
|
|
error = mac_execve_enter(uap->mac_p, imgp);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Activate the image.
|
|
* Warning: If activation failed after point of no return, it returns error
|
|
* as 0 and pretends the call succeeded.
|
|
*/
|
|
error = exec_activate_image(imgp);
|
|
#if defined(HAS_APPLE_PAC)
|
|
const uint8_t disable_user_jop = imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_NOJOP ? TRUE : FALSE;
|
|
ml_task_set_jop_pid_from_shared_region(new_task, disable_user_jop);
|
|
ml_task_set_disable_user_jop(new_task, disable_user_jop);
|
|
ml_thread_set_disable_user_jop(imgp->ip_new_thread, disable_user_jop);
|
|
ml_thread_set_jop_pid(imgp->ip_new_thread, new_task);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If you've come here to add support for some new HW feature or some per-process or per-vmmap
|
|
* or per-pmap flag that needs to be set before the process runs, or are in general lost, here
|
|
* is some help. This summary was accurate as of Jul 2022. Use git log as needed. This comment
|
|
* is here to prevent a recurrence of rdar://96307913
|
|
*
|
|
* In posix_spawn, following is what happens:
|
|
* 1. Lots of prep and checking work
|
|
* 2. Image activation via exec_activate_image(). The new task will get a new pmap here
|
|
* 3. More prep work. (YOU ARE HERE)
|
|
* 4. exec_resettextvp() is called
|
|
* 5. At this point it is safe to check entitlements and code signatures
|
|
* 6. task_clear_return_wait(get_threadtask(imgp->ip_new_thread), TCRW_CLEAR_INITIAL_WAIT);
|
|
* The new thread is allowed to run in kernel. It cannot yet get to userland
|
|
* 7. More things done here. This is your chance to affect the task before it runs in
|
|
* userspace
|
|
* 8. task_clear_return_wait(get_threadtask(imgp->ip_new_thread), TCRW_CLEAR_FINAL_WAIT);
|
|
* The new thread is allowed to run in userland
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (error == 0 && !spawn_no_exec) {
|
|
p = proc_exec_switch_task(current_proc(), p, old_task, new_task, imgp->ip_new_thread, &inherit);
|
|
/* proc ref returned */
|
|
should_release_proc_ref = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (error == 0) {
|
|
/* process completed the exec, but may have failed after point of no return */
|
|
exec_done = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_EXCLAVES
|
|
if (!error && task_conclave_id != NULL) {
|
|
kern_return_t kr;
|
|
kr = task_add_conclave(new_task, task_conclave_id);
|
|
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (!error && imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL) {
|
|
thread_t child_thread = imgp->ip_new_thread;
|
|
uthread_t child_uthread = get_bsdthread_info(child_thread);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Because of POSIX_SPAWN_SETEXEC, we need to handle this after image
|
|
* activation, else when image activation fails (before the point of no
|
|
* return) would leave the parent process in a modified state.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (px_sa.psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_SETPGROUP) {
|
|
struct setpgid_args spga;
|
|
spga.pid = proc_getpid(p);
|
|
spga.pgid = px_sa.psa_pgroup;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Effectively, call setpgid() system call; works
|
|
* because there are no pointer arguments.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((error = setpgid(p, &spga, ival)) != 0) {
|
|
goto bad_px_sa;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (px_sa.psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_SETSID) {
|
|
error = setsid_internal(p);
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
|
goto bad_px_sa;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we have a spawn attr, and it contains signal related flags,
|
|
* the we need to process them in the "context" of the new child
|
|
* process, so we have to process it following image activation,
|
|
* prior to making the thread runnable in user space. This is
|
|
* necessitated by some signal information being per-thread rather
|
|
* than per-process, and we don't have the new allocation in hand
|
|
* until after the image is activated.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Mask a list of signals, instead of them being unmasked, if
|
|
* they were unmasked in the parent; note that some signals
|
|
* are not maskable.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (px_sa.psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_SETSIGMASK) {
|
|
child_uthread->uu_sigmask = (px_sa.psa_sigmask & ~sigcantmask);
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Default a list of signals instead of ignoring them, if
|
|
* they were ignored in the parent. Note that we pass
|
|
* spawn_no_exec to setsigvec() to indicate that we called
|
|
* fork1() and therefore do not need to call proc_signalstart()
|
|
* internally.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (px_sa.psa_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_SETSIGDEF) {
|
|
vec.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
|
|
vec.sa_tramp = 0;
|
|
vec.sa_mask = 0;
|
|
vec.sa_flags = 0;
|
|
for (sig = 1; sig < NSIG; sig++) {
|
|
if (px_sa.psa_sigdefault & (1 << (sig - 1))) {
|
|
error = setsigvec(p, child_thread, sig, &vec, spawn_no_exec);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Activate the CPU usage monitor, if requested. This is done via a task-wide, per-thread CPU
|
|
* usage limit, which will generate a resource exceeded exception if any one thread exceeds the
|
|
* limit.
|
|
*
|
|
* Userland gives us interval in seconds, and the kernel SPI expects nanoseconds.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((px_sa.psa_cpumonitor_percent != 0) && (px_sa.psa_cpumonitor_percent < UINT8_MAX)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Always treat a CPU monitor activation coming from spawn as entitled. Requiring
|
|
* an entitlement to configure the monitor a certain way seems silly, since
|
|
* whomever is turning it on could just as easily choose not to do so.
|
|
*/
|
|
error = proc_set_task_ruse_cpu(proc_task(p),
|
|
TASK_POLICY_RESOURCE_ATTRIBUTE_NOTIFY_EXC,
|
|
(uint8_t)px_sa.psa_cpumonitor_percent,
|
|
px_sa.psa_cpumonitor_interval * NSEC_PER_SEC,
|
|
0, TRUE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (px_pcred_info &&
|
|
(px_pcred_info->pspci_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_POSIX_CRED_LOGIN)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* setlogin() must happen after setsid()
|
|
*/
|
|
setlogin_internal(p, px_pcred_info->pspci_login);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bad_px_sa:
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
|
KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT(BSDDBG_CODE(DBG_BSD_PROC, BSD_PROC_EXITREASON_CREATE) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
|
|
proc_getpid(p), OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_BAD_PSATTR, 0, 0);
|
|
exec_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_BAD_PSATTR);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bad:
|
|
|
|
if (error == 0) {
|
|
/* reset delay idle sleep status if set */
|
|
#if CONFIG_DELAY_IDLE_SLEEP
|
|
if ((p->p_flag & P_DELAYIDLESLEEP) == P_DELAYIDLESLEEP) {
|
|
OSBitAndAtomic(~((uint32_t)P_DELAYIDLESLEEP), &p->p_flag);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_DELAY_IDLE_SLEEP */
|
|
/* upon successful spawn, re/set the proc control state */
|
|
if (imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL) {
|
|
switch (px_sa.psa_pcontrol) {
|
|
case POSIX_SPAWN_PCONTROL_THROTTLE:
|
|
p->p_pcaction = P_PCTHROTTLE;
|
|
break;
|
|
case POSIX_SPAWN_PCONTROL_SUSPEND:
|
|
p->p_pcaction = P_PCSUSP;
|
|
break;
|
|
case POSIX_SPAWN_PCONTROL_KILL:
|
|
p->p_pcaction = P_PCKILL;
|
|
break;
|
|
case POSIX_SPAWN_PCONTROL_NONE:
|
|
default:
|
|
p->p_pcaction = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
;
|
|
}
|
|
exec_resettextvp(p, imgp);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Enable new task IPC access if exec_activate_image() returned an
|
|
* active task. (Checks active bit in ipc_task_enable() under lock).
|
|
* Must enable after resettextvp so that task port policies are not evaluated
|
|
* until the csblob in the textvp is accurately reflected.
|
|
*/
|
|
ipc_task_enable(new_task);
|
|
|
|
/* Set task exception ports now that we can check entitlements */
|
|
if (imgp->ip_px_spa != NULL) {
|
|
error = exec_handle_exception_port_actions(imgp, &port_actions);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_MEMORYSTATUS
|
|
/* Set jetsam priority for DriverKit processes */
|
|
if (px_sa.psa_apptype == POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_DRIVER) {
|
|
px_sa.psa_priority = JETSAM_PRIORITY_DRIVER_APPLE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Has jetsam attributes? */
|
|
if (imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL && (px_sa.psa_jetsam_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_JETSAM_SET)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* With 2-level high-water-mark support, POSIX_SPAWN_JETSAM_HIWATER_BACKGROUND is no
|
|
* longer relevant, as background limits are described via the inactive limit slots.
|
|
*
|
|
* That said, however, if the POSIX_SPAWN_JETSAM_HIWATER_BACKGROUND is passed in,
|
|
* we attempt to mimic previous behavior by forcing the BG limit data into the
|
|
* inactive/non-fatal mode and force the active slots to hold system_wide/fatal mode.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (px_sa.psa_jetsam_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_JETSAM_HIWATER_BACKGROUND) {
|
|
memorystatus_update(p, px_sa.psa_priority, 0, FALSE, /* assertion priority */
|
|
(px_sa.psa_jetsam_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_JETSAM_USE_EFFECTIVE_PRIORITY),
|
|
TRUE,
|
|
-1, TRUE,
|
|
px_sa.psa_memlimit_inactive, FALSE);
|
|
} else {
|
|
memorystatus_update(p, px_sa.psa_priority, 0, FALSE, /* assertion priority */
|
|
(px_sa.psa_jetsam_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_JETSAM_USE_EFFECTIVE_PRIORITY),
|
|
TRUE,
|
|
px_sa.psa_memlimit_active,
|
|
(px_sa.psa_jetsam_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_JETSAM_MEMLIMIT_ACTIVE_FATAL),
|
|
px_sa.psa_memlimit_inactive,
|
|
(px_sa.psa_jetsam_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_JETSAM_MEMLIMIT_INACTIVE_FATAL));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Has jetsam relaunch behavior? */
|
|
if (imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL && (px_sa.psa_jetsam_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_JETSAM_RELAUNCH_BEHAVIOR_MASK)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Launchd has passed in data indicating the behavior of this process in response to jetsam.
|
|
* This data would be used by the jetsam subsystem to determine the position and protection
|
|
* offered to this process on dirty -> clean transitions.
|
|
*/
|
|
int relaunch_flags = P_MEMSTAT_RELAUNCH_UNKNOWN;
|
|
switch (px_sa.psa_jetsam_flags & POSIX_SPAWN_JETSAM_RELAUNCH_BEHAVIOR_MASK) {
|
|
case POSIX_SPAWN_JETSAM_RELAUNCH_BEHAVIOR_LOW:
|
|
relaunch_flags = P_MEMSTAT_RELAUNCH_LOW;
|
|
break;
|
|
case POSIX_SPAWN_JETSAM_RELAUNCH_BEHAVIOR_MED:
|
|
relaunch_flags = P_MEMSTAT_RELAUNCH_MED;
|
|
break;
|
|
case POSIX_SPAWN_JETSAM_RELAUNCH_BEHAVIOR_HIGH:
|
|
relaunch_flags = P_MEMSTAT_RELAUNCH_HIGH;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
memorystatus_relaunch_flags_update(p, relaunch_flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_MEMORYSTATUS */
|
|
if (imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL && px_sa.psa_thread_limit > 0) {
|
|
task_set_thread_limit(new_task, (uint16_t)px_sa.psa_thread_limit);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_PROC_RESOURCE_LIMITS
|
|
if (imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL && (px_sa.psa_port_soft_limit > 0 || px_sa.psa_port_hard_limit > 0)) {
|
|
task_set_port_space_limits(new_task, (uint32_t)px_sa.psa_port_soft_limit,
|
|
(uint32_t)px_sa.psa_port_hard_limit);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL && (px_sa.psa_filedesc_soft_limit > 0 || px_sa.psa_filedesc_hard_limit > 0)) {
|
|
proc_set_filedesc_limits(p, (int)px_sa.psa_filedesc_soft_limit,
|
|
(int)px_sa.psa_filedesc_hard_limit);
|
|
}
|
|
if (imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL && (px_sa.psa_kqworkloop_soft_limit > 0 || px_sa.psa_kqworkloop_hard_limit > 0)) {
|
|
proc_set_kqworkloop_limits(p, (int)px_sa.psa_kqworkloop_soft_limit,
|
|
(int)px_sa.psa_kqworkloop_hard_limit);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_RESOURCE_LIMITS */
|
|
|
|
/* Disable wakeup monitoring for DriverKit processes */
|
|
if (px_sa.psa_apptype == POSIX_SPAWN_PROC_TYPE_DRIVER) {
|
|
uint32_t flags = WAKEMON_DISABLE;
|
|
task_wakeups_monitor_ctl(new_task, &flags, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we successfully called fork1() or cloneproc, we always need
|
|
* to do this. This is because we come back from that call with
|
|
* signals blocked in the child, and we have to unblock them, for exec
|
|
* case they are unblocked before activation, but for true spawn case
|
|
* we want to wait until after we've performed any spawn actions.
|
|
* This has to happen before process_signature(), which uses psignal.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (proc_transit_set) {
|
|
proc_transend(p, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Drop the signal lock on the child which was taken on our
|
|
* behalf by forkproc()/cloneproc() to prevent signals being
|
|
* received by the child in a partially constructed state.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (proc_signal_set) {
|
|
proc_signalend(p, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (error == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We need to initialize the bank context behind the protection of
|
|
* the proc_trans lock to prevent a race with exit. We can't do this during
|
|
* exec_activate_image because task_bank_init checks entitlements that
|
|
* aren't loaded until subsequent calls (including exec_resettextvp).
|
|
*/
|
|
error = proc_transstart(p, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (error == 0) {
|
|
task_bank_init(new_task);
|
|
proc_transend(p, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if __arm64__
|
|
proc_footprint_entitlement_hacks(p, new_task);
|
|
#endif /* __arm64__ */
|
|
|
|
#if XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX
|
|
#define SINGLE_JIT_ENTITLEMENT "com.apple.security.cs.single-jit"
|
|
if (IOTaskHasEntitlement(new_task, SINGLE_JIT_ENTITLEMENT)) {
|
|
vm_map_single_jit(get_task_map(new_task));
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX */
|
|
|
|
#if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls)
|
|
task_set_pac_exception_fatal_flag(new_task);
|
|
#endif /* __has_feature(ptrauth_calls) */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Inherit task role from old task to new task for exec */
|
|
if (error == 0 && !spawn_no_exec) {
|
|
proc_inherit_task_role(new_task, old_task);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_ARCADE
|
|
if (error == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check to see if we need to trigger an arcade upcall AST now
|
|
* that the vnode has been reset on the task.
|
|
*/
|
|
arcade_prepare(new_task, imgp->ip_new_thread);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCADE */
|
|
|
|
if (error == 0) {
|
|
proc_apply_jit_and_vm_policies(imgp, p, new_task);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Clear the initial wait on the thread before handling spawn policy */
|
|
if (imgp && imgp->ip_new_thread) {
|
|
task_clear_return_wait(get_threadtask(imgp->ip_new_thread), TCRW_CLEAR_INITIAL_WAIT);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Apply the spawnattr policy, apptype (which primes the task for importance donation),
|
|
* and bind any portwatch ports to the new task.
|
|
* This must be done after the exec so that the child's thread is ready,
|
|
* and after the in transit state has been released, because priority is
|
|
* dropped here so we need to be prepared for a potentially long preemption interval
|
|
*
|
|
* TODO: Consider splitting this up into separate phases
|
|
*/
|
|
if (error == 0 && imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL) {
|
|
struct _posix_spawnattr *psa = (struct _posix_spawnattr *) imgp->ip_px_sa;
|
|
|
|
error = exec_handle_spawnattr_policy(p, imgp->ip_new_thread, psa->psa_apptype, psa->psa_qos_clamp,
|
|
psa->psa_darwin_role, &port_actions);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Transfer the turnstile watchport boost to new task if in exec */
|
|
if (error == 0 && !spawn_no_exec) {
|
|
task_transfer_turnstile_watchports(old_task, new_task, imgp->ip_new_thread);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (error == 0 && imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL) {
|
|
struct _posix_spawnattr *psa = (struct _posix_spawnattr *) imgp->ip_px_sa;
|
|
|
|
if (psa->psa_no_smt) {
|
|
task_set_no_smt(new_task);
|
|
}
|
|
if (psa->psa_tecs) {
|
|
task_set_tecs(new_task);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (error == 0 && imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL) {
|
|
struct _posix_spawnattr *psa = (struct _posix_spawnattr *) imgp->ip_px_sa;
|
|
|
|
if (psa->psa_options & PSA_OPTION_DATALESS_IOPOLICY) {
|
|
struct _iopol_param_t iop_param = {
|
|
.iop_scope = IOPOL_SCOPE_PROCESS,
|
|
.iop_iotype = IOPOL_TYPE_VFS_MATERIALIZE_DATALESS_FILES,
|
|
.iop_policy = psa->psa_dataless_iopolicy,
|
|
};
|
|
error = iopolicysys_vfs_materialize_dataless_files(p, IOPOL_CMD_SET, iop_param.iop_scope,
|
|
iop_param.iop_policy, &iop_param);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (error == 0) {
|
|
/* Apply the main thread qos */
|
|
thread_t main_thread = imgp->ip_new_thread;
|
|
task_set_main_thread_qos(new_task, main_thread);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Release any ports we kept around for binding to the new task
|
|
* We need to release the rights even if the posix_spawn has failed.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (imgp->ip_px_spa != NULL) {
|
|
exec_port_actions_destroy(&port_actions);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We have to delay operations which might throw a signal until after
|
|
* the signals have been unblocked; however, we want that to happen
|
|
* after exec_resettextvp() so that the textvp is correct when they
|
|
* fire.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (error == 0) {
|
|
error = process_signature(p, imgp);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Pay for our earlier safety; deliver the delayed signals from
|
|
* the incomplete spawn process now that it's complete.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (imgp != NULL && spawn_no_exec && (p->p_lflag & P_LTRACED)) {
|
|
psignal_vfork(p, proc_task(p), imgp->ip_new_thread, SIGTRAP);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (error == 0 && !spawn_no_exec) {
|
|
KDBG(BSDDBG_CODE(DBG_BSD_PROC, BSD_PROC_EXEC),
|
|
proc_getpid(p));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (spawn_no_exec) {
|
|
/* flag the 'fork' has occurred */
|
|
proc_knote(p->p_pptr, NOTE_FORK | proc_getpid(p));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* flag exec has occurred, notify only if it has not failed due to FP Key error */
|
|
if (!error && ((p->p_lflag & P_LTERM_DECRYPTFAIL) == 0)) {
|
|
proc_knote(p, NOTE_EXEC);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (imgp != NULL) {
|
|
uthread_set_exec_data(current_uthread(), NULL);
|
|
if (imgp->ip_vp) {
|
|
vnode_put(imgp->ip_vp);
|
|
}
|
|
if (imgp->ip_scriptvp) {
|
|
vnode_put(imgp->ip_scriptvp);
|
|
}
|
|
if (imgp->ip_strings) {
|
|
execargs_free(imgp);
|
|
}
|
|
if (imgp->ip_free_map) {
|
|
/* Free the map after dropping iocount on vnode to avoid deadlock */
|
|
vm_map_deallocate(imgp->ip_free_map);
|
|
}
|
|
kfree_data(imgp->ip_px_sfa,
|
|
px_args.file_actions_size);
|
|
kfree_data(imgp->ip_px_spa,
|
|
px_args.port_actions_size);
|
|
#if CONFIG_PERSONAS
|
|
kfree_data(imgp->ip_px_persona,
|
|
px_args.persona_info_size);
|
|
#endif
|
|
kfree_data(imgp->ip_px_pcred_info,
|
|
px_args.posix_cred_info_size);
|
|
|
|
if (subsystem_root_path != NULL) {
|
|
zfree(ZV_NAMEI, subsystem_root_path);
|
|
}
|
|
#if CONFIG_MACF
|
|
struct ip_px_smpx_s *px_s = &imgp->ip_px_smpx;
|
|
kfree_data(px_s->array, px_args.mac_extensions_size);
|
|
kfree_data(px_s->data, (vm_size_t)px_s->datalen);
|
|
|
|
if (imgp->ip_execlabelp) {
|
|
mac_cred_label_free(imgp->ip_execlabelp);
|
|
imgp->ip_execlabelp = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (imgp->ip_scriptlabelp) {
|
|
mac_vnode_label_free(imgp->ip_scriptlabelp);
|
|
imgp->ip_scriptlabelp = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (imgp->ip_cs_error != OS_REASON_NULL) {
|
|
os_reason_free(imgp->ip_cs_error);
|
|
imgp->ip_cs_error = OS_REASON_NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (imgp->ip_inherited_shared_region_id != NULL) {
|
|
kfree_data(imgp->ip_inherited_shared_region_id,
|
|
strlen(imgp->ip_inherited_shared_region_id) + 1);
|
|
imgp->ip_inherited_shared_region_id = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_DTRACE
|
|
if (spawn_no_exec) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* In the original DTrace reference implementation,
|
|
* posix_spawn() was a libc routine that just
|
|
* did vfork(2) then exec(2). Thus the proc::: probes
|
|
* are very fork/exec oriented. The details of this
|
|
* in-kernel implementation of posix_spawn() is different
|
|
* (while producing the same process-observable effects)
|
|
* particularly w.r.t. errors, and which thread/process
|
|
* is constructing what on behalf of whom.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
DTRACE_PROC1(spawn__failure, int, error);
|
|
} else {
|
|
DTRACE_PROC(spawn__success);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Some DTrace scripts, e.g. newproc.d in
|
|
* /usr/bin, rely on the the 'exec-success'
|
|
* probe being fired in the child after the
|
|
* new process image has been constructed
|
|
* in order to determine the associated pid.
|
|
*
|
|
* So, even though the parent built the image
|
|
* here, for compatibility, mark the new thread
|
|
* so 'exec-success' fires on it as it leaves
|
|
* the kernel.
|
|
*/
|
|
dtrace_thread_didexec(imgp->ip_new_thread);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
DTRACE_PROC1(exec__failure, int, error);
|
|
} else {
|
|
dtrace_thread_didexec(imgp->ip_new_thread);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((dtrace_proc_waitfor_hook = dtrace_proc_waitfor_exec_ptr) != NULL) {
|
|
(*dtrace_proc_waitfor_hook)(p);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_AUDIT
|
|
if (!error && AUDIT_ENABLED() && p) {
|
|
/* Add the CDHash of the new process to the audit record */
|
|
uint8_t *cdhash = cs_get_cdhash(p);
|
|
if (cdhash) {
|
|
AUDIT_ARG(data, cdhash, sizeof(uint8_t), CS_CDHASH_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* terminate the new task if exec failed */
|
|
if (new_task != NULL && task_is_exec_copy(new_task)) {
|
|
task_terminate_internal(new_task);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (exec_failure_reason && !spawn_no_exec) {
|
|
psignal_with_reason(p, SIGKILL, exec_failure_reason);
|
|
exec_failure_reason = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Return to both the parent and the child? */
|
|
if (imgp != NULL && spawn_no_exec) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the parent wants the pid, copy it out
|
|
*/
|
|
if (error == 0 && pid != USER_ADDR_NULL) {
|
|
_Static_assert(sizeof(pid_t) == 4, "posix_spawn() assumes a 32-bit pid_t");
|
|
bool aligned = (pid & 3) == 0;
|
|
if (aligned) {
|
|
(void)copyout_atomic32(proc_getpid(p), pid);
|
|
} else {
|
|
(void)suword(pid, proc_getpid(p));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
retval[0] = error;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we had an error, perform an internal reap ; this is
|
|
* entirely safe, as we have a real process backing us.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
proc_list_lock();
|
|
p->p_listflag |= P_LIST_DEADPARENT;
|
|
proc_list_unlock();
|
|
proc_lock(p);
|
|
/* make sure no one else has killed it off... */
|
|
if (p->p_stat != SZOMB && p->exit_thread == NULL) {
|
|
p->exit_thread = current_thread();
|
|
p->p_posix_spawn_failed = true;
|
|
proc_unlock(p);
|
|
exit1(p, 1, (int *)NULL);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* someone is doing it for us; just skip it */
|
|
proc_unlock(p);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do not terminate the current task, if proc_exec_switch_task did not
|
|
* switch the tasks, terminating the current task without the switch would
|
|
* result in loosing the SIGKILL status.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (task_did_exec(old_task)) {
|
|
/* Terminate the current task, since exec will start in new task */
|
|
task_terminate_internal(old_task);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Release the thread ref returned by cloneproc/fork1 */
|
|
if (imgp != NULL && imgp->ip_new_thread) {
|
|
/* clear the exec complete flag if there is an error before point of no-return */
|
|
uint32_t clearwait_flags = TCRW_CLEAR_FINAL_WAIT;
|
|
if (!spawn_no_exec && !exec_done && error != 0) {
|
|
clearwait_flags |= TCRW_CLEAR_EXEC_COMPLETE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* wake up the new thread */
|
|
task_clear_return_wait(get_threadtask(imgp->ip_new_thread), clearwait_flags);
|
|
thread_deallocate(imgp->ip_new_thread);
|
|
imgp->ip_new_thread = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Release the ref returned by cloneproc/fork1 */
|
|
if (new_task) {
|
|
task_deallocate(new_task);
|
|
new_task = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (should_release_proc_ref) {
|
|
proc_rele(p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kfree_type(typeof(*__spawn_data), __spawn_data);
|
|
|
|
if (inherit != NULL) {
|
|
ipc_importance_release(inherit);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_EXCLAVES
|
|
if (task_conclave_id != NULL) {
|
|
kfree_data(task_conclave_id, MAXCONCLAVENAME);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
assert(spawn_no_exec || exec_failure_reason == NULL);
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* proc_exec_switch_task
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters: old_proc proc before exec
|
|
* new_proc proc after exec
|
|
* old_task task before exec
|
|
* new_task task after exec
|
|
* new_thread thread in new task
|
|
* inherit resulting importance linkage
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: proc.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: The function will switch proc in pid hash from old proc to new proc.
|
|
* The switch needs to happen after draining all proc refs and inside
|
|
* a proc list lock. In the case of failure to switch the proc, which
|
|
* might happen if the process received a SIGKILL or jetsam killed it,
|
|
* it will make sure that the new tasks terminates. User proc ref returned
|
|
* to caller.
|
|
*
|
|
* This function is called after point of no return, in the case
|
|
* failure to switch, it will terminate the new task and swallow the
|
|
* error and let the terminated process complete exec and die.
|
|
*/
|
|
proc_t
|
|
proc_exec_switch_task(proc_t old_proc, proc_t new_proc, task_t old_task, task_t new_task, thread_t new_thread,
|
|
void **inherit)
|
|
{
|
|
boolean_t task_active;
|
|
boolean_t proc_active;
|
|
boolean_t thread_active;
|
|
boolean_t reparent_traced_child = FALSE;
|
|
thread_t old_thread = current_thread();
|
|
|
|
thread_set_exec_promotion(old_thread);
|
|
old_proc = proc_refdrain_will_exec(old_proc);
|
|
|
|
new_proc = proc_refdrain_will_exec(new_proc);
|
|
/* extra proc ref returned to the caller */
|
|
|
|
assert(get_threadtask(new_thread) == new_task);
|
|
task_active = task_is_active(new_task);
|
|
proc_active = !(old_proc->p_lflag & P_LEXIT);
|
|
|
|
/* Check if the current thread is not aborted due to SIGKILL */
|
|
thread_active = thread_is_active(old_thread);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do not switch the proc if the new task or proc is already terminated
|
|
* as a result of error in exec past point of no return
|
|
*/
|
|
if (proc_active && task_active && thread_active) {
|
|
uthread_t new_uthread = get_bsdthread_info(new_thread);
|
|
uthread_t old_uthread = current_uthread();
|
|
|
|
/* Clear dispatchqueue and workloop ast offset */
|
|
new_proc->p_dispatchqueue_offset = 0;
|
|
new_proc->p_dispatchqueue_serialno_offset = 0;
|
|
new_proc->p_dispatchqueue_label_offset = 0;
|
|
new_proc->p_return_to_kernel_offset = 0;
|
|
new_proc->p_pthread_wq_quantum_offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* If old_proc is session leader, change the leader to new proc */
|
|
session_replace_leader(old_proc, new_proc);
|
|
|
|
proc_lock(old_proc);
|
|
|
|
/* Copy the signal state, dtrace state and set bsd ast on new thread */
|
|
act_set_astbsd(new_thread);
|
|
new_uthread->uu_siglist |= old_uthread->uu_siglist;
|
|
new_uthread->uu_siglist |= old_proc->p_siglist;
|
|
new_uthread->uu_sigwait = old_uthread->uu_sigwait;
|
|
new_uthread->uu_sigmask = old_uthread->uu_sigmask;
|
|
new_uthread->uu_oldmask = old_uthread->uu_oldmask;
|
|
new_uthread->uu_exit_reason = old_uthread->uu_exit_reason;
|
|
#if CONFIG_DTRACE
|
|
new_uthread->t_dtrace_sig = old_uthread->t_dtrace_sig;
|
|
new_uthread->t_dtrace_stop = old_uthread->t_dtrace_stop;
|
|
new_uthread->t_dtrace_resumepid = old_uthread->t_dtrace_resumepid;
|
|
assert(new_uthread->t_dtrace_scratch == NULL);
|
|
new_uthread->t_dtrace_scratch = old_uthread->t_dtrace_scratch;
|
|
|
|
old_uthread->t_dtrace_sig = 0;
|
|
old_uthread->t_dtrace_stop = 0;
|
|
old_uthread->t_dtrace_resumepid = 0;
|
|
old_uthread->t_dtrace_scratch = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_PROC_UDATA_STORAGE
|
|
new_proc->p_user_data = old_proc->p_user_data;
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_UDATA_STORAGE */
|
|
|
|
/* Copy the resource accounting info */
|
|
thread_copy_resource_info(new_thread, current_thread());
|
|
|
|
/* Clear the exit reason and signal state on old thread */
|
|
old_uthread->uu_exit_reason = NULL;
|
|
old_uthread->uu_siglist = 0;
|
|
|
|
task_set_did_exec_flag(old_task);
|
|
task_clear_exec_copy_flag(new_task);
|
|
|
|
task_copy_fields_for_exec(new_task, old_task);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Need to transfer pending watch port boosts to the new task
|
|
* while still making sure that the old task remains in the
|
|
* importance linkage. Create an importance linkage from old task
|
|
* to new task, then switch the task importance base of old task
|
|
* and new task. After the switch the port watch boost will be
|
|
* boosting the new task and new task will be donating importance
|
|
* to old task.
|
|
*/
|
|
*inherit = ipc_importance_exec_switch_task(old_task, new_task);
|
|
|
|
/* Transfer parent's ptrace state to child */
|
|
new_proc->p_lflag &= ~(P_LTRACED | P_LSIGEXC | P_LNOATTACH);
|
|
new_proc->p_lflag |= (old_proc->p_lflag & (P_LTRACED | P_LSIGEXC | P_LNOATTACH));
|
|
new_proc->p_oppid = old_proc->p_oppid;
|
|
|
|
if (old_proc->p_pptr != new_proc->p_pptr) {
|
|
reparent_traced_child = TRUE;
|
|
new_proc->p_lflag |= P_LTRACE_WAIT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
proc_unlock(old_proc);
|
|
|
|
/* Update the list of proc knotes */
|
|
proc_transfer_knotes(old_proc, new_proc);
|
|
|
|
/* Update the proc interval timers */
|
|
proc_inherit_itimers(old_proc, new_proc);
|
|
|
|
proc_list_lock();
|
|
|
|
/* Insert the new proc in child list of parent proc */
|
|
p_reparentallchildren(old_proc, new_proc);
|
|
|
|
/* Switch proc in pid hash */
|
|
phash_replace_locked(old_proc, new_proc);
|
|
|
|
/* Transfer the shadow flag to old proc */
|
|
os_atomic_andnot(&new_proc->p_refcount, P_REF_SHADOW, relaxed);
|
|
os_atomic_or(&old_proc->p_refcount, P_REF_SHADOW, relaxed);
|
|
|
|
/* Change init proc if launchd exec */
|
|
if (old_proc == initproc) {
|
|
/* Take the ref on new proc after proc_refwake_did_exec */
|
|
initproc = new_proc;
|
|
/* Drop the proc ref on old proc */
|
|
proc_rele(old_proc);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
proc_list_unlock();
|
|
#if CONFIG_EXCLAVES
|
|
task_inherit_conclave(old_task, new_task);
|
|
#endif
|
|
} else {
|
|
task_terminate_internal(new_task);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
proc_refwake_did_exec(new_proc);
|
|
proc_refwake_did_exec(old_proc);
|
|
|
|
/* Take a ref on initproc if it changed */
|
|
if (new_proc == initproc) {
|
|
initproc = proc_ref(new_proc, false);
|
|
assert(initproc != PROC_NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
thread_clear_exec_promotion(old_thread);
|
|
proc_rele(old_proc);
|
|
|
|
if (reparent_traced_child) {
|
|
proc_t pp = proc_parent(old_proc);
|
|
assert(pp != PROC_NULL);
|
|
|
|
proc_reparentlocked(new_proc, pp, 1, 0);
|
|
proc_rele(pp);
|
|
|
|
proc_lock(new_proc);
|
|
new_proc->p_lflag &= ~P_LTRACE_WAIT;
|
|
proc_unlock(new_proc);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return new_proc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* execve
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters: uap->fname File name to exec
|
|
* uap->argp Argument list
|
|
* uap->envp Environment list
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: 0 Success
|
|
* __mac_execve:EINVAL Invalid argument
|
|
* __mac_execve:ENOTSUP Invalid argument
|
|
* __mac_execve:EACCES Permission denied
|
|
* __mac_execve:EINTR Interrupted function
|
|
* __mac_execve:ENOMEM Not enough space
|
|
* __mac_execve:EFAULT Bad address
|
|
* __mac_execve:ENAMETOOLONG Filename too long
|
|
* __mac_execve:ENOEXEC Executable file format error
|
|
* __mac_execve:ETXTBSY Text file busy [misuse of error code]
|
|
* __mac_execve:???
|
|
*
|
|
* TODO: Dynamic linker header address on stack is copied via suword()
|
|
*/
|
|
/* ARGSUSED */
|
|
int
|
|
execve(proc_t p, struct execve_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
|
|
{
|
|
struct __mac_execve_args muap;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
memoryshot(VM_EXECVE, DBG_FUNC_NONE);
|
|
|
|
muap.fname = uap->fname;
|
|
muap.argp = uap->argp;
|
|
muap.envp = uap->envp;
|
|
muap.mac_p = USER_ADDR_NULL;
|
|
err = __mac_execve(p, &muap, retval);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* __mac_execve
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters: uap->fname File name to exec
|
|
* uap->argp Argument list
|
|
* uap->envp Environment list
|
|
* uap->mac_p MAC label supplied by caller
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: 0 Success
|
|
* EINVAL Invalid argument
|
|
* ENOTSUP Not supported
|
|
* ENOEXEC Executable file format error
|
|
* exec_activate_image:EINVAL Invalid argument
|
|
* exec_activate_image:EACCES Permission denied
|
|
* exec_activate_image:EINTR Interrupted function
|
|
* exec_activate_image:ENOMEM Not enough space
|
|
* exec_activate_image:EFAULT Bad address
|
|
* exec_activate_image:ENAMETOOLONG Filename too long
|
|
* exec_activate_image:ENOEXEC Executable file format error
|
|
* exec_activate_image:ETXTBSY Text file busy [misuse of error code]
|
|
* exec_activate_image:EBADEXEC The executable is corrupt/unknown
|
|
* exec_activate_image:???
|
|
* mac_execve_enter:???
|
|
*
|
|
* TODO: Dynamic linker header address on stack is copied via suword()
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
__mac_execve(proc_t p, struct __mac_execve_args *uap, int32_t *retval __unused)
|
|
{
|
|
struct image_params *imgp = NULL;
|
|
struct vnode_attr *vap = NULL;
|
|
struct vnode_attr *origvap = NULL;
|
|
int error;
|
|
int is_64 = IS_64BIT_PROCESS(p);
|
|
struct vfs_context context;
|
|
struct uthread *uthread = NULL;
|
|
task_t old_task = current_task();
|
|
task_t new_task = NULL;
|
|
boolean_t should_release_proc_ref = FALSE;
|
|
boolean_t exec_done = FALSE;
|
|
void *inherit = NULL;
|
|
struct {
|
|
struct image_params imgp;
|
|
struct vnode_attr va;
|
|
struct vnode_attr origva;
|
|
} *__execve_data;
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate a big chunk for locals instead of using stack since these
|
|
* structures a pretty big.
|
|
*/
|
|
__execve_data = kalloc_type(typeof(*__execve_data), Z_WAITOK | Z_ZERO);
|
|
if (__execve_data == NULL) {
|
|
error = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto exit_with_error;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp = &__execve_data->imgp;
|
|
vap = &__execve_data->va;
|
|
origvap = &__execve_data->origva;
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize the common data in the image_params structure */
|
|
imgp->ip_user_fname = uap->fname;
|
|
imgp->ip_user_argv = uap->argp;
|
|
imgp->ip_user_envv = uap->envp;
|
|
imgp->ip_vattr = vap;
|
|
imgp->ip_origvattr = origvap;
|
|
imgp->ip_vfs_context = &context;
|
|
imgp->ip_flags = (is_64 ? IMGPF_WAS_64BIT_ADDR : IMGPF_NONE) | ((p->p_flag & P_DISABLE_ASLR) ? IMGPF_DISABLE_ASLR : IMGPF_NONE);
|
|
imgp->ip_seg = (is_64 ? UIO_USERSPACE64 : UIO_USERSPACE32);
|
|
imgp->ip_mac_return = 0;
|
|
imgp->ip_cs_error = OS_REASON_NULL;
|
|
imgp->ip_simulator_binary = IMGPF_SB_DEFAULT;
|
|
imgp->ip_subsystem_root_path = NULL;
|
|
uthread_set_exec_data(current_uthread(), imgp);
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_MACF
|
|
if (uap->mac_p != USER_ADDR_NULL) {
|
|
error = mac_execve_enter(uap->mac_p, imgp);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto exit_with_error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
uthread = current_uthread();
|
|
{
|
|
imgp->ip_flags |= IMGPF_EXEC;
|
|
|
|
/* Adjust the user proc count */
|
|
(void)chgproccnt(kauth_getruid(), 1);
|
|
/*
|
|
* For execve case, create a new proc, task and thread
|
|
* but don't make the proc visible to userland. After
|
|
* image activation, the new proc would take place of
|
|
* the old proc in pid hash and other lists that make
|
|
* the proc visible to the system.
|
|
*/
|
|
imgp->ip_new_thread = cloneproc(old_task, NULL, p, CLONEPROC_EXEC);
|
|
/* task and thread ref returned by cloneproc */
|
|
if (imgp->ip_new_thread == NULL) {
|
|
(void)chgproccnt(kauth_getruid(), -1);
|
|
error = ENOMEM;
|
|
goto exit_with_error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
new_task = get_threadtask(imgp->ip_new_thread);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = (proc_t)get_bsdthreadtask_info(imgp->ip_new_thread);
|
|
|
|
context.vc_thread = imgp->ip_new_thread;
|
|
context.vc_ucred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p); /* XXX must NOT be kauth_cred_get() */
|
|
|
|
imgp->ip_subsystem_root_path = p->p_subsystem_root_path;
|
|
|
|
proc_transend(p, 0);
|
|
proc_signalend(p, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Activate the image.
|
|
* Warning: If activation failed after point of no return, it returns error
|
|
* as 0 and pretends the call succeeded.
|
|
*/
|
|
error = exec_activate_image(imgp);
|
|
/* thread and task ref returned for vfexec case */
|
|
|
|
if (imgp->ip_new_thread != NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* task reference might be returned by exec_activate_image
|
|
* for vfexec.
|
|
*/
|
|
new_task = get_threadtask(imgp->ip_new_thread);
|
|
#if defined(HAS_APPLE_PAC)
|
|
ml_task_set_disable_user_jop(new_task, imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_NOJOP ? TRUE : FALSE);
|
|
ml_thread_set_disable_user_jop(imgp->ip_new_thread, imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_NOJOP ? TRUE : FALSE);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!error) {
|
|
p = proc_exec_switch_task(current_proc(), p, old_task, new_task, imgp->ip_new_thread, &inherit);
|
|
/* proc ref returned */
|
|
should_release_proc_ref = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kauth_cred_unref(&context.vc_ucred);
|
|
|
|
if (!error) {
|
|
exec_done = TRUE;
|
|
assert(imgp->ip_new_thread != NULL);
|
|
|
|
exec_resettextvp(p, imgp);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Enable new task IPC access if exec_activate_image() returned an
|
|
* active task. (Checks active bit in ipc_task_enable() under lock).
|
|
* Must enable after resettextvp so that task port policies are not evaluated
|
|
* until the csblob in the textvp is accurately reflected.
|
|
*/
|
|
ipc_task_enable(new_task);
|
|
error = process_signature(p, imgp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(HAS_APPLE_PAC)
|
|
if (imgp->ip_new_thread && !error) {
|
|
ml_task_set_jop_pid_from_shared_region(new_task, imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_NOJOP);
|
|
ml_thread_set_jop_pid(imgp->ip_new_thread, new_task);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* defined(HAS_APPLE_PAC) */
|
|
|
|
/* flag exec has occurred, notify only if it has not failed due to FP Key error */
|
|
if (exec_done && ((p->p_lflag & P_LTERM_DECRYPTFAIL) == 0)) {
|
|
proc_knote(p, NOTE_EXEC);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (imgp->ip_vp != NULLVP) {
|
|
vnode_put(imgp->ip_vp);
|
|
}
|
|
if (imgp->ip_scriptvp != NULLVP) {
|
|
vnode_put(imgp->ip_scriptvp);
|
|
}
|
|
if (imgp->ip_free_map) {
|
|
/* Free the map after dropping iocount on vnode to avoid deadlock */
|
|
vm_map_deallocate(imgp->ip_free_map);
|
|
}
|
|
if (imgp->ip_strings) {
|
|
execargs_free(imgp);
|
|
}
|
|
#if CONFIG_MACF
|
|
if (imgp->ip_execlabelp) {
|
|
mac_cred_label_free(imgp->ip_execlabelp);
|
|
imgp->ip_execlabelp = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (imgp->ip_scriptlabelp) {
|
|
mac_vnode_label_free(imgp->ip_scriptlabelp);
|
|
imgp->ip_scriptlabelp = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (imgp->ip_cs_error != OS_REASON_NULL) {
|
|
os_reason_free(imgp->ip_cs_error);
|
|
imgp->ip_cs_error = OS_REASON_NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!error) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We need to initialize the bank context behind the protection of
|
|
* the proc_trans lock to prevent a race with exit. We can't do this during
|
|
* exec_activate_image because task_bank_init checks entitlements that
|
|
* aren't loaded until subsequent calls (including exec_resettextvp).
|
|
*/
|
|
error = proc_transstart(p, 0, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!error) {
|
|
task_bank_init(new_task);
|
|
proc_transend(p, 0);
|
|
|
|
// Don't inherit crash behavior across exec
|
|
p->p_crash_behavior = 0;
|
|
p->p_crash_behavior_deadline = 0;
|
|
|
|
#if __arm64__
|
|
proc_footprint_entitlement_hacks(p, new_task);
|
|
#endif /* __arm64__ */
|
|
|
|
#if XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX
|
|
if (IOTaskHasEntitlement(new_task, SINGLE_JIT_ENTITLEMENT)) {
|
|
vm_map_single_jit(get_task_map(new_task));
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX */
|
|
|
|
/* Sever any extant thread affinity */
|
|
thread_affinity_exec(current_thread());
|
|
|
|
/* Inherit task role from old task to new task for exec */
|
|
proc_inherit_task_role(new_task, old_task);
|
|
|
|
thread_t main_thread = imgp->ip_new_thread;
|
|
|
|
task_set_main_thread_qos(new_task, main_thread);
|
|
|
|
#if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls)
|
|
task_set_pac_exception_fatal_flag(new_task);
|
|
#endif /* __has_feature(ptrauth_calls) */
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_ARCADE
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check to see if we need to trigger an arcade upcall AST now
|
|
* that the vnode has been reset on the task.
|
|
*/
|
|
arcade_prepare(new_task, imgp->ip_new_thread);
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCADE */
|
|
|
|
proc_apply_jit_and_vm_policies(imgp, p, new_task);
|
|
|
|
if (vm_darkwake_mode == TRUE) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* This process is being launched when the system
|
|
* is in darkwake. So mark it specially. This will
|
|
* cause all its pages to be entered in the background Q.
|
|
*/
|
|
task_set_darkwake_mode(new_task, vm_darkwake_mode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_DTRACE
|
|
dtrace_thread_didexec(imgp->ip_new_thread);
|
|
|
|
if ((dtrace_proc_waitfor_hook = dtrace_proc_waitfor_exec_ptr) != NULL) {
|
|
(*dtrace_proc_waitfor_hook)(p);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_AUDIT
|
|
if (!error && AUDIT_ENABLED() && p) {
|
|
/* Add the CDHash of the new process to the audit record */
|
|
uint8_t *cdhash = cs_get_cdhash(p);
|
|
if (cdhash) {
|
|
AUDIT_ARG(data, cdhash, sizeof(uint8_t), CS_CDHASH_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
} else {
|
|
DTRACE_PROC1(exec__failure, int, error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
exit_with_error:
|
|
|
|
/* terminate the new task it if exec failed */
|
|
if (new_task != NULL && task_is_exec_copy(new_task)) {
|
|
task_terminate_internal(new_task);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (imgp != NULL) {
|
|
/* Clear the initial wait on the thread transferring watchports */
|
|
if (imgp->ip_new_thread) {
|
|
task_clear_return_wait(get_threadtask(imgp->ip_new_thread), TCRW_CLEAR_INITIAL_WAIT);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Transfer the watchport boost to new task */
|
|
if (!error) {
|
|
task_transfer_turnstile_watchports(old_task,
|
|
new_task, imgp->ip_new_thread);
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do not terminate the current task, if proc_exec_switch_task did not
|
|
* switch the tasks, terminating the current task without the switch would
|
|
* result in loosing the SIGKILL status.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (task_did_exec(old_task)) {
|
|
/* Terminate the current task, since exec will start in new task */
|
|
task_terminate_internal(old_task);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Release the thread ref returned by cloneproc */
|
|
if (imgp->ip_new_thread) {
|
|
/* clear the exec complete flag if there is an error before point of no-return */
|
|
uint32_t clearwait_flags = TCRW_CLEAR_FINAL_WAIT;
|
|
if (!exec_done && error != 0) {
|
|
clearwait_flags |= TCRW_CLEAR_EXEC_COMPLETE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* wake up the new exec thread */
|
|
task_clear_return_wait(get_threadtask(imgp->ip_new_thread), clearwait_flags);
|
|
thread_deallocate(imgp->ip_new_thread);
|
|
imgp->ip_new_thread = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Release the ref returned by fork_create_child */
|
|
if (new_task) {
|
|
task_deallocate(new_task);
|
|
new_task = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (should_release_proc_ref) {
|
|
proc_rele(p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uthread_set_exec_data(current_uthread(), NULL);
|
|
kfree_type(typeof(*__execve_data), __execve_data);
|
|
|
|
if (inherit != NULL) {
|
|
ipc_importance_release(inherit);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* copyinptr
|
|
*
|
|
* Description: Copy a pointer in from user space to a user_addr_t in kernel
|
|
* space, based on 32/64 bitness of the user space
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters: froma User space address
|
|
* toptr Address of kernel space user_addr_t
|
|
* ptr_size 4/8, based on 'froma' address space
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: 0 Success
|
|
* EFAULT Bad 'froma'
|
|
*
|
|
* Implicit returns:
|
|
* *ptr_size Modified
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
copyinptr(user_addr_t froma, user_addr_t *toptr, int ptr_size)
|
|
{
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
if (ptr_size == 4) {
|
|
/* 64 bit value containing 32 bit address */
|
|
unsigned int i = 0;
|
|
|
|
error = copyin(froma, &i, 4);
|
|
*toptr = CAST_USER_ADDR_T(i); /* SAFE */
|
|
} else {
|
|
error = copyin(froma, toptr, 8);
|
|
}
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* copyoutptr
|
|
*
|
|
* Description: Copy a pointer out from a user_addr_t in kernel space to
|
|
* user space, based on 32/64 bitness of the user space
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters: ua User space address to copy to
|
|
* ptr Address of kernel space user_addr_t
|
|
* ptr_size 4/8, based on 'ua' address space
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: 0 Success
|
|
* EFAULT Bad 'ua'
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
copyoutptr(user_addr_t ua, user_addr_t ptr, int ptr_size)
|
|
{
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
if (ptr_size == 4) {
|
|
/* 64 bit value containing 32 bit address */
|
|
unsigned int i = CAST_DOWN_EXPLICIT(unsigned int, ua); /* SAFE */
|
|
|
|
error = copyout(&i, ptr, 4);
|
|
} else {
|
|
error = copyout(&ua, ptr, 8);
|
|
}
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* exec_copyout_strings
|
|
*
|
|
* Copy out the strings segment to user space. The strings segment is put
|
|
* on a preinitialized stack frame.
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters: struct image_params * the image parameter block
|
|
* int * a pointer to the stack offset variable
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: 0 Success
|
|
* !0 Faiure: errno
|
|
*
|
|
* Implicit returns:
|
|
* (*stackp) The stack offset, modified
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: The strings segment layout is backward, from the beginning
|
|
* of the top of the stack to consume the minimal amount of
|
|
* space possible; the returned stack pointer points to the
|
|
* end of the area consumed (stacks grow downward).
|
|
*
|
|
* argc is an int; arg[i] are pointers; env[i] are pointers;
|
|
* the 0's are (void *)NULL's
|
|
*
|
|
* The stack frame layout is:
|
|
*
|
|
* +-------------+ <- p->user_stack
|
|
* | 16b |
|
|
* +-------------+
|
|
* | STRING AREA |
|
|
* | : |
|
|
* | : |
|
|
* | : |
|
|
* +- -- -- -- --+
|
|
* | PATH AREA |
|
|
* +-------------+
|
|
* | 0 |
|
|
* +-------------+
|
|
* | applev[n] |
|
|
* +-------------+
|
|
* :
|
|
* :
|
|
* +-------------+
|
|
* | applev[1] |
|
|
* +-------------+
|
|
* | exec_path / |
|
|
* | applev[0] |
|
|
* +-------------+
|
|
* | 0 |
|
|
* +-------------+
|
|
* | env[n] |
|
|
* +-------------+
|
|
* :
|
|
* :
|
|
* +-------------+
|
|
* | env[0] |
|
|
* +-------------+
|
|
* | 0 |
|
|
* +-------------+
|
|
* | arg[argc-1] |
|
|
* +-------------+
|
|
* :
|
|
* :
|
|
* +-------------+
|
|
* | arg[0] |
|
|
* +-------------+
|
|
* | argc |
|
|
* sp-> +-------------+
|
|
*
|
|
* Although technically a part of the STRING AREA, we treat the PATH AREA as
|
|
* a separate entity. This allows us to align the beginning of the PATH AREA
|
|
* to a pointer boundary so that the exec_path, env[i], and argv[i] pointers
|
|
* which preceed it on the stack are properly aligned.
|
|
*/
|
|
__attribute__((noinline))
|
|
static int
|
|
exec_copyout_strings(struct image_params *imgp, user_addr_t *stackp)
|
|
{
|
|
proc_t p = vfs_context_proc(imgp->ip_vfs_context);
|
|
int ptr_size = (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_IS_64BIT_ADDR) ? 8 : 4;
|
|
int ptr_area_size;
|
|
void *ptr_buffer_start, *ptr_buffer;
|
|
size_t string_size;
|
|
|
|
user_addr_t string_area; /* *argv[], *env[] */
|
|
user_addr_t ptr_area; /* argv[], env[], applev[] */
|
|
user_addr_t argc_area; /* argc */
|
|
user_addr_t stack;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
unsigned i;
|
|
struct copyout_desc {
|
|
char *start_string;
|
|
int count;
|
|
#if CONFIG_DTRACE
|
|
user_addr_t *dtrace_cookie;
|
|
#endif
|
|
boolean_t null_term;
|
|
} descriptors[] = {
|
|
{
|
|
.start_string = imgp->ip_startargv,
|
|
.count = imgp->ip_argc,
|
|
#if CONFIG_DTRACE
|
|
.dtrace_cookie = &p->p_dtrace_argv,
|
|
#endif
|
|
.null_term = TRUE
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
.start_string = imgp->ip_endargv,
|
|
.count = imgp->ip_envc,
|
|
#if CONFIG_DTRACE
|
|
.dtrace_cookie = &p->p_dtrace_envp,
|
|
#endif
|
|
.null_term = TRUE
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
.start_string = imgp->ip_strings,
|
|
.count = 1,
|
|
#if CONFIG_DTRACE
|
|
.dtrace_cookie = NULL,
|
|
#endif
|
|
.null_term = FALSE
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
.start_string = imgp->ip_endenvv,
|
|
.count = imgp->ip_applec - 1, /* exec_path handled above */
|
|
#if CONFIG_DTRACE
|
|
.dtrace_cookie = NULL,
|
|
#endif
|
|
.null_term = TRUE
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
stack = *stackp;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* All previous contributors to the string area
|
|
* should have aligned their sub-area
|
|
*/
|
|
if (imgp->ip_strspace % ptr_size != 0) {
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Grow the stack down for the strings we've been building up */
|
|
string_size = imgp->ip_strendp - imgp->ip_strings;
|
|
stack -= string_size;
|
|
string_area = stack;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Need room for one pointer for each string, plus
|
|
* one for the NULLs terminating the argv, envv, and apple areas.
|
|
*/
|
|
ptr_area_size = (imgp->ip_argc + imgp->ip_envc + imgp->ip_applec + 3) * ptr_size;
|
|
stack -= ptr_area_size;
|
|
ptr_area = stack;
|
|
|
|
/* We'll construct all the pointer arrays in our string buffer,
|
|
* which we already know is aligned properly, and ip_argspace
|
|
* was used to verify we have enough space.
|
|
*/
|
|
ptr_buffer_start = ptr_buffer = (void *)imgp->ip_strendp;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Need room for pointer-aligned argc slot.
|
|
*/
|
|
stack -= ptr_size;
|
|
argc_area = stack;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Record the size of the arguments area so that sysctl_procargs()
|
|
* can return the argument area without having to parse the arguments.
|
|
*/
|
|
proc_lock(p);
|
|
p->p_argc = imgp->ip_argc;
|
|
p->p_argslen = (int)(*stackp - string_area);
|
|
proc_unlock(p);
|
|
|
|
/* Return the initial stack address: the location of argc */
|
|
*stackp = stack;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Copy out the entire strings area.
|
|
*/
|
|
error = copyout(imgp->ip_strings, string_area,
|
|
string_size);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(descriptors) / sizeof(descriptors[0]); i++) {
|
|
char *cur_string = descriptors[i].start_string;
|
|
int j;
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_DTRACE
|
|
if (descriptors[i].dtrace_cookie) {
|
|
proc_lock(p);
|
|
*descriptors[i].dtrace_cookie = ptr_area + ((uintptr_t)ptr_buffer - (uintptr_t)ptr_buffer_start); /* dtrace convenience */
|
|
proc_unlock(p);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_DTRACE */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* For each segment (argv, envv, applev), copy as many pointers as requested
|
|
* to our pointer buffer.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (j = 0; j < descriptors[i].count; j++) {
|
|
user_addr_t cur_address = string_area + (cur_string - imgp->ip_strings);
|
|
|
|
/* Copy out the pointer to the current string. Alignment has been verified */
|
|
if (ptr_size == 8) {
|
|
*(uint64_t *)ptr_buffer = (uint64_t)cur_address;
|
|
} else {
|
|
*(uint32_t *)ptr_buffer = (uint32_t)cur_address;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ptr_buffer = (void *)((uintptr_t)ptr_buffer + ptr_size);
|
|
cur_string += strlen(cur_string) + 1; /* Only a NUL between strings in the same area */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (descriptors[i].null_term) {
|
|
if (ptr_size == 8) {
|
|
*(uint64_t *)ptr_buffer = 0ULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
*(uint32_t *)ptr_buffer = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ptr_buffer = (void *)((uintptr_t)ptr_buffer + ptr_size);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Copy out all our pointer arrays in bulk.
|
|
*/
|
|
error = copyout(ptr_buffer_start, ptr_area,
|
|
ptr_area_size);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* argc (int32, stored in a ptr_size area) */
|
|
error = copyoutptr((user_addr_t)imgp->ip_argc, argc_area, ptr_size);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bad:
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* exec_extract_strings
|
|
*
|
|
* Copy arguments and environment from user space into work area; we may
|
|
* have already copied some early arguments into the work area, and if
|
|
* so, any arguments opied in are appended to those already there.
|
|
* This function is the primary manipulator of ip_argspace, since
|
|
* these are the arguments the client of execve(2) knows about. After
|
|
* each argv[]/envv[] string is copied, we charge the string length
|
|
* and argv[]/envv[] pointer slot to ip_argspace, so that we can
|
|
* full preflight the arg list size.
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters: struct image_params * the image parameter block
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: 0 Success
|
|
* !0 Failure: errno
|
|
*
|
|
* Implicit returns;
|
|
* (imgp->ip_argc) Count of arguments, updated
|
|
* (imgp->ip_envc) Count of environment strings, updated
|
|
* (imgp->ip_argspace) Count of remaining of NCARGS
|
|
* (imgp->ip_interp_buffer) Interpreter and args (mutated in place)
|
|
*
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: The argument and environment vectors are user space pointers
|
|
* to arrays of user space pointers.
|
|
*/
|
|
__attribute__((noinline))
|
|
static int
|
|
exec_extract_strings(struct image_params *imgp)
|
|
{
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
int ptr_size = (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_WAS_64BIT_ADDR) ? 8 : 4;
|
|
int new_ptr_size = (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_IS_64BIT_ADDR) ? 8 : 4;
|
|
user_addr_t argv = imgp->ip_user_argv;
|
|
user_addr_t envv = imgp->ip_user_envv;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Adjust space reserved for the path name by however much padding it
|
|
* needs. Doing this here since we didn't know if this would be a 32-
|
|
* or 64-bit process back in exec_save_path.
|
|
*/
|
|
while (imgp->ip_strspace % new_ptr_size != 0) {
|
|
*imgp->ip_strendp++ = '\0';
|
|
imgp->ip_strspace--;
|
|
/* imgp->ip_argspace--; not counted towards exec args total */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* From now on, we start attributing string space to ip_argspace
|
|
*/
|
|
imgp->ip_startargv = imgp->ip_strendp;
|
|
imgp->ip_argc = 0;
|
|
|
|
if ((imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_INTERPRET) != 0) {
|
|
user_addr_t arg;
|
|
char *argstart, *ch;
|
|
|
|
/* First, the arguments in the "#!" string are tokenized and extracted. */
|
|
argstart = imgp->ip_interp_buffer;
|
|
while (argstart) {
|
|
ch = argstart;
|
|
while (*ch && !IS_WHITESPACE(*ch)) {
|
|
ch++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (*ch == '\0') {
|
|
/* last argument, no need to NUL-terminate */
|
|
error = exec_add_user_string(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(argstart), UIO_SYSSPACE, TRUE);
|
|
argstart = NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* NUL-terminate */
|
|
*ch = '\0';
|
|
error = exec_add_user_string(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(argstart), UIO_SYSSPACE, TRUE);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Find the next string. We know spaces at the end of the string have already
|
|
* been stripped.
|
|
*/
|
|
argstart = ch + 1;
|
|
while (IS_WHITESPACE(*argstart)) {
|
|
argstart++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Error-check, regardless of whether this is the last interpreter arg or not */
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
if (imgp->ip_argspace < new_ptr_size) {
|
|
error = E2BIG;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_argspace -= new_ptr_size; /* to hold argv[] entry */
|
|
imgp->ip_argc++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (argv != 0LL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we are running an interpreter, replace the av[0] that was
|
|
* passed to execve() with the path name that was
|
|
* passed to execve() for interpreters which do not use the PATH
|
|
* to locate their script arguments.
|
|
*/
|
|
error = copyinptr(argv, &arg, ptr_size);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
if (arg != 0LL) {
|
|
argv += ptr_size; /* consume without using */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (imgp->ip_interp_sugid_fd != -1) {
|
|
char temp[19]; /* "/dev/fd/" + 10 digits + NUL */
|
|
snprintf(temp, sizeof(temp), "/dev/fd/%d", imgp->ip_interp_sugid_fd);
|
|
error = exec_add_user_string(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(temp), UIO_SYSSPACE, TRUE);
|
|
} else {
|
|
error = exec_add_user_string(imgp, imgp->ip_user_fname, imgp->ip_seg, TRUE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
if (imgp->ip_argspace < new_ptr_size) {
|
|
error = E2BIG;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_argspace -= new_ptr_size; /* to hold argv[] entry */
|
|
imgp->ip_argc++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (argv != 0LL) {
|
|
user_addr_t arg;
|
|
|
|
error = copyinptr(argv, &arg, ptr_size);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (arg == 0LL) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
argv += ptr_size;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* av[n...] = arg[n]
|
|
*/
|
|
error = exec_add_user_string(imgp, arg, imgp->ip_seg, TRUE);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
if (imgp->ip_argspace < new_ptr_size) {
|
|
error = E2BIG;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_argspace -= new_ptr_size; /* to hold argv[] entry */
|
|
imgp->ip_argc++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Save space for argv[] NULL terminator */
|
|
if (imgp->ip_argspace < new_ptr_size) {
|
|
error = E2BIG;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_argspace -= new_ptr_size;
|
|
|
|
/* Note where the args ends and env begins. */
|
|
imgp->ip_endargv = imgp->ip_strendp;
|
|
imgp->ip_envc = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Now, get the environment */
|
|
while (envv != 0LL) {
|
|
user_addr_t env;
|
|
|
|
error = copyinptr(envv, &env, ptr_size);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
envv += ptr_size;
|
|
if (env == 0LL) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* av[n...] = env[n]
|
|
*/
|
|
error = exec_add_user_string(imgp, env, imgp->ip_seg, TRUE);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
if (imgp->ip_argspace < new_ptr_size) {
|
|
error = E2BIG;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_argspace -= new_ptr_size; /* to hold envv[] entry */
|
|
imgp->ip_envc++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Save space for envv[] NULL terminator */
|
|
if (imgp->ip_argspace < new_ptr_size) {
|
|
error = E2BIG;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_argspace -= new_ptr_size;
|
|
|
|
/* Align the tail of the combined argv+envv area */
|
|
while (imgp->ip_strspace % new_ptr_size != 0) {
|
|
if (imgp->ip_argspace < 1) {
|
|
error = E2BIG;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
*imgp->ip_strendp++ = '\0';
|
|
imgp->ip_strspace--;
|
|
imgp->ip_argspace--;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Note where the envv ends and applev begins. */
|
|
imgp->ip_endenvv = imgp->ip_strendp;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* From now on, we are no longer charging argument
|
|
* space to ip_argspace.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
bad:
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Libc has an 8-element array set up for stack guard values. It only fills
|
|
* in one of those entries, and both gcc and llvm seem to use only a single
|
|
* 8-byte guard. Until somebody needs more than an 8-byte guard value, don't
|
|
* do the work to construct them.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define GUARD_VALUES 1
|
|
#define GUARD_KEY "stack_guard="
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* System malloc needs some entropy when it is initialized.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define ENTROPY_VALUES 2
|
|
#define ENTROPY_KEY "malloc_entropy="
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* libplatform needs a random pointer-obfuscation value when it is initialized.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define PTR_MUNGE_VALUES 1
|
|
#define PTR_MUNGE_KEY "ptr_munge="
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* System malloc engages nanozone for UIAPP.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define NANO_ENGAGE_KEY "MallocNanoZone=1"
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Used to pass experiment flags up to libmalloc.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define LIBMALLOC_EXPERIMENT_FACTORS_KEY "MallocExperiment="
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Passes information about hardened runtime entitlements to libsystem/libmalloc
|
|
*/
|
|
#define HARDENED_RUNTIME_KEY "HardenedRuntime="
|
|
|
|
#define PFZ_KEY "pfz="
|
|
extern user32_addr_t commpage_text32_location;
|
|
extern user64_addr_t commpage_text64_location;
|
|
|
|
extern uuid_string_t bootsessionuuid_string;
|
|
static TUNABLE(uint32_t, exe_boothash_salt, "exe_boothash_salt", 0);
|
|
|
|
__startup_func
|
|
static void
|
|
exe_boothash_salt_generate(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!PE_parse_boot_argn("exe_boothash_salt", NULL, 0)) {
|
|
read_random(&exe_boothash_salt, sizeof(exe_boothash_salt));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
STARTUP(EARLY_BOOT, STARTUP_RANK_MIDDLE, exe_boothash_salt_generate);
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define MAIN_STACK_VALUES 4
|
|
#define MAIN_STACK_KEY "main_stack="
|
|
|
|
#define FSID_KEY "executable_file="
|
|
#define DYLD_FSID_KEY "dyld_file="
|
|
#define CDHASH_KEY "executable_cdhash="
|
|
#define DYLD_FLAGS_KEY "dyld_flags="
|
|
#define SUBSYSTEM_ROOT_PATH_KEY "subsystem_root_path="
|
|
#define APP_BOOT_SESSION_KEY "executable_boothash="
|
|
#if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls)
|
|
#define PTRAUTH_DISABLED_FLAG "ptrauth_disabled=1"
|
|
#define DYLD_ARM64E_ABI_KEY "arm64e_abi="
|
|
#endif /* __has_feature(ptrauth_calls) */
|
|
#define MAIN_TH_PORT_KEY "th_port="
|
|
|
|
#define FSID_MAX_STRING "0x1234567890abcdef,0x1234567890abcdef"
|
|
|
|
#define HEX_STR_LEN 18 // 64-bit hex value "0x0123456701234567"
|
|
#define HEX_STR_LEN32 10 // 32-bit hex value "0x01234567"
|
|
|
|
#if XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX && _POSIX_SPAWN_FORCE_4K_PAGES && PMAP_CREATE_FORCE_4K_PAGES
|
|
#define VM_FORCE_4K_PAGES_KEY "vm_force_4k_pages=1"
|
|
#endif /* XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX && _POSIX_SPAWN_FORCE_4K_PAGES && PMAP_CREATE_FORCE_4K_PAGES */
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
exec_add_entropy_key(struct image_params *imgp,
|
|
const char *key,
|
|
int values,
|
|
boolean_t embedNUL)
|
|
{
|
|
const int limit = 8;
|
|
uint64_t entropy[limit];
|
|
char str[strlen(key) + (HEX_STR_LEN + 1) * limit + 1];
|
|
if (values > limit) {
|
|
values = limit;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
read_random(entropy, sizeof(entropy[0]) * values);
|
|
|
|
if (embedNUL) {
|
|
entropy[0] &= ~(0xffull << 8);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int len = scnprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%s0x%llx", key, entropy[0]);
|
|
size_t remaining = sizeof(str) - len;
|
|
for (int i = 1; i < values && remaining > 0; ++i) {
|
|
size_t start = sizeof(str) - remaining;
|
|
len = scnprintf(&str[start], remaining, ",0x%llx", entropy[i]);
|
|
remaining -= len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return exec_add_user_string(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(str), UIO_SYSSPACE, FALSE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Build up the contents of the apple[] string vector
|
|
*/
|
|
#if (DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG)
|
|
extern uint64_t dyld_flags;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls)
|
|
static inline bool
|
|
is_arm64e_running_as_arm64(const struct image_params *imgp)
|
|
{
|
|
return (imgp->ip_origcpusubtype & ~CPU_SUBTYPE_MASK) == CPU_SUBTYPE_ARM64E &&
|
|
(imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_NOJOP);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* __has_feature(ptrauth_calls) */
|
|
|
|
_Atomic uint64_t libmalloc_experiment_factors = 0;
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
exec_add_apple_strings(struct image_params *imgp,
|
|
const load_result_t *load_result)
|
|
{
|
|
int error;
|
|
int img_ptr_size = (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_IS_64BIT_ADDR) ? 8 : 4;
|
|
thread_t new_thread;
|
|
ipc_port_t sright;
|
|
uint64_t local_experiment_factors = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* exec_save_path stored the first string */
|
|
imgp->ip_applec = 1;
|
|
|
|
/* adding the pfz string */
|
|
{
|
|
char pfz_string[strlen(PFZ_KEY) + HEX_STR_LEN + 1];
|
|
|
|
if (img_ptr_size == 8) {
|
|
__assert_only size_t ret = snprintf(pfz_string, sizeof(pfz_string), PFZ_KEY "0x%llx", commpage_text64_location);
|
|
assert(ret < sizeof(pfz_string));
|
|
} else {
|
|
snprintf(pfz_string, sizeof(pfz_string), PFZ_KEY "0x%x", commpage_text32_location);
|
|
}
|
|
error = exec_add_user_string(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(pfz_string), UIO_SYSSPACE, FALSE);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
printf("Failed to add the pfz string with error %d\n", error);
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_applec++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* adding the NANO_ENGAGE_KEY key */
|
|
if (imgp->ip_px_sa) {
|
|
struct _posix_spawnattr* psa = (struct _posix_spawnattr *) imgp->ip_px_sa;
|
|
int proc_flags = psa->psa_flags;
|
|
|
|
if ((proc_flags & _POSIX_SPAWN_NANO_ALLOCATOR) == _POSIX_SPAWN_NANO_ALLOCATOR) {
|
|
const char *nano_string = NANO_ENGAGE_KEY;
|
|
error = exec_add_user_string(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(nano_string), UIO_SYSSPACE, FALSE);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_applec++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Supply libc with a collection of random values to use when
|
|
* implementing -fstack-protector.
|
|
*
|
|
* (The first random string always contains an embedded NUL so that
|
|
* __stack_chk_guard also protects against C string vulnerabilities)
|
|
*/
|
|
error = exec_add_entropy_key(imgp, GUARD_KEY, GUARD_VALUES, TRUE);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_applec++;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Supply libc with entropy for system malloc.
|
|
*/
|
|
error = exec_add_entropy_key(imgp, ENTROPY_KEY, ENTROPY_VALUES, FALSE);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_applec++;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Supply libpthread & libplatform with a random value to use for pointer
|
|
* obfuscation.
|
|
*/
|
|
error = exec_add_entropy_key(imgp, PTR_MUNGE_KEY, PTR_MUNGE_VALUES, FALSE);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_applec++;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add MAIN_STACK_KEY: Supplies the address and size of the main thread's
|
|
* stack if it was allocated by the kernel.
|
|
*
|
|
* The guard page is not included in this stack size as libpthread
|
|
* expects to add it back in after receiving this value.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (load_result->unixproc) {
|
|
char stack_string[strlen(MAIN_STACK_KEY) + (HEX_STR_LEN + 1) * MAIN_STACK_VALUES + 1];
|
|
snprintf(stack_string, sizeof(stack_string),
|
|
MAIN_STACK_KEY "0x%llx,0x%llx,0x%llx,0x%llx",
|
|
(uint64_t)load_result->user_stack,
|
|
(uint64_t)load_result->user_stack_size,
|
|
(uint64_t)load_result->user_stack_alloc,
|
|
(uint64_t)load_result->user_stack_alloc_size);
|
|
error = exec_add_user_string(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(stack_string), UIO_SYSSPACE, FALSE);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_applec++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (imgp->ip_vattr) {
|
|
uint64_t fsid = vnode_get_va_fsid(imgp->ip_vattr);
|
|
uint64_t fsobjid = imgp->ip_vattr->va_fileid;
|
|
|
|
char fsid_string[strlen(FSID_KEY) + strlen(FSID_MAX_STRING) + 1];
|
|
snprintf(fsid_string, sizeof(fsid_string),
|
|
FSID_KEY "0x%llx,0x%llx", fsid, fsobjid);
|
|
error = exec_add_user_string(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(fsid_string), UIO_SYSSPACE, FALSE);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_applec++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (imgp->ip_dyld_fsid || imgp->ip_dyld_fsobjid) {
|
|
char fsid_string[strlen(DYLD_FSID_KEY) + strlen(FSID_MAX_STRING) + 1];
|
|
snprintf(fsid_string, sizeof(fsid_string),
|
|
DYLD_FSID_KEY "0x%llx,0x%llx", imgp->ip_dyld_fsid, imgp->ip_dyld_fsobjid);
|
|
error = exec_add_user_string(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(fsid_string), UIO_SYSSPACE, FALSE);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_applec++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t cdhash[SHA1_RESULTLEN];
|
|
int cdhash_errror = ubc_cs_getcdhash(imgp->ip_vp, imgp->ip_arch_offset, cdhash);
|
|
if (cdhash_errror == 0) {
|
|
char hash_string[strlen(CDHASH_KEY) + 2 * SHA1_RESULTLEN + 1];
|
|
strncpy(hash_string, CDHASH_KEY, sizeof(hash_string));
|
|
char *p = hash_string + sizeof(CDHASH_KEY) - 1;
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < SHA1_RESULTLEN; i++) {
|
|
snprintf(p, 3, "%02x", (int) cdhash[i]);
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
error = exec_add_user_string(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(hash_string), UIO_SYSSPACE, FALSE);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_applec++;
|
|
|
|
/* hash together cd-hash and boot-session-uuid */
|
|
uint8_t sha_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
SHA256_CTX sha_ctx;
|
|
SHA256_Init(&sha_ctx);
|
|
SHA256_Update(&sha_ctx, &exe_boothash_salt, sizeof(exe_boothash_salt));
|
|
SHA256_Update(&sha_ctx, bootsessionuuid_string, sizeof(bootsessionuuid_string));
|
|
SHA256_Update(&sha_ctx, cdhash, sizeof(cdhash));
|
|
SHA256_Final(sha_digest, &sha_ctx);
|
|
char app_boot_string[strlen(APP_BOOT_SESSION_KEY) + 2 * SHA1_RESULTLEN + 1];
|
|
strncpy(app_boot_string, APP_BOOT_SESSION_KEY, sizeof(app_boot_string));
|
|
char *s = app_boot_string + sizeof(APP_BOOT_SESSION_KEY) - 1;
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < SHA1_RESULTLEN; i++) {
|
|
snprintf(s, 3, "%02x", (int) sha_digest[i]);
|
|
s += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
error = exec_add_user_string(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(app_boot_string), UIO_SYSSPACE, FALSE);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_applec++;
|
|
}
|
|
#if (DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG)
|
|
if (dyld_flags) {
|
|
char dyld_flags_string[strlen(DYLD_FLAGS_KEY) + HEX_STR_LEN + 1];
|
|
snprintf(dyld_flags_string, sizeof(dyld_flags_string), DYLD_FLAGS_KEY "0x%llx", dyld_flags);
|
|
error = exec_add_user_string(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(dyld_flags_string), UIO_SYSSPACE, FALSE);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_applec++;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (imgp->ip_subsystem_root_path) {
|
|
size_t buffer_len = MAXPATHLEN + strlen(SUBSYSTEM_ROOT_PATH_KEY);
|
|
char subsystem_root_path_string[buffer_len];
|
|
int required_len = snprintf(subsystem_root_path_string, buffer_len, SUBSYSTEM_ROOT_PATH_KEY "%s", imgp->ip_subsystem_root_path);
|
|
|
|
if (((size_t)required_len >= buffer_len) || (required_len < 0)) {
|
|
error = ENAMETOOLONG;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = exec_add_user_string(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(subsystem_root_path_string), UIO_SYSSPACE, FALSE);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
imgp->ip_applec++;
|
|
}
|
|
#if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls)
|
|
if (is_arm64e_running_as_arm64(imgp)) {
|
|
error = exec_add_user_string(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(PTRAUTH_DISABLED_FLAG), UIO_SYSSPACE, FALSE);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
imgp->ip_applec++;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* __has_feature(ptrauth_calls) */
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls) && defined(XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX)
|
|
{
|
|
char dyld_abi_string[strlen(DYLD_ARM64E_ABI_KEY) + 8];
|
|
strlcpy(dyld_abi_string, DYLD_ARM64E_ABI_KEY, sizeof(dyld_abi_string));
|
|
bool allowAll = bootarg_arm64e_preview_abi;
|
|
strlcat(dyld_abi_string, (allowAll ? "all" : "os"), sizeof(dyld_abi_string));
|
|
error = exec_add_user_string(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(dyld_abi_string), UIO_SYSSPACE, FALSE);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
imgp->ip_applec++;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add main thread mach port name
|
|
* +1 uref on main thread port, this ref will be extracted by libpthread in __pthread_init
|
|
* and consumed in _bsdthread_terminate. Leaking the main thread port name if not linked
|
|
* against libpthread.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((new_thread = imgp->ip_new_thread) != THREAD_NULL) {
|
|
thread_reference(new_thread);
|
|
sright = convert_thread_to_port_pinned(new_thread);
|
|
task_t new_task = get_threadtask(new_thread);
|
|
mach_port_name_t name = ipc_port_copyout_send(sright, get_task_ipcspace(new_task));
|
|
char port_name_hex_str[strlen(MAIN_TH_PORT_KEY) + HEX_STR_LEN32 + 1];
|
|
snprintf(port_name_hex_str, sizeof(port_name_hex_str), MAIN_TH_PORT_KEY "0x%x", name);
|
|
|
|
error = exec_add_user_string(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(port_name_hex_str), UIO_SYSSPACE, FALSE);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_applec++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX && _POSIX_SPAWN_FORCE_4K_PAGES && PMAP_CREATE_FORCE_4K_PAGES
|
|
if (imgp->ip_px_sa != NULL) {
|
|
struct _posix_spawnattr* psa = (struct _posix_spawnattr *) imgp->ip_px_sa;
|
|
if (psa->psa_flags & _POSIX_SPAWN_FORCE_4K_PAGES) {
|
|
const char *vm_force_4k_string = VM_FORCE_4K_PAGES_KEY;
|
|
error = exec_add_user_string(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(vm_force_4k_string), UIO_SYSSPACE, FALSE);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_applec++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX && _POSIX_SPAWN_FORCE_4K_PAGES && PMAP_CREATE_FORCE_4K_PAGES */
|
|
|
|
/* adding the libmalloc experiment string */
|
|
local_experiment_factors = os_atomic_load_wide(&libmalloc_experiment_factors, relaxed);
|
|
if (__improbable(local_experiment_factors != 0)) {
|
|
char libmalloc_experiment_factors_string[strlen(LIBMALLOC_EXPERIMENT_FACTORS_KEY) + HEX_STR_LEN + 1];
|
|
|
|
snprintf(
|
|
libmalloc_experiment_factors_string,
|
|
sizeof(libmalloc_experiment_factors_string),
|
|
LIBMALLOC_EXPERIMENT_FACTORS_KEY "0x%llx",
|
|
local_experiment_factors);
|
|
error = exec_add_user_string(
|
|
imgp,
|
|
CAST_USER_ADDR_T(libmalloc_experiment_factors_string),
|
|
UIO_SYSSPACE,
|
|
FALSE);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
printf("Failed to add the libmalloc experiment factors string with error %d\n", error);
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_applec++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* tell dyld that it can leverage hardware for its read-only/read-write trusted path */
|
|
if (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_HW_TPRO) {
|
|
const char *dyld_hw_tpro = "dyld_hw_tpro=1";
|
|
error = exec_add_user_string(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(dyld_hw_tpro), UIO_SYSSPACE, FALSE);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
printf("Failed to add dyld hw tpro setting with error %d\n", error);
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
imgp->ip_applec++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (load_result->hardened_runtime_binary) {
|
|
const size_t HR_STRING_SIZE = sizeof(HARDENED_RUNTIME_KEY) + HR_FLAGS_NUM_NIBBLES + 2 + 1;
|
|
char hardened_runtime[HR_STRING_SIZE];
|
|
snprintf(hardened_runtime, HR_STRING_SIZE, HARDENED_RUNTIME_KEY"0x%x", load_result->hardened_runtime_binary);
|
|
error = exec_add_user_string(imgp, CAST_USER_ADDR_T(hardened_runtime), UIO_SYSSPACE, FALSE);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
printf("Failed to add hardened runtime flag with error %d\n", error);
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_applec++;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Align the tail of the combined applev area */
|
|
while (imgp->ip_strspace % img_ptr_size != 0) {
|
|
*imgp->ip_strendp++ = '\0';
|
|
imgp->ip_strspace--;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bad:
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* exec_check_permissions
|
|
*
|
|
* Description: Verify that the file that is being attempted to be executed
|
|
* is in fact allowed to be executed based on it POSIX file
|
|
* permissions and other access control criteria
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters: struct image_params * the image parameter block
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: 0 Success
|
|
* EACCES Permission denied
|
|
* ENOEXEC Executable file format error
|
|
* ETXTBSY Text file busy [misuse of error code]
|
|
* vnode_getattr:???
|
|
* vnode_authorize:???
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
exec_check_permissions(struct image_params *imgp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct vnode *vp = imgp->ip_vp;
|
|
struct vnode_attr *vap = imgp->ip_vattr;
|
|
proc_t p = vfs_context_proc(imgp->ip_vfs_context);
|
|
int error;
|
|
kauth_action_t action;
|
|
|
|
/* Only allow execution of regular files */
|
|
if (!vnode_isreg(vp)) {
|
|
return EACCES;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get the file attributes that we will be using here and elsewhere */
|
|
VATTR_INIT(vap);
|
|
VATTR_WANTED(vap, va_uid);
|
|
VATTR_WANTED(vap, va_gid);
|
|
VATTR_WANTED(vap, va_mode);
|
|
VATTR_WANTED(vap, va_fsid);
|
|
VATTR_WANTED(vap, va_fsid64);
|
|
VATTR_WANTED(vap, va_fileid);
|
|
VATTR_WANTED(vap, va_data_size);
|
|
if ((error = vnode_getattr(vp, vap, imgp->ip_vfs_context)) != 0) {
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ensure that at least one execute bit is on - otherwise root
|
|
* will always succeed, and we don't want to happen unless the
|
|
* file really is executable.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!vfs_authopaque(vnode_mount(vp)) && ((vap->va_mode & (S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)) == 0)) {
|
|
return EACCES;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Disallow zero length files */
|
|
if (vap->va_data_size == 0) {
|
|
return ENOEXEC;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
imgp->ip_arch_offset = (user_size_t)0;
|
|
#if __LP64__
|
|
imgp->ip_arch_size = vap->va_data_size;
|
|
#else
|
|
if (vap->va_data_size > UINT32_MAX) {
|
|
return ENOEXEC;
|
|
}
|
|
imgp->ip_arch_size = (user_size_t)vap->va_data_size;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Disable setuid-ness for traced programs or if MNT_NOSUID */
|
|
if ((vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_NOSUID) || (p->p_lflag & P_LTRACED)) {
|
|
vap->va_mode &= ~(VSUID | VSGID);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Disable _POSIX_SPAWN_ALLOW_DATA_EXEC and _POSIX_SPAWN_DISABLE_ASLR
|
|
* flags for setuid/setgid binaries.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (vap->va_mode & (VSUID | VSGID)) {
|
|
imgp->ip_flags &= ~(IMGPF_ALLOW_DATA_EXEC | IMGPF_DISABLE_ASLR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_MACF
|
|
error = mac_vnode_check_exec(imgp->ip_vfs_context, vp, imgp);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Check for execute permission */
|
|
action = KAUTH_VNODE_EXECUTE;
|
|
/* Traced images must also be readable */
|
|
if (p->p_lflag & P_LTRACED) {
|
|
action |= KAUTH_VNODE_READ_DATA;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((error = vnode_authorize(vp, NULL, action, imgp->ip_vfs_context)) != 0) {
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
/* Don't let it run if anyone had it open for writing */
|
|
vnode_lock(vp);
|
|
if (vp->v_writecount) {
|
|
panic("going to return ETXTBSY %x", vp);
|
|
vnode_unlock(vp);
|
|
return ETXTBSY;
|
|
}
|
|
vnode_unlock(vp);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* XXX May want to indicate to underlying FS that vnode is open */
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* exec_handle_sugid
|
|
*
|
|
* Initially clear the P_SUGID in the process flags; if an SUGID process is
|
|
* exec'ing a non-SUGID image, then this is the point of no return.
|
|
*
|
|
* If the image being activated is SUGID, then replace the credential with a
|
|
* copy, disable tracing (unless the tracing process is root), reset the
|
|
* mach task port to revoke it, set the P_SUGID bit,
|
|
*
|
|
* If the saved user and group ID will be changing, then make sure it happens
|
|
* to a new credential, rather than a shared one.
|
|
*
|
|
* Set the security token (this is probably obsolete, given that the token
|
|
* should not technically be separate from the credential itself).
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters: struct image_params * the image parameter block
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: void No failure indication
|
|
*
|
|
* Implicit returns:
|
|
* <process credential> Potentially modified/replaced
|
|
* <task port> Potentially revoked
|
|
* <process flags> P_SUGID bit potentially modified
|
|
* <security token> Potentially modified
|
|
*/
|
|
__attribute__((noinline))
|
|
static int
|
|
exec_handle_sugid(struct image_params *imgp)
|
|
{
|
|
proc_t p = vfs_context_proc(imgp->ip_vfs_context);
|
|
kauth_cred_t cred = vfs_context_ucred(imgp->ip_vfs_context);
|
|
int i;
|
|
int leave_sugid_clear = 0;
|
|
int mac_reset_ipc = 0;
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
#if CONFIG_MACF
|
|
int mac_transition, disjoint_cred = 0;
|
|
int label_update_return = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Determine whether a call to update the MAC label will result in the
|
|
* credential changing.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: MAC policies which do not actually end up modifying
|
|
* the label subsequently are strongly encouraged to
|
|
* return 0 for this check, since a non-zero answer will
|
|
* slow down the exec fast path for normal binaries.
|
|
*/
|
|
mac_transition = mac_cred_check_label_update_execve(
|
|
imgp->ip_vfs_context,
|
|
imgp->ip_vp,
|
|
imgp->ip_arch_offset,
|
|
imgp->ip_scriptvp,
|
|
imgp->ip_scriptlabelp,
|
|
imgp->ip_execlabelp,
|
|
p,
|
|
&imgp->ip_px_smpx);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
OSBitAndAtomic(~((uint32_t)P_SUGID), &p->p_flag);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Order of the following is important; group checks must go last,
|
|
* as we use the success of the 'ismember' check combined with the
|
|
* failure of the explicit match to indicate that we will be setting
|
|
* the egid of the process even though the new process did not
|
|
* require VSUID/VSGID bits in order for it to set the new group as
|
|
* its egid.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: Technically, by this we are implying a call to
|
|
* setegid() in the new process, rather than implying
|
|
* it used its VSGID bit to set the effective group,
|
|
* even though there is no code in that process to make
|
|
* such a call.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (((imgp->ip_origvattr->va_mode & VSUID) != 0 &&
|
|
kauth_cred_getuid(cred) != imgp->ip_origvattr->va_uid) ||
|
|
((imgp->ip_origvattr->va_mode & VSGID) != 0 &&
|
|
((kauth_cred_ismember_gid(cred, imgp->ip_origvattr->va_gid, &leave_sugid_clear) || !leave_sugid_clear) ||
|
|
(kauth_cred_getgid(cred) != imgp->ip_origvattr->va_gid)))) {
|
|
#if CONFIG_MACF
|
|
/* label for MAC transition and neither VSUID nor VSGID */
|
|
handle_mac_transition:
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_SETUID
|
|
/*
|
|
* Replace the credential with a copy of itself if euid or
|
|
* egid change.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: setuid binaries will automatically opt out of
|
|
* group resolver participation as a side effect
|
|
* of this operation. This is an intentional
|
|
* part of the security model, which requires a
|
|
* participating credential be established by
|
|
* escalating privilege, setting up all other
|
|
* aspects of the credential including whether
|
|
* or not to participate in external group
|
|
* membership resolution, then dropping their
|
|
* effective privilege to that of the desired
|
|
* final credential state.
|
|
*
|
|
* Modifications to p_ucred must be guarded using the
|
|
* proc's ucred lock. This prevents others from accessing
|
|
* a garbage credential.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (imgp->ip_origvattr->va_mode & VSUID) {
|
|
kauth_cred_proc_update(p, PROC_SETTOKEN_NONE,
|
|
^bool (kauth_cred_t parent __unused, kauth_cred_t model) {
|
|
return kauth_cred_model_setresuid(model,
|
|
KAUTH_UID_NONE,
|
|
imgp->ip_origvattr->va_uid,
|
|
imgp->ip_origvattr->va_uid,
|
|
KAUTH_UID_NONE);
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (imgp->ip_origvattr->va_mode & VSGID) {
|
|
kauth_cred_proc_update(p, PROC_SETTOKEN_NONE,
|
|
^bool (kauth_cred_t parent __unused, kauth_cred_t model) {
|
|
return kauth_cred_model_setresgid(model,
|
|
KAUTH_GID_NONE,
|
|
imgp->ip_origvattr->va_gid,
|
|
imgp->ip_origvattr->va_gid);
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SETUID */
|
|
|
|
#if CONFIG_MACF
|
|
/*
|
|
* If a policy has indicated that it will transition the label,
|
|
* before making the call into the MAC policies, get a new
|
|
* duplicate credential, so they can modify it without
|
|
* modifying any others sharing it.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (mac_transition) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* This hook may generate upcalls that require
|
|
* importance donation from the kernel.
|
|
* (23925818)
|
|
*/
|
|
thread_t thread = current_thread();
|
|
thread_enable_send_importance(thread, TRUE);
|
|
kauth_proc_label_update_execve(p,
|
|
imgp->ip_vfs_context,
|
|
imgp->ip_vp,
|
|
imgp->ip_arch_offset,
|
|
imgp->ip_scriptvp,
|
|
imgp->ip_scriptlabelp,
|
|
imgp->ip_execlabelp,
|
|
&imgp->ip_csflags,
|
|
&imgp->ip_px_smpx,
|
|
&disjoint_cred, /* will be non zero if disjoint */
|
|
&label_update_return);
|
|
thread_enable_send_importance(thread, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
if (disjoint_cred) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If updating the MAC label resulted in a
|
|
* disjoint credential, flag that we need to
|
|
* set the P_SUGID bit. This protects
|
|
* against debuggers being attached by an
|
|
* insufficiently privileged process onto the
|
|
* result of a transition to a more privileged
|
|
* credential.
|
|
*/
|
|
leave_sugid_clear = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
imgp->ip_mac_return = label_update_return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mac_reset_ipc = mac_proc_check_inherit_ipc_ports(p, p->p_textvp, p->p_textoff, imgp->ip_vp, imgp->ip_arch_offset, imgp->ip_scriptvp);
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_MACF */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If 'leave_sugid_clear' is non-zero, then we passed the
|
|
* VSUID and MACF checks, and successfully determined that
|
|
* the previous cred was a member of the VSGID group, but
|
|
* that it was not the default at the time of the execve,
|
|
* and that the post-labelling credential was not disjoint.
|
|
* So we don't set the P_SUGID or reset mach ports and fds
|
|
* on the basis of simply running this code.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (mac_reset_ipc || !leave_sugid_clear) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Have mach reset the task and thread ports.
|
|
* We don't want anyone who had the ports before
|
|
* a setuid exec to be able to access/control the
|
|
* task/thread after.
|
|
*/
|
|
ipc_task_reset((imgp->ip_new_thread != NULL) ?
|
|
get_threadtask(imgp->ip_new_thread) : proc_task(p));
|
|
ipc_thread_reset((imgp->ip_new_thread != NULL) ?
|
|
imgp->ip_new_thread : current_thread());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!leave_sugid_clear) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Flag the process as setuid.
|
|
*/
|
|
OSBitOrAtomic(P_SUGID, &p->p_flag);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Radar 2261856; setuid security hole fix
|
|
* XXX For setuid processes, attempt to ensure that
|
|
* stdin, stdout, and stderr are already allocated.
|
|
* We do not want userland to accidentally allocate
|
|
* descriptors in this range which has implied meaning
|
|
* to libc.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
|
|
if (fp_get_noref_locked(p, i) != NULL) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do the kernel equivalent of
|
|
*
|
|
* if i == 0
|
|
* (void) open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
|
|
* else
|
|
* (void) open("/dev/null", O_WRONLY);
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct fileproc *fp;
|
|
int indx;
|
|
int flag;
|
|
struct nameidata *ndp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
flag = FREAD;
|
|
} else {
|
|
flag = FWRITE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((error = falloc_exec(p, imgp->ip_vfs_context,
|
|
&fp, &indx)) != 0) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ndp = kalloc_type(struct nameidata,
|
|
Z_WAITOK | Z_ZERO | Z_NOFAIL);
|
|
|
|
NDINIT(ndp, LOOKUP, OP_OPEN, FOLLOW, UIO_SYSSPACE,
|
|
CAST_USER_ADDR_T("/dev/null"),
|
|
imgp->ip_vfs_context);
|
|
|
|
if ((error = vn_open(ndp, flag, 0)) != 0) {
|
|
fp_free(p, indx, fp);
|
|
kfree_type(struct nameidata, ndp);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct fileglob *fg = fp->fp_glob;
|
|
|
|
fg->fg_flag = flag;
|
|
fg->fg_ops = &vnops;
|
|
fp_set_data(fp, ndp->ni_vp);
|
|
|
|
vnode_put(ndp->ni_vp);
|
|
|
|
proc_fdlock(p);
|
|
procfdtbl_releasefd(p, indx, NULL);
|
|
fp_drop(p, indx, fp, 1);
|
|
proc_fdunlock(p);
|
|
|
|
kfree_type(struct nameidata, ndp);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#if CONFIG_MACF
|
|
else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We are here because we were told that the MAC label will
|
|
* be transitioned, and the binary is not VSUID or VSGID; to
|
|
* deal with this case, we could either duplicate a lot of
|
|
* code, or we can indicate we want to default the P_SUGID
|
|
* bit clear and jump back up.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (mac_transition) {
|
|
leave_sugid_clear = 1;
|
|
goto handle_mac_transition;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_MACF */
|
|
|
|
/* Update the process' identity version and set the security token */
|
|
proc_setpidversion(p, OSIncrementAtomic(&nextpidversion));
|
|
task_set_uniqueid(proc_task(p));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Implement the semantic where the effective user and group become
|
|
* the saved user and group in exec'ed programs.
|
|
*/
|
|
kauth_cred_proc_update(p, PROC_SETTOKEN_ALWAYS,
|
|
^bool (kauth_cred_t parent __unused, kauth_cred_t model) {
|
|
posix_cred_t pcred = posix_cred_get(model);
|
|
|
|
if (pcred->cr_svuid == pcred->cr_uid &&
|
|
pcred->cr_svgid == pcred->cr_gid) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pcred->cr_svuid = pcred->cr_uid;
|
|
pcred->cr_svgid = pcred->cr_gid;
|
|
return true;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* create_unix_stack
|
|
*
|
|
* Description: Set the user stack address for the process to the provided
|
|
* address. If a custom stack was not set as a result of the
|
|
* load process (i.e. as specified by the image file for the
|
|
* executable), then allocate the stack in the provided map and
|
|
* set up appropriate guard pages for enforcing administrative
|
|
* limits on stack growth, if they end up being needed.
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters: p Process to set stack on
|
|
* load_result Information from mach-o load commands
|
|
* map Address map in which to allocate the new stack
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: KERN_SUCCESS Stack successfully created
|
|
* !KERN_SUCCESS Mach failure code
|
|
*/
|
|
__attribute__((noinline))
|
|
static kern_return_t
|
|
create_unix_stack(vm_map_t map, load_result_t* load_result,
|
|
proc_t p)
|
|
{
|
|
mach_vm_size_t size, prot_size;
|
|
mach_vm_offset_t addr, prot_addr;
|
|
kern_return_t kr;
|
|
|
|
mach_vm_address_t user_stack = load_result->user_stack;
|
|
|
|
proc_lock(p);
|
|
p->user_stack = (uintptr_t)user_stack;
|
|
if (load_result->custom_stack) {
|
|
p->p_lflag |= P_LCUSTOM_STACK;
|
|
}
|
|
proc_unlock(p);
|
|
if (vm_map_page_shift(map) < (int)PAGE_SHIFT) {
|
|
DEBUG4K_LOAD("map %p user_stack 0x%llx custom %d user_stack_alloc_size 0x%llx\n", map, user_stack, load_result->custom_stack, load_result->user_stack_alloc_size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (load_result->user_stack_alloc_size > 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allocate enough space for the maximum stack size we
|
|
* will ever authorize and an extra page to act as
|
|
* a guard page for stack overflows. For default stacks,
|
|
* vm_initial_limit_stack takes care of the extra guard page.
|
|
* Otherwise we must allocate it ourselves.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (mach_vm_round_page_overflow(load_result->user_stack_alloc_size, &size)) {
|
|
return KERN_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
|
|
}
|
|
addr = vm_map_trunc_page(load_result->user_stack - size,
|
|
vm_map_page_mask(map));
|
|
kr = mach_vm_allocate_kernel(map, &addr, size,
|
|
VM_FLAGS_FIXED, VM_MEMORY_STACK);
|
|
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
// Can't allocate at default location, try anywhere
|
|
addr = 0;
|
|
kr = mach_vm_allocate_kernel(map, &addr, size,
|
|
VM_FLAGS_ANYWHERE, VM_MEMORY_STACK);
|
|
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
return kr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
user_stack = addr + size;
|
|
load_result->user_stack = (user_addr_t)user_stack;
|
|
|
|
proc_lock(p);
|
|
p->user_stack = (uintptr_t)user_stack;
|
|
proc_unlock(p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
load_result->user_stack_alloc = (user_addr_t)addr;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* And prevent access to what's above the current stack
|
|
* size limit for this process.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (load_result->user_stack_size == 0) {
|
|
load_result->user_stack_size = proc_limitgetcur(p, RLIMIT_STACK);
|
|
prot_size = vm_map_trunc_page(size - load_result->user_stack_size, vm_map_page_mask(map));
|
|
} else {
|
|
prot_size = PAGE_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
prot_addr = addr;
|
|
kr = mach_vm_protect(map,
|
|
prot_addr,
|
|
prot_size,
|
|
FALSE,
|
|
VM_PROT_NONE);
|
|
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
(void)mach_vm_deallocate(map, addr, size);
|
|
return kr;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return KERN_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/reboot.h>
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* load_init_program_at_path
|
|
*
|
|
* Description: Load the "init" program; in most cases, this will be "launchd"
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters: p Process to call execve() to create
|
|
* the "init" program
|
|
* scratch_addr Page in p, scratch space
|
|
* path NULL terminated path
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: KERN_SUCCESS Success
|
|
* !KERN_SUCCESS See execve/mac_execve for error codes
|
|
*
|
|
* Notes: The process that is passed in is the first manufactured
|
|
* process on the system, and gets here via bsd_ast() firing
|
|
* for the first time. This is done to ensure that bsd_init()
|
|
* has run to completion.
|
|
*
|
|
* The address map of the first manufactured process matches the
|
|
* word width of the kernel. Once the self-exec completes, the
|
|
* initproc might be different.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
load_init_program_at_path(proc_t p, user_addr_t scratch_addr, const char* path)
|
|
{
|
|
int retval[2];
|
|
int error;
|
|
struct execve_args init_exec_args;
|
|
user_addr_t argv0 = USER_ADDR_NULL, argv1 = USER_ADDR_NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Validate inputs and pre-conditions
|
|
*/
|
|
assert(p);
|
|
assert(scratch_addr);
|
|
assert(path);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Copy out program name.
|
|
*/
|
|
size_t path_length = strlen(path) + 1;
|
|
argv0 = scratch_addr;
|
|
error = copyout(path, argv0, path_length);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
scratch_addr = USER_ADDR_ALIGN(scratch_addr + path_length, sizeof(user_addr_t));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Put out first (and only) argument, similarly.
|
|
* Assumes everything fits in a page as allocated above.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (boothowto & RB_SINGLE) {
|
|
const char *init_args = "-s";
|
|
size_t init_args_length = strlen(init_args) + 1;
|
|
|
|
argv1 = scratch_addr;
|
|
error = copyout(init_args, argv1, init_args_length);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
scratch_addr = USER_ADDR_ALIGN(scratch_addr + init_args_length, sizeof(user_addr_t));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (proc_is64bit(p)) {
|
|
user64_addr_t argv64bit[3] = {};
|
|
|
|
argv64bit[0] = argv0;
|
|
argv64bit[1] = argv1;
|
|
argv64bit[2] = USER_ADDR_NULL;
|
|
|
|
error = copyout(argv64bit, scratch_addr, sizeof(argv64bit));
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
user32_addr_t argv32bit[3] = {};
|
|
|
|
argv32bit[0] = (user32_addr_t)argv0;
|
|
argv32bit[1] = (user32_addr_t)argv1;
|
|
argv32bit[2] = USER_ADDR_NULL;
|
|
|
|
error = copyout(argv32bit, scratch_addr, sizeof(argv32bit));
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set up argument block for fake call to execve.
|
|
*/
|
|
init_exec_args.fname = argv0;
|
|
init_exec_args.argp = scratch_addr;
|
|
init_exec_args.envp = USER_ADDR_NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* So that init task is set with uid,gid 0 token
|
|
*
|
|
* The access to the cred is safe:
|
|
* the proc isn't running yet, it's stable.
|
|
*/
|
|
set_security_token(p, proc_ucred_unsafe(p));
|
|
|
|
return execve(p, &init_exec_args, retval);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const char * init_programs[] = {
|
|
#if DEBUG
|
|
"/usr/appleinternal/sbin/launchd.debug",
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG
|
|
"/usr/appleinternal/sbin/launchd.development",
|
|
#endif
|
|
"/sbin/launchd",
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* load_init_program
|
|
*
|
|
* Description: Load the "init" program; in most cases, this will be "launchd"
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters: p Process to call execve() to create
|
|
* the "init" program
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: (void)
|
|
*
|
|
* Notes: The process that is passed in is the first manufactured
|
|
* process on the system, and gets here via bsd_ast() firing
|
|
* for the first time. This is done to ensure that bsd_init()
|
|
* has run to completion.
|
|
*
|
|
* In DEBUG & DEVELOPMENT builds, the launchdsuffix boot-arg
|
|
* may be used to select a specific launchd executable. As with
|
|
* the kcsuffix boot-arg, setting launchdsuffix to "" or "release"
|
|
* will force /sbin/launchd to be selected.
|
|
*
|
|
* Search order by build:
|
|
*
|
|
* DEBUG DEVELOPMENT RELEASE PATH
|
|
* ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
* 1 1 NA /usr/appleinternal/sbin/launchd.$LAUNCHDSUFFIX
|
|
* 2 NA NA /usr/appleinternal/sbin/launchd.debug
|
|
* 3 2 NA /usr/appleinternal/sbin/launchd.development
|
|
* 4 3 1 /sbin/launchd
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
load_init_program(proc_t p)
|
|
{
|
|
uint32_t i;
|
|
int error;
|
|
vm_map_t map = current_map();
|
|
mach_vm_offset_t scratch_addr = 0;
|
|
mach_vm_size_t map_page_size = vm_map_page_size(map);
|
|
|
|
(void) mach_vm_allocate_kernel(map, &scratch_addr, map_page_size, VM_FLAGS_ANYWHERE, VM_KERN_MEMORY_NONE);
|
|
#if CONFIG_MEMORYSTATUS
|
|
(void) memorystatus_init_at_boot_snapshot();
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_MEMORYSTATUS */
|
|
|
|
#if DEBUG || DEVELOPMENT
|
|
/* Check for boot-arg suffix first */
|
|
char launchd_suffix[64];
|
|
if (PE_parse_boot_argn("launchdsuffix", launchd_suffix, sizeof(launchd_suffix))) {
|
|
char launchd_path[128];
|
|
boolean_t is_release_suffix = ((launchd_suffix[0] == 0) ||
|
|
(strcmp(launchd_suffix, "release") == 0));
|
|
|
|
if (is_release_suffix) {
|
|
printf("load_init_program: attempting to load /sbin/launchd\n");
|
|
error = load_init_program_at_path(p, (user_addr_t)scratch_addr, "/sbin/launchd");
|
|
if (!error) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
panic("Process 1 exec of launchd.release failed, errno %d", error);
|
|
} else {
|
|
strlcpy(launchd_path, "/usr/appleinternal/sbin/launchd.", sizeof(launchd_path));
|
|
strlcat(launchd_path, launchd_suffix, sizeof(launchd_path));
|
|
|
|
printf("load_init_program: attempting to load %s\n", launchd_path);
|
|
error = load_init_program_at_path(p, (user_addr_t)scratch_addr, launchd_path);
|
|
if (!error) {
|
|
return;
|
|
} else if (error != ENOENT) {
|
|
printf("load_init_program: failed loading %s: errno %d\n", launchd_path, error);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
error = ENOENT;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(init_programs) / sizeof(init_programs[0]); i++) {
|
|
printf("load_init_program: attempting to load %s\n", init_programs[i]);
|
|
error = load_init_program_at_path(p, (user_addr_t)scratch_addr, init_programs[i]);
|
|
if (!error) {
|
|
return;
|
|
} else if (error != ENOENT) {
|
|
printf("load_init_program: failed loading %s: errno %d\n", init_programs[i], error);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
panic("Process 1 exec of %s failed, errno %d", ((i == 0) ? "<null>" : init_programs[i - 1]), error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* load_return_to_errno
|
|
*
|
|
* Description: Convert a load_return_t (Mach error) to an errno (BSD error)
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters: lrtn Mach error number
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: (int) BSD error number
|
|
* 0 Success
|
|
* EBADARCH Bad architecture
|
|
* EBADMACHO Bad Mach object file
|
|
* ESHLIBVERS Bad shared library version
|
|
* ENOMEM Out of memory/resource shortage
|
|
* EACCES Access denied
|
|
* ENOENT Entry not found (usually "file does
|
|
* does not exist")
|
|
* EIO An I/O error occurred
|
|
* EBADEXEC The executable is corrupt/unknown
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
load_return_to_errno(load_return_t lrtn)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (lrtn) {
|
|
case LOAD_SUCCESS:
|
|
return 0;
|
|
case LOAD_BADARCH:
|
|
return EBADARCH;
|
|
case LOAD_BADMACHO:
|
|
case LOAD_BADMACHO_UPX:
|
|
return EBADMACHO;
|
|
case LOAD_SHLIB:
|
|
return ESHLIBVERS;
|
|
case LOAD_NOSPACE:
|
|
case LOAD_RESOURCE:
|
|
return ENOMEM;
|
|
case LOAD_PROTECT:
|
|
return EACCES;
|
|
case LOAD_ENOENT:
|
|
return ENOENT;
|
|
case LOAD_IOERROR:
|
|
return EIO;
|
|
case LOAD_DECRYPTFAIL:
|
|
return EAUTH;
|
|
case LOAD_FAILURE:
|
|
default:
|
|
return EBADEXEC;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#include <mach/mach_types.h>
|
|
#include <mach/vm_prot.h>
|
|
#include <mach/semaphore.h>
|
|
#include <mach/sync_policy.h>
|
|
#include <kern/clock.h>
|
|
#include <mach/kern_return.h>
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* execargs_alloc
|
|
*
|
|
* Description: Allocate the block of memory used by the execve arguments.
|
|
* At the same time, we allocate a page so that we can read in
|
|
* the first page of the image.
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters: struct image_params * the image parameter block
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: 0 Success
|
|
* EINVAL Invalid argument
|
|
* EACCES Permission denied
|
|
* EINTR Interrupted function
|
|
* ENOMEM Not enough space
|
|
*
|
|
* Notes: This is a temporary allocation into the kernel address space
|
|
* to enable us to copy arguments in from user space. This is
|
|
* necessitated by not mapping the process calling execve() into
|
|
* the kernel address space during the execve() system call.
|
|
*
|
|
* We assemble the argument and environment, etc., into this
|
|
* region before copying it as a single block into the child
|
|
* process address space (at the top or bottom of the stack,
|
|
* depending on which way the stack grows; see the function
|
|
* exec_copyout_strings() for details).
|
|
*
|
|
* This ends up with a second (possibly unnecessary) copy compared
|
|
* with assembing the data directly into the child address space,
|
|
* instead, but since we cannot be guaranteed that the parent has
|
|
* not modified its environment, we can't really know that it's
|
|
* really a block there as well.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int execargs_waiters = 0;
|
|
static LCK_MTX_DECLARE_ATTR(execargs_cache_lock, &proc_lck_grp, &proc_lck_attr);
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
execargs_lock_lock(void)
|
|
{
|
|
lck_mtx_lock_spin(&execargs_cache_lock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
execargs_lock_unlock(void)
|
|
{
|
|
lck_mtx_unlock(&execargs_cache_lock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static wait_result_t
|
|
execargs_lock_sleep(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return lck_mtx_sleep(&execargs_cache_lock, LCK_SLEEP_DEFAULT, &execargs_free_count, THREAD_INTERRUPTIBLE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static kern_return_t
|
|
execargs_purgeable_allocate(char **execarg_address)
|
|
{
|
|
mach_vm_offset_t addr = 0;
|
|
kern_return_t kr = mach_vm_allocate_kernel(bsd_pageable_map, &addr,
|
|
BSD_PAGEABLE_SIZE_PER_EXEC, VM_FLAGS_ANYWHERE | VM_FLAGS_PURGABLE,
|
|
VM_KERN_MEMORY_NONE);
|
|
*execarg_address = (char *)addr;
|
|
assert(kr == KERN_SUCCESS);
|
|
return kr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static kern_return_t
|
|
execargs_purgeable_reference(void *execarg_address)
|
|
{
|
|
int state = VM_PURGABLE_NONVOLATILE;
|
|
kern_return_t kr = vm_purgable_control(bsd_pageable_map, (vm_offset_t) execarg_address, VM_PURGABLE_SET_STATE, &state);
|
|
|
|
assert(kr == KERN_SUCCESS);
|
|
return kr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static kern_return_t
|
|
execargs_purgeable_volatilize(void *execarg_address)
|
|
{
|
|
int state = VM_PURGABLE_VOLATILE | VM_PURGABLE_ORDERING_OBSOLETE;
|
|
kern_return_t kr;
|
|
kr = vm_purgable_control(bsd_pageable_map, (vm_offset_t) execarg_address, VM_PURGABLE_SET_STATE, &state);
|
|
|
|
assert(kr == KERN_SUCCESS);
|
|
|
|
return kr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
execargs_wakeup_waiters(void)
|
|
{
|
|
thread_wakeup(&execargs_free_count);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
execargs_alloc(struct image_params *imgp)
|
|
{
|
|
kern_return_t kret;
|
|
wait_result_t res;
|
|
int i, cache_index = -1;
|
|
|
|
execargs_lock_lock();
|
|
|
|
while (execargs_free_count == 0) {
|
|
execargs_waiters++;
|
|
res = execargs_lock_sleep();
|
|
execargs_waiters--;
|
|
if (res != THREAD_AWAKENED) {
|
|
execargs_lock_unlock();
|
|
return EINTR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
execargs_free_count--;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < execargs_cache_size; i++) {
|
|
vm_offset_t element = execargs_cache[i];
|
|
if (element) {
|
|
cache_index = i;
|
|
imgp->ip_strings = (char *)(execargs_cache[i]);
|
|
execargs_cache[i] = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(execargs_free_count >= 0);
|
|
|
|
execargs_lock_unlock();
|
|
|
|
if (cache_index == -1) {
|
|
kret = execargs_purgeable_allocate(&imgp->ip_strings);
|
|
} else {
|
|
kret = execargs_purgeable_reference(imgp->ip_strings);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(kret == KERN_SUCCESS);
|
|
if (kret != KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
return ENOMEM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* last page used to read in file headers */
|
|
imgp->ip_vdata = imgp->ip_strings + (NCARGS + PAGE_SIZE);
|
|
imgp->ip_strendp = imgp->ip_strings;
|
|
imgp->ip_argspace = NCARGS;
|
|
imgp->ip_strspace = (NCARGS + PAGE_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* execargs_free
|
|
*
|
|
* Description: Free the block of memory used by the execve arguments and the
|
|
* first page of the executable by a previous call to the function
|
|
* execargs_alloc().
|
|
*
|
|
* Parameters: struct image_params * the image parameter block
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns: 0 Success
|
|
* EINVAL Invalid argument
|
|
* EINTR Oeration interrupted
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
execargs_free(struct image_params *imgp)
|
|
{
|
|
kern_return_t kret;
|
|
int i;
|
|
boolean_t needs_wakeup = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
kret = execargs_purgeable_volatilize(imgp->ip_strings);
|
|
|
|
execargs_lock_lock();
|
|
execargs_free_count++;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < execargs_cache_size; i++) {
|
|
vm_offset_t element = execargs_cache[i];
|
|
if (element == 0) {
|
|
execargs_cache[i] = (vm_offset_t) imgp->ip_strings;
|
|
imgp->ip_strings = NULL;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(imgp->ip_strings == NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (execargs_waiters > 0) {
|
|
needs_wakeup = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
execargs_lock_unlock();
|
|
|
|
if (needs_wakeup == TRUE) {
|
|
execargs_wakeup_waiters();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return kret == KERN_SUCCESS ? 0 : EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
uthread_set_exec_data(struct uthread *uth, struct image_params *imgp)
|
|
{
|
|
uth->uu_save.uus_exec_data.imgp = imgp;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t
|
|
thread_get_current_exec_path(char *path, size_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
struct uthread *uth = current_uthread();
|
|
struct image_params *imgp = uth->uu_save.uus_exec_data.imgp;
|
|
size_t string_size = 0;
|
|
char *exec_path;
|
|
|
|
if (path == NULL || imgp == NULL || imgp->ip_strings == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
exec_path = imgp->ip_strings + strlen(EXECUTABLE_KEY);
|
|
string_size = imgp->ip_strendp - exec_path;
|
|
string_size = MIN(MAXPATHLEN, string_size);
|
|
string_size = MIN(size, string_size);
|
|
|
|
string_size = strlcpy(path, exec_path, string_size);
|
|
return string_size;
|
|
}
|
|
static void
|
|
exec_resettextvp(proc_t p, struct image_params *imgp)
|
|
{
|
|
vnode_t vp;
|
|
off_t offset;
|
|
vnode_t tvp = p->p_textvp;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
vp = imgp->ip_vp;
|
|
offset = imgp->ip_arch_offset;
|
|
|
|
if (vp == NULLVP) {
|
|
panic("exec_resettextvp: expected valid vp");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = vnode_ref(vp);
|
|
proc_lock(p);
|
|
if (ret == 0) {
|
|
p->p_textvp = vp;
|
|
p->p_textoff = offset;
|
|
} else {
|
|
p->p_textvp = NULLVP; /* this is paranoia */
|
|
p->p_textoff = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
proc_unlock(p);
|
|
|
|
if (tvp != NULLVP) {
|
|
if (vnode_getwithref(tvp) == 0) {
|
|
vnode_rele(tvp);
|
|
vnode_put(tvp);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Includes the 0-byte (therefore "SIZE" instead of "LEN").
|
|
static const size_t CS_CDHASH_STRING_SIZE = CS_CDHASH_LEN * 2 + 1;
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
cdhash_to_string(char str[CS_CDHASH_STRING_SIZE], uint8_t const * const cdhash)
|
|
{
|
|
static char const nibble[] = "0123456789abcdef";
|
|
|
|
/* Apparently still the safest way to get a hex representation
|
|
* of binary data.
|
|
* xnu's printf routines have %*D/%20D in theory, but "not really", see:
|
|
* <rdar://problem/33328859> confusion around %*D/%nD in printf
|
|
*/
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < CS_CDHASH_LEN; ++i) {
|
|
str[i * 2] = nibble[(cdhash[i] & 0xf0) >> 4];
|
|
str[i * 2 + 1] = nibble[cdhash[i] & 0x0f];
|
|
}
|
|
str[CS_CDHASH_STRING_SIZE - 1] = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* __EXEC_WAITING_ON_TASKGATED_CODE_SIGNATURE_UPCALL__
|
|
*
|
|
* Description: Waits for the userspace daemon to respond to the request
|
|
* we made. Function declared non inline to be visible in
|
|
* stackshots and spindumps as well as debugging.
|
|
*/
|
|
__attribute__((noinline)) int
|
|
__EXEC_WAITING_ON_TASKGATED_CODE_SIGNATURE_UPCALL__(mach_port_t task_access_port, int32_t new_pid)
|
|
{
|
|
return find_code_signature(task_access_port, new_pid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Update signature dependent process state, called by
|
|
* process_signature.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
proc_process_signature(proc_t p, os_reason_t *signature_failure_reason)
|
|
{
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
char const *error_msg = NULL;
|
|
|
|
kern_return_t kr = machine_task_process_signature(proc_get_task_raw(p), proc_platform(p), proc_sdk(p), &error_msg);
|
|
|
|
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (error_msg != NULL) {
|
|
uint32_t error_msg_len = (uint32_t)strlen(error_msg) + 1;
|
|
mach_vm_address_t data_addr = 0;
|
|
int reason_error = 0;
|
|
int kcdata_error = 0;
|
|
|
|
os_reason_t reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_SECURITY_POLICY);
|
|
reason->osr_flags = OS_REASON_FLAG_GENERATE_CRASH_REPORT | OS_REASON_FLAG_CONSISTENT_FAILURE;
|
|
|
|
if ((reason_error = os_reason_alloc_buffer_noblock(reason,
|
|
kcdata_estimate_required_buffer_size(1, error_msg_len))) == 0 &&
|
|
(kcdata_error = kcdata_get_memory_addr(&reason->osr_kcd_descriptor,
|
|
EXIT_REASON_USER_DESC, error_msg_len,
|
|
&data_addr)) == KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
kern_return_t mc_error = kcdata_memcpy(&reason->osr_kcd_descriptor, (mach_vm_address_t)data_addr,
|
|
error_msg, error_msg_len);
|
|
|
|
if (mc_error != KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
printf("process_signature: failed to copy reason string (kcdata_memcpy error: %d)\n",
|
|
mc_error);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
printf("failed to allocate space for reason string (os_reason_alloc_buffer error: %d, kcdata error: %d, length: %u)\n",
|
|
reason_error, kcdata_error, error_msg_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(*signature_failure_reason == NULL); // shouldn't have gotten so far
|
|
*signature_failure_reason = reason;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
process_signature(proc_t p, struct image_params *imgp)
|
|
{
|
|
mach_port_t port = IPC_PORT_NULL;
|
|
kern_return_t kr = KERN_FAILURE;
|
|
int error = EACCES;
|
|
boolean_t unexpected_failure = FALSE;
|
|
struct cs_blob *csb;
|
|
boolean_t require_success = FALSE;
|
|
int spawn = (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_SPAWN);
|
|
const int vfexec = 0;
|
|
os_reason_t signature_failure_reason = OS_REASON_NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Override inherited code signing flags with the
|
|
* ones for the process that is being successfully
|
|
* loaded
|
|
*/
|
|
proc_lock(p);
|
|
proc_csflags_update(p, imgp->ip_csflags);
|
|
proc_unlock(p);
|
|
|
|
/* Set the switch_protect flag on the map */
|
|
if (proc_getcsflags(p) & (CS_HARD | CS_KILL)) {
|
|
vm_map_switch_protect(get_task_map(proc_task(p)), TRUE);
|
|
}
|
|
/* set the cs_enforced flags in the map */
|
|
if (proc_getcsflags(p) & CS_ENFORCEMENT) {
|
|
vm_map_cs_enforcement_set(get_task_map(proc_task(p)), TRUE);
|
|
} else {
|
|
vm_map_cs_enforcement_set(get_task_map(proc_task(p)), FALSE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* image activation may be failed due to policy
|
|
* which is unexpected but security framework does not
|
|
* approve of exec, kill and return immediately.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (imgp->ip_mac_return != 0) {
|
|
KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT(BSDDBG_CODE(DBG_BSD_PROC, BSD_PROC_EXITREASON_CREATE) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
|
|
proc_getpid(p), OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_SECURITY_POLICY, 0, 0);
|
|
signature_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_SECURITY_POLICY);
|
|
error = imgp->ip_mac_return;
|
|
unexpected_failure = TRUE;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (imgp->ip_cs_error != OS_REASON_NULL) {
|
|
signature_failure_reason = imgp->ip_cs_error;
|
|
imgp->ip_cs_error = OS_REASON_NULL;
|
|
error = EACCES;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* call the launch constraints hook */
|
|
os_reason_t launch_constraint_reason;
|
|
if ((error = mac_proc_check_launch_constraints(p, imgp, &launch_constraint_reason)) != 0) {
|
|
signature_failure_reason = launch_constraint_reason;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX
|
|
/* Check for platform passed in spawn attr if iOS binary is being spawned */
|
|
if (proc_platform(p) == PLATFORM_IOS) {
|
|
struct _posix_spawnattr *psa = (struct _posix_spawnattr *) imgp->ip_px_sa;
|
|
if (psa == NULL || psa->psa_platform == 0) {
|
|
boolean_t no_sandbox_entitled = FALSE;
|
|
#if DEBUG || DEVELOPMENT
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allow iOS binaries to spawn on internal systems
|
|
* if no-sandbox entitlement is present of unentitled_ios_sim_launch
|
|
* boot-arg set to true
|
|
*/
|
|
if (unentitled_ios_sim_launch) {
|
|
no_sandbox_entitled = TRUE;
|
|
} else {
|
|
no_sandbox_entitled = IOVnodeHasEntitlement(imgp->ip_vp,
|
|
(int64_t)imgp->ip_arch_offset, "com.apple.private.security.no-sandbox");
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* DEBUG || DEVELOPMENT */
|
|
if (!no_sandbox_entitled) {
|
|
signature_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC,
|
|
EXEC_EXIT_REASON_WRONG_PLATFORM);
|
|
error = EACCES;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
printf("Allowing spawn of iOS binary %s since it has "
|
|
"com.apple.private.security.no-sandbox entitlement or unentitled_ios_sim_launch "
|
|
"boot-arg set to true\n", p->p_name);
|
|
} else if (psa->psa_platform != PLATFORM_IOS) {
|
|
/* Simulator binary spawned with wrong platform */
|
|
signature_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC,
|
|
EXEC_EXIT_REASON_WRONG_PLATFORM);
|
|
error = EACCES;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
} else {
|
|
printf("Allowing spawn of iOS binary %s since correct platform was passed in spawn\n",
|
|
p->p_name);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* XNU_TARGET_OS_OSX */
|
|
|
|
/* If the code signature came through the image activation path, we skip the
|
|
* taskgated / externally attached path. */
|
|
if (imgp->ip_csflags & CS_SIGNED) {
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The rest of the code is for signatures that either already have been externally
|
|
* attached (likely, but not necessarily by a previous run through the taskgated
|
|
* path), or that will now be attached by taskgated. */
|
|
|
|
kr = task_get_task_access_port(proc_task(p), &port);
|
|
if (KERN_SUCCESS != kr || !IPC_PORT_VALID(port)) {
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
if (require_success) {
|
|
KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT(BSDDBG_CODE(DBG_BSD_PROC, BSD_PROC_EXITREASON_CREATE) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
|
|
proc_getpid(p), OS_REASON_CODESIGNING, CODESIGNING_EXIT_REASON_TASK_ACCESS_PORT, 0, 0);
|
|
signature_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_CODESIGNING, CODESIGNING_EXIT_REASON_TASK_ACCESS_PORT);
|
|
error = EACCES;
|
|
}
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* taskgated returns KERN_SUCCESS if it has completed its work
|
|
* and the exec should continue, KERN_FAILURE if the exec should
|
|
* fail, or it may error out with different error code in an
|
|
* event of mig failure (e.g. process was signalled during the
|
|
* rpc call, taskgated died, mig server died etc.).
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
kr = __EXEC_WAITING_ON_TASKGATED_CODE_SIGNATURE_UPCALL__(port, proc_getpid(p));
|
|
switch (kr) {
|
|
case KERN_SUCCESS:
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
case KERN_FAILURE:
|
|
error = EACCES;
|
|
|
|
KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT(BSDDBG_CODE(DBG_BSD_PROC, BSD_PROC_EXITREASON_CREATE) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
|
|
proc_getpid(p), OS_REASON_CODESIGNING, CODESIGNING_EXIT_REASON_TASKGATED_INVALID_SIG, 0, 0);
|
|
signature_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_CODESIGNING, CODESIGNING_EXIT_REASON_TASKGATED_INVALID_SIG);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
default:
|
|
error = EACCES;
|
|
|
|
KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT(BSDDBG_CODE(DBG_BSD_PROC, BSD_PROC_EXITREASON_CREATE) | DBG_FUNC_NONE,
|
|
proc_getpid(p), OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_TASKGATED_OTHER, 0, 0);
|
|
signature_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_TASKGATED_OTHER);
|
|
unexpected_failure = TRUE;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Only do this if exec_resettextvp() did not fail */
|
|
if (p->p_textvp != NULLVP) {
|
|
csb = ubc_cs_blob_get(p->p_textvp, -1, -1, p->p_textoff);
|
|
|
|
if (csb != NULL) {
|
|
/* As the enforcement we can do here is very limited, we only allow things that
|
|
* are the only reason why this code path still exists:
|
|
* Adhoc signed non-platform binaries without special cs_flags and without any
|
|
* entitlements (unrestricted ones still pass AMFI). */
|
|
if (
|
|
/* Revalidate the blob if necessary through bumped generation count. */
|
|
(ubc_cs_generation_check(p->p_textvp) == 0 ||
|
|
ubc_cs_blob_revalidate(p->p_textvp, csb, imgp, 0, proc_platform(p)) == 0) &&
|
|
/* Only CS_ADHOC, no CS_KILL, CS_HARD etc. */
|
|
(csb->csb_flags & CS_ALLOWED_MACHO) == CS_ADHOC &&
|
|
/* If it has a CMS blob, it's not adhoc. The CS_ADHOC flag can lie. */
|
|
csblob_find_blob_bytes((const uint8_t *)csb->csb_mem_kaddr, csb->csb_mem_size,
|
|
CSSLOT_SIGNATURESLOT,
|
|
CSMAGIC_BLOBWRAPPER) == NULL &&
|
|
/* It could still be in a trust cache (unlikely with CS_ADHOC), or a magic path. */
|
|
csb->csb_platform_binary == 0 &&
|
|
/* No entitlements, not even unrestricted ones. */
|
|
csb->csb_entitlements_blob == NULL &&
|
|
csb->csb_der_entitlements_blob == NULL) {
|
|
proc_lock(p);
|
|
proc_csflags_set(p, CS_SIGNED | CS_VALID);
|
|
proc_unlock(p);
|
|
} else {
|
|
uint8_t cdhash[CS_CDHASH_LEN];
|
|
char cdhash_string[CS_CDHASH_STRING_SIZE];
|
|
proc_getcdhash(p, cdhash);
|
|
cdhash_to_string(cdhash_string, cdhash);
|
|
printf("ignoring detached code signature on '%s' with cdhash '%s' "
|
|
"because it is invalid, or not a simple adhoc signature.\n",
|
|
p->p_name, cdhash_string);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
if (0 == error) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Update the new process's signature-dependent process state.
|
|
* state.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
error = proc_process_signature(p, &signature_failure_reason);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (0 == error) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Update the new main thread's signature-dependent thread
|
|
* state. This was also called when the thread was created,
|
|
* but for the main thread the signature was not yet attached
|
|
* at that time.
|
|
*/
|
|
kr = thread_process_signature(imgp->ip_new_thread, proc_get_task_raw(p));
|
|
|
|
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
signature_failure_reason = os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_MACHINE_THREAD);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (0 == error) {
|
|
/* The process's code signature related properties are
|
|
* fully set up, so this is an opportune moment to log
|
|
* platform binary execution, if desired. */
|
|
if (platform_exec_logging != 0 && csproc_get_platform_binary(p)) {
|
|
uint8_t cdhash[CS_CDHASH_LEN];
|
|
char cdhash_string[CS_CDHASH_STRING_SIZE];
|
|
proc_getcdhash(p, cdhash);
|
|
cdhash_to_string(cdhash_string, cdhash);
|
|
|
|
os_log(peLog, "CS Platform Exec Logging: Executing platform signed binary "
|
|
"'%s' with cdhash %s\n", p->p_name, cdhash_string);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!unexpected_failure) {
|
|
proc_csflags_set(p, CS_KILLED);
|
|
}
|
|
/* make very sure execution fails */
|
|
if (vfexec || spawn) {
|
|
assert(signature_failure_reason != OS_REASON_NULL);
|
|
psignal_vfork_with_reason(p, proc_task(p), imgp->ip_new_thread,
|
|
SIGKILL, signature_failure_reason);
|
|
signature_failure_reason = OS_REASON_NULL;
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
assert(signature_failure_reason != OS_REASON_NULL);
|
|
psignal_with_reason(p, SIGKILL, signature_failure_reason);
|
|
signature_failure_reason = OS_REASON_NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (port != IPC_PORT_NULL) {
|
|
ipc_port_release_send(port);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If we hit this, we likely would have leaked an exit reason */
|
|
assert(signature_failure_reason == OS_REASON_NULL);
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Typically as soon as we start executing this process, the
|
|
* first instruction will trigger a VM fault to bring the text
|
|
* pages (as executable) into the address space, followed soon
|
|
* thereafter by dyld data structures (for dynamic executable).
|
|
* To optimize this, as well as improve support for hardware
|
|
* debuggers that can only access resident pages present
|
|
* in the process' page tables, we prefault some pages if
|
|
* possible. Errors are non-fatal.
|
|
*/
|
|
#ifndef PREVENT_CALLER_STACK_USE
|
|
#define PREVENT_CALLER_STACK_USE __attribute__((noinline))
|
|
#endif
|
|
static void PREVENT_CALLER_STACK_USE
|
|
exec_prefault_data(proc_t p __unused, struct image_params *imgp, load_result_t *load_result)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
size_t expected_all_image_infos_size;
|
|
kern_return_t kr;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Prefault executable or dyld entry point.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (vm_map_page_shift(current_map()) < (int)PAGE_SHIFT) {
|
|
DEBUG4K_LOAD("entry_point 0x%llx\n", (uint64_t)load_result->entry_point);
|
|
}
|
|
kr = vm_fault(current_map(),
|
|
vm_map_trunc_page(load_result->entry_point,
|
|
vm_map_page_mask(current_map())),
|
|
VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_EXECUTE,
|
|
FALSE, VM_KERN_MEMORY_NONE,
|
|
THREAD_UNINT, NULL, 0);
|
|
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
DEBUG4K_ERROR("map %p va 0x%llx -> 0x%x\n", current_map(), (uint64_t)vm_map_trunc_page(load_result->entry_point, vm_map_page_mask(current_map())), kr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_IS_64BIT_ADDR) {
|
|
expected_all_image_infos_size = sizeof(struct user64_dyld_all_image_infos);
|
|
} else {
|
|
expected_all_image_infos_size = sizeof(struct user32_dyld_all_image_infos);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Decode dyld anchor structure from <mach-o/dyld_images.h> */
|
|
if (load_result->dynlinker &&
|
|
load_result->all_image_info_addr &&
|
|
load_result->all_image_info_size >= expected_all_image_infos_size) {
|
|
union {
|
|
struct user64_dyld_all_image_infos infos64;
|
|
struct user32_dyld_all_image_infos infos32;
|
|
} all_image_infos;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Pre-fault to avoid copyin() going through the trap handler
|
|
* and recovery path.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (vm_map_page_shift(current_map()) < (int)PAGE_SHIFT) {
|
|
DEBUG4K_LOAD("all_image_info_addr 0x%llx\n", load_result->all_image_info_addr);
|
|
}
|
|
kr = vm_fault(current_map(),
|
|
vm_map_trunc_page(load_result->all_image_info_addr,
|
|
vm_map_page_mask(current_map())),
|
|
VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE,
|
|
FALSE, VM_KERN_MEMORY_NONE,
|
|
THREAD_UNINT, NULL, 0);
|
|
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
// printf("%s:%d map %p va 0x%llx -> 0x%x\n", __FUNCTION__, __LINE__, current_map(), vm_map_trunc_page(load_result->all_image_info_addr, vm_map_page_mask(current_map())), kr);
|
|
}
|
|
if ((load_result->all_image_info_addr & PAGE_MASK) + expected_all_image_infos_size > PAGE_SIZE) {
|
|
/* all_image_infos straddles a page */
|
|
kr = vm_fault(current_map(),
|
|
vm_map_trunc_page(load_result->all_image_info_addr + expected_all_image_infos_size - 1,
|
|
vm_map_page_mask(current_map())),
|
|
VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE,
|
|
FALSE, VM_KERN_MEMORY_NONE,
|
|
THREAD_UNINT, NULL, 0);
|
|
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
// printf("%s:%d map %p va 0x%llx -> 0x%x\n", __FUNCTION__, __LINE__, current_map(), vm_map_trunc_page(load_result->all_image_info_addr + expected_all_image_infos_size -1, vm_map_page_mask(current_map())), kr);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (vm_map_page_shift(current_map()) < (int)PAGE_SHIFT) {
|
|
DEBUG4K_LOAD("copyin(0x%llx, 0x%lx)\n", load_result->all_image_info_addr, expected_all_image_infos_size);
|
|
}
|
|
ret = copyin((user_addr_t)load_result->all_image_info_addr,
|
|
&all_image_infos,
|
|
expected_all_image_infos_size);
|
|
if (ret == 0 && all_image_infos.infos32.version >= DYLD_ALL_IMAGE_INFOS_ADDRESS_MINIMUM_VERSION) {
|
|
user_addr_t notification_address;
|
|
user_addr_t dyld_image_address;
|
|
user_addr_t dyld_version_address;
|
|
user_addr_t dyld_all_image_infos_address;
|
|
user_addr_t dyld_slide_amount;
|
|
|
|
if (imgp->ip_flags & IMGPF_IS_64BIT_ADDR) {
|
|
notification_address = (user_addr_t)all_image_infos.infos64.notification;
|
|
dyld_image_address = (user_addr_t)all_image_infos.infos64.dyldImageLoadAddress;
|
|
dyld_version_address = (user_addr_t)all_image_infos.infos64.dyldVersion;
|
|
dyld_all_image_infos_address = (user_addr_t)all_image_infos.infos64.dyldAllImageInfosAddress;
|
|
} else {
|
|
notification_address = all_image_infos.infos32.notification;
|
|
dyld_image_address = all_image_infos.infos32.dyldImageLoadAddress;
|
|
dyld_version_address = all_image_infos.infos32.dyldVersion;
|
|
dyld_all_image_infos_address = all_image_infos.infos32.dyldAllImageInfosAddress;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* dyld statically sets up the all_image_infos in its Mach-O
|
|
* binary at static link time, with pointers relative to its default
|
|
* load address. Since ASLR might slide dyld before its first
|
|
* instruction is executed, "dyld_slide_amount" tells us how far
|
|
* dyld was loaded compared to its default expected load address.
|
|
* All other pointers into dyld's image should be adjusted by this
|
|
* amount. At some point later, dyld will fix up pointers to take
|
|
* into account the slide, at which point the all_image_infos_address
|
|
* field in the structure will match the runtime load address, and
|
|
* "dyld_slide_amount" will be 0, if we were to consult it again.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
dyld_slide_amount = (user_addr_t)load_result->all_image_info_addr - dyld_all_image_infos_address;
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
kprintf("exec_prefault: 0x%016llx 0x%08x 0x%016llx 0x%016llx 0x%016llx 0x%016llx\n",
|
|
(uint64_t)load_result->all_image_info_addr,
|
|
all_image_infos.infos32.version,
|
|
(uint64_t)notification_address,
|
|
(uint64_t)dyld_image_address,
|
|
(uint64_t)dyld_version_address,
|
|
(uint64_t)dyld_all_image_infos_address);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (vm_map_page_shift(current_map()) < (int)PAGE_SHIFT) {
|
|
DEBUG4K_LOAD("notification_address 0x%llx dyld_slide_amount 0x%llx\n", (uint64_t)notification_address, (uint64_t)dyld_slide_amount);
|
|
}
|
|
kr = vm_fault(current_map(),
|
|
vm_map_trunc_page(notification_address + dyld_slide_amount,
|
|
vm_map_page_mask(current_map())),
|
|
VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_EXECUTE,
|
|
FALSE, VM_KERN_MEMORY_NONE,
|
|
THREAD_UNINT, NULL, 0);
|
|
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
// printf("%s:%d map %p va 0x%llx -> 0x%x\n", __FUNCTION__, __LINE__, current_map(), vm_map_trunc_page(notification_address + dyld_slide_amount, vm_map_page_mask(current_map())), kr);
|
|
}
|
|
if (vm_map_page_shift(current_map()) < (int)PAGE_SHIFT) {
|
|
DEBUG4K_LOAD("dyld_image_address 0x%llx dyld_slide_amount 0x%llx\n", (uint64_t)dyld_image_address, (uint64_t)dyld_slide_amount);
|
|
}
|
|
kr = vm_fault(current_map(),
|
|
vm_map_trunc_page(dyld_image_address + dyld_slide_amount,
|
|
vm_map_page_mask(current_map())),
|
|
VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_EXECUTE,
|
|
FALSE, VM_KERN_MEMORY_NONE,
|
|
THREAD_UNINT, NULL, 0);
|
|
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
// printf("%s:%d map %p va 0x%llx -> 0x%x\n", __FUNCTION__, __LINE__, current_map(), vm_map_trunc_page(dyld_image_address + dyld_slide_amount, vm_map_page_mask(current_map())), kr);
|
|
}
|
|
if (vm_map_page_shift(current_map()) < (int)PAGE_SHIFT) {
|
|
DEBUG4K_LOAD("dyld_version_address 0x%llx dyld_slide_amount 0x%llx\n", (uint64_t)dyld_version_address, (uint64_t)dyld_slide_amount);
|
|
}
|
|
kr = vm_fault(current_map(),
|
|
vm_map_trunc_page(dyld_version_address + dyld_slide_amount,
|
|
vm_map_page_mask(current_map())),
|
|
VM_PROT_READ,
|
|
FALSE, VM_KERN_MEMORY_NONE,
|
|
THREAD_UNINT, NULL, 0);
|
|
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
// printf("%s:%d map %p va 0x%llx -> 0x%x\n", __FUNCTION__, __LINE__, current_map(), vm_map_trunc_page(dyld_version_address + dyld_slide_amount, vm_map_page_mask(current_map())), kr);
|
|
}
|
|
if (vm_map_page_shift(current_map()) < (int)PAGE_SHIFT) {
|
|
DEBUG4K_LOAD("dyld_all_image_infos_address 0x%llx dyld_slide_amount 0x%llx\n", (uint64_t)dyld_version_address, (uint64_t)dyld_slide_amount);
|
|
}
|
|
kr = vm_fault(current_map(),
|
|
vm_map_trunc_page(dyld_all_image_infos_address + dyld_slide_amount,
|
|
vm_map_page_mask(current_map())),
|
|
VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE,
|
|
FALSE, VM_KERN_MEMORY_NONE,
|
|
THREAD_UNINT, NULL, 0);
|
|
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
|
|
// printf("%s:%d map %p va 0x%llx -> 0x%x\n", __FUNCTION__, __LINE__, current_map(), vm_map_trunc_page(dyld_all_image_infos_address + dyld_slide_amount, vm_map_page_mask(current_map())), kr);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
sysctl_libmalloc_experiments SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS
|
|
{
|
|
#pragma unused(oidp, arg2, req)
|
|
int changed;
|
|
errno_t error;
|
|
uint64_t value = os_atomic_load_wide(&libmalloc_experiment_factors, relaxed);
|
|
|
|
error = sysctl_io_number(req, value, sizeof(value), &value, &changed);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (changed) {
|
|
os_atomic_store_wide(&libmalloc_experiment_factors, value, relaxed);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPERIMENT_FACTOR_PROC(_kern, libmalloc_experiments, CTLTYPE_QUAD | CTLFLAG_RW, 0, 0, &sysctl_libmalloc_experiments, "A", "");
|