337 lines
9.5 KiB
C
337 lines
9.5 KiB
C
/*
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* ARM debug helpers.
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*
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* This code is licensed under the GNU GPL v2 or later.
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*
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
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*/
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#include "qemu/osdep.h"
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#include "cpu.h"
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#include "internals.h"
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#include "exec/exec-all.h"
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#include "exec/helper-proto.h"
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/* Return true if the linked breakpoint entry lbn passes its checks */
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static bool linked_bp_matches(ARMCPU *cpu, int lbn)
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{
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CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
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uint64_t bcr = env->cp15.dbgbcr[lbn];
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int brps = arm_num_brps(cpu);
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int ctx_cmps = arm_num_ctx_cmps(cpu);
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int bt;
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uint32_t contextidr;
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uint64_t hcr_el2;
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/*
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* Links to unimplemented or non-context aware breakpoints are
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* CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE: either behave as if disabled, or
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* as if linked to an UNKNOWN context-aware breakpoint (in which
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* case DBGWCR<n>_EL1.LBN must indicate that breakpoint).
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* We choose the former.
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*/
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if (lbn >= brps || lbn < (brps - ctx_cmps)) {
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return false;
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}
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bcr = env->cp15.dbgbcr[lbn];
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if (extract64(bcr, 0, 1) == 0) {
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/* Linked breakpoint disabled : generate no events */
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return false;
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}
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bt = extract64(bcr, 20, 4);
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hcr_el2 = arm_hcr_el2_eff(env);
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switch (bt) {
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case 3: /* linked context ID match */
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switch (arm_current_el(env)) {
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default:
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/* Context matches never fire in AArch64 EL3 */
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return false;
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case 2:
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if (!(hcr_el2 & HCR_E2H)) {
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/* Context matches never fire in EL2 without E2H enabled. */
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return false;
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}
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contextidr = env->cp15.contextidr_el[2];
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break;
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case 1:
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contextidr = env->cp15.contextidr_el[1];
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break;
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case 0:
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if ((hcr_el2 & (HCR_E2H | HCR_TGE)) == (HCR_E2H | HCR_TGE)) {
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contextidr = env->cp15.contextidr_el[2];
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} else {
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contextidr = env->cp15.contextidr_el[1];
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}
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break;
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}
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break;
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case 7: /* linked contextidr_el1 match */
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contextidr = env->cp15.contextidr_el[1];
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break;
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case 13: /* linked contextidr_el2 match */
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contextidr = env->cp15.contextidr_el[2];
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break;
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case 9: /* linked VMID match (reserved if no EL2) */
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case 11: /* linked context ID and VMID match (reserved if no EL2) */
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case 15: /* linked full context ID match */
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default:
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/*
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* Links to Unlinked context breakpoints must generate no
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* events; we choose to do the same for reserved values too.
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*/
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return false;
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}
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/*
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* We match the whole register even if this is AArch32 using the
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* short descriptor format (in which case it holds both PROCID and ASID),
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* since we don't implement the optional v7 context ID masking.
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*/
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return contextidr == (uint32_t)env->cp15.dbgbvr[lbn];
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}
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static bool bp_wp_matches(ARMCPU *cpu, int n, bool is_wp)
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{
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CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
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uint64_t cr;
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int pac, hmc, ssc, wt, lbn;
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/*
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* Note that for watchpoints the check is against the CPU security
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* state, not the S/NS attribute on the offending data access.
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*/
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bool is_secure = arm_is_secure(env);
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int access_el = arm_current_el(env);
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if (is_wp) {
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CPUWatchpoint *wp = env->cpu_watchpoint[n];
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if (!wp || !(wp->flags & BP_WATCHPOINT_HIT)) {
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return false;
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}
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cr = env->cp15.dbgwcr[n];
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if (wp->hitattrs.user) {
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/*
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* The LDRT/STRT/LDT/STT "unprivileged access" instructions should
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* match watchpoints as if they were accesses done at EL0, even if
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* the CPU is at EL1 or higher.
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*/
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access_el = 0;
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}
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} else {
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uint64_t pc = is_a64(env) ? env->pc : env->regs[15];
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if (!env->cpu_breakpoint[n] || env->cpu_breakpoint[n]->pc != pc) {
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return false;
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}
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cr = env->cp15.dbgbcr[n];
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}
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/*
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* The WATCHPOINT_HIT flag guarantees us that the watchpoint is
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* enabled and that the address and access type match; for breakpoints
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* we know the address matched; check the remaining fields, including
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* linked breakpoints. We rely on WCR and BCR having the same layout
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* for the LBN, SSC, HMC, PAC/PMC and is-linked fields.
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* Note that some combinations of {PAC, HMC, SSC} are reserved and
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* must act either like some valid combination or as if the watchpoint
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* were disabled. We choose the former, and use this together with
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* the fact that EL3 must always be Secure and EL2 must always be
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* Non-Secure to simplify the code slightly compared to the full
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* table in the ARM ARM.
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*/
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pac = extract64(cr, 1, 2);
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hmc = extract64(cr, 13, 1);
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ssc = extract64(cr, 14, 2);
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switch (ssc) {
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case 0:
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break;
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case 1:
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case 3:
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if (is_secure) {
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return false;
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}
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break;
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case 2:
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if (!is_secure) {
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return false;
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}
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break;
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}
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switch (access_el) {
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case 3:
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case 2:
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if (!hmc) {
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return false;
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}
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break;
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case 1:
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if (extract32(pac, 0, 1) == 0) {
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return false;
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}
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break;
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case 0:
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if (extract32(pac, 1, 1) == 0) {
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return false;
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}
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break;
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default:
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g_assert_not_reached();
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}
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wt = extract64(cr, 20, 1);
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lbn = extract64(cr, 16, 4);
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if (wt && !linked_bp_matches(cpu, lbn)) {
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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static bool check_watchpoints(ARMCPU *cpu)
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{
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CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
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int n;
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/*
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* If watchpoints are disabled globally or we can't take debug
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* exceptions here then watchpoint firings are ignored.
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*/
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if (extract32(env->cp15.mdscr_el1, 15, 1) == 0
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|| !arm_generate_debug_exceptions(env)) {
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return false;
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}
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for (n = 0; n < ARRAY_SIZE(env->cpu_watchpoint); n++) {
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if (bp_wp_matches(cpu, n, true)) {
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return true;
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}
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}
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return false;
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}
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static bool check_breakpoints(ARMCPU *cpu)
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{
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CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
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int n;
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/*
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* If breakpoints are disabled globally or we can't take debug
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* exceptions here then breakpoint firings are ignored.
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*/
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if (extract32(env->cp15.mdscr_el1, 15, 1) == 0
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|| !arm_generate_debug_exceptions(env)) {
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return false;
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}
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for (n = 0; n < ARRAY_SIZE(env->cpu_breakpoint); n++) {
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if (bp_wp_matches(cpu, n, false)) {
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return true;
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}
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}
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return false;
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}
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void HELPER(check_breakpoints)(CPUARMState *env)
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{
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ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env);
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if (check_breakpoints(cpu)) {
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HELPER(exception_internal(env, EXCP_DEBUG));
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}
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}
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bool arm_debug_check_watchpoint(CPUState *cs, CPUWatchpoint *wp)
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{
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/*
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* Called by core code when a CPU watchpoint fires; need to check if this
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* is also an architectural watchpoint match.
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*/
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ARMCPU *cpu = ARM_CPU(cs);
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return check_watchpoints(cpu);
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}
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void arm_debug_excp_handler(CPUState *cs)
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{
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/*
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* Called by core code when a watchpoint or breakpoint fires;
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* need to check which one and raise the appropriate exception.
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*/
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ARMCPU *cpu = ARM_CPU(cs);
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CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
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CPUWatchpoint *wp_hit = cs->watchpoint_hit;
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if (wp_hit) {
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if (wp_hit->flags & BP_CPU) {
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bool wnr = (wp_hit->flags & BP_WATCHPOINT_HIT_WRITE) != 0;
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bool same_el = arm_debug_target_el(env) == arm_current_el(env);
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cs->watchpoint_hit = NULL;
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env->exception.fsr = arm_debug_exception_fsr(env);
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env->exception.vaddress = wp_hit->hitaddr;
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raise_exception(env, EXCP_DATA_ABORT,
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syn_watchpoint(same_el, 0, wnr),
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arm_debug_target_el(env));
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}
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} else {
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uint64_t pc = is_a64(env) ? env->pc : env->regs[15];
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bool same_el = (arm_debug_target_el(env) == arm_current_el(env));
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/*
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* (1) GDB breakpoints should be handled first.
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* (2) Do not raise a CPU exception if no CPU breakpoint has fired,
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* since singlestep is also done by generating a debug internal
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* exception.
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*/
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if (cpu_breakpoint_test(cs, pc, BP_GDB)
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|| !cpu_breakpoint_test(cs, pc, BP_CPU)) {
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return;
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}
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env->exception.fsr = arm_debug_exception_fsr(env);
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/*
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* FAR is UNKNOWN: clear vaddress to avoid potentially exposing
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* values to the guest that it shouldn't be able to see at its
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* exception/security level.
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*/
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env->exception.vaddress = 0;
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raise_exception(env, EXCP_PREFETCH_ABORT,
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syn_breakpoint(same_el),
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arm_debug_target_el(env));
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}
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}
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#if !defined(CONFIG_USER_ONLY)
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vaddr arm_adjust_watchpoint_address(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr, int len)
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{
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ARMCPU *cpu = ARM_CPU(cs);
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CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
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/*
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* In BE32 system mode, target memory is stored byteswapped (on a
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* little-endian host system), and by the time we reach here (via an
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* opcode helper) the addresses of subword accesses have been adjusted
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* to account for that, which means that watchpoints will not match.
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* Undo the adjustment here.
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*/
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if (arm_sctlr_b(env)) {
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if (len == 1) {
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addr ^= 3;
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} else if (len == 2) {
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addr ^= 2;
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}
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}
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return addr;
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}
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#endif
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