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(U//FOUO) SIGINT Helping HUMINT

FROM: HUMINT Support / Support to Operations Branch (S2D31) and Deputy Chief, CIHS's Central Eurasia Division (S2D1) Run Date: 06/13/2005

(TS//SI) In the wake of 9/11, SID has shared more SIGINT-related information with Intelligence Community partners than ever before -- more, in fact, than some ever thought possible. This has been especially true regarding SIGINT support to HUMINT operations. Here's a case in point: In late 2004, the CIA was conducting a major operation against individuals connected to Iran's covert weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. The SID shop that supports HUMINT operations, S2D31, broke new ground in sharing information with CIA, with important results.

(TS//SI) NSA possessed audio files and verbatim transcripts of intercepted conversations between a high-priority HUMINT target and his close family relatives. The material was not only analyzed and reported, but also transmitted in raw form with accompanying analytic comments to CIA with the help of the Special Source Operations' Global Operations Management Division (S3323) and under the guidance of S1's SIGINT Post-Publication Services (S1213). This specially tailored product enabled CIA operatives to positively identify speakers, more effectively assess the mental state of its human assets (i.e. people providing CIA with information) and sub-assets, and advise these assets under conditions which, at times, were truly life-threatening.

(S//SI) In another information-shar	ing endeavor, five Russian lingu	lists from the FBI visited
CIHS (Counter Intelligence and HUN	4INT Support - S2D) in Februar	y 2005 to listen to intercept
of a Russ	sian communicat	tions system
Having already identified some pers	onnel	the FBI
linguists hoped to be able to identify	y the voices	heard on this channel.
Although the linguists were unable t	to confirm the identities	, they were
able to use what they heard to rule out some suspected communicators. Additionally, they were		
able to confirm some of their observ	vations about the	

(U//FOUO) These two examples show how invaluable access to SIGINT -- once rarely shared outside SIGINT channels -- can be for agencies like the CIA and FBI. The S2 operations staff has recently streamlined and simplified the process for sharing information with external IC partners. Type "go infoshare" in your internal browser for more details.

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